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Abstract
Insurgent guerrilla groups are on occasion faced with difficult decisions: whether and when to become a conventional force, and whether to defend an operational base or fixed site. Standard doctrine suggests that to achieve state capture or acquire autonomous status apart from a central authority, the ability to successfully engage in conventional warfare may became necessary. A conventional force must be capable of defending territory, a defined space. Accompanying the decision to defend territory is a certain level of risk. This article examines the decision by four insurgent organizations to defend ‘operational hubs’, territory deemed worthy of a defense. The analysis herein submits that in insurgent warfare the utility of the territory being defended often supersedes the likelihood of a successful defense, on occasion generating negative outcomes for the insurgent forces.
Notes on contributor
Albert Harris has taught International Relations and International Law in the US for 25 years. His published work includes articles in the journals Cooperation and Conflict, International Negotiations, Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Negotiation Journal, and the Journal of Conflict Studies. His current scholarly interest has a concentration in the area of civil war and insurgency. Professor Harris welcomes correspondence pertaining to developments in the sub-field of civil war and insurgency.
Notes
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