Response

Andrew Chesterman argues that ideas about translation need to be assessed “in a universalistic context” regardless of their “context of discovery”, on the grounds that “all scientific endeavour is intrinsically universalist”. Amidst repeated references to the sciences, not once does he question the applicability of this approach to human social phenomena and hence translation. Although systematic knowledge of translation can be gained through observation, certain aspects (e.g. its cultural embeddedness and the creative elements) do not lend themselves to a scientific approach, which by definition seeks to identify the operation of general laws. Only late in the paper does Chesterman acknowledge diverging views on translation studies (TS) – as “an empirical human science” (emphasis added; his argument, though, is based on ideas from the natural and social sciences) or “a hermeneutic discipline” – but he concludes that regarding TS as both might further divide the field. Yet interdisciplinary approaches bring many benefits, and opting for only one of these would be detrimental to TS. Chesterman does belatedly concede that “translation is a cultural phenomenon”, so why this insistence on evaluation on a purely scientific basis, when context and subject position are so vital in analyzing cultural phenomena? Although scientific methods certainly have a place in the humanities, this does not preclude other approaches.

Chesterman recognizes that the term “universals” is “misleading” in the translation context. Importantly, he acknowledges that “[o]ur mistake has been to assume too quickly that the tendencies or regularities we have found might really be ‘universal’.” This is precisely the argument made by “relativists”. Case closed. The “search for patterns and generalizations” is on firmer ground, since typical does not mean ubiquitous (although generalizations still need substantiation). Yet in life and art it is often the irregular and atypical that suggest creative, thought-provoking new approaches.

The “typical” differences between source and target texts cited by Chesterman (e.g. interference, explicitation and increasing standardization) are qualitatively different from differences in translation across cultures. Historical evidence clearly shows that certain practices (e.g. team translation; “translation” by monolinguals aided by bilingual informants), functions (e.g. as a means of disseminating simplified language, as with plain Ottoman, or reviving and expanding a classical language for modern use, as with Hebrew) and conceptualizations (e.g. as “cannibalization” in Brazil or as pouring into a differently shaped container in the Philippines) of translation are not universal or even typical. The preconceptions, experiences and intellectual concerns that inform translation are at least in part specific to particular historical and cultural contexts, so conclusions based on a subset of cultures are likely to lack broader validity. Thus, for instance, it is problematic to equate translation with translation in the “West” (itself a construct masking internal diversity), despite the valuable contributions made by translations and translation scholars from various Western cultures. Practices, functions and conceptualizations originating in the West might seem natural and self-evident when one is immersed in a Western culture, yet that is not necessarily so when they are viewed from outside the mainstream, a position that lends itself to greater self-reflexivity. Why is it that non-Western practices and ideas of translation are regarded as particular to their sites of origin yet the same lens is not applied to Western practices and ideas?

It is indeed in the nature of a theory to “generalize as far as possible” beyond particular cases. Yet once theories cannot adequately explain certain instances or phenomena, they need to be refined, supplemented or even rejected. A more inclusive approach to the study of translation will help confirm or modify existing theories and hypotheses and perhaps generate new ones, allowing for sounder and more nuanced explanations. Postcolonial theories, which largely originated in non-Western contexts (particularly India), have already contributed to a greater understanding of translation in contexts of unequal power. Situated analyses of particular contexts can thus contain implications that transcend the item being investigated and can modulate more macroscopic claims. I agree that testing specific hypotheses in different contexts might lead to more general hypotheses that are applicable “to any case where a given set of conditions is met.” This is one rationale for multi-archival research and a greater focus on local contexts. A focus on the particular also retains the livedness of translation practices.

Chesterman concedes that some current assumptions in TS “look doubtful in the face of evidence from translation practices that have so far been little studied”, and he acknowledges the value of taking the particular context into account when evaluating hypotheses – yet he contradictorily and ahistorically argues for assessing hypotheses “in a universalist context”. Although he is right in saying that the appropriate response is to test assumptions on pertinent data of any origin, the key here is relevance. Western theories and practices have already permeated (i.e. become relevant in) many non-Western cultures, so it is valid to test their appropriateness in these new contexts – just as culturally inflected ideas originating in non-Western cultures should be subject to similar testing if they seek or gain a broader foothold or make unfounded claims to “universality”. But that is not the case. The goal of relativists is not to find theories or practices that are “general” or to encourage different centrisms, but to “enlarge” (to borrow Tymoczko's [2007] term) our understanding so as to include practices and ideas that seem less general (though further study might reveal that they are in fact more widespread than currently known). Chesterman is misrepresenting relativists when he says they suppose that non-Western assumptions and ideas are “valid for translation universally”. And emotive claims about a relativist approach taking us “back to Nazi or Stalinist science” are not constructive.

Whereas universalists emphasize core similarities, relativists additionally seek what lies beyond this core – i.e. differences. The two focuses are valid and complementary. Chesterman overstates the case in claiming that relativism sees only differences; it would be just as “naive” to focus solely on similarities, as he acknowledges. Culture-specific practices and notions of translation merit study not on the essentialist grounds of their origins, but because “they are, quite simply, different” (emphasis in original). Whereas universalism erases “other people's subjectivities and cultural practices” (Dirlik 2013, 35) in its search for commonalities, differences extend and deepen our understanding of translation-related thinking and praxis. The more local contexts we study, the better we will be able to identify underlying regularities and significant differences and address fundamental questions about translation.

Chesterman rightly emphasizes the importance of both top-down and bottom-up approaches and recognizes that starting with a limited claim and exploring its range of application is a “standard” procedure – yet he critiques those who adopt a bottom-up approach. There remains much scope for testing general (top-down) claims and their “range of useful application” against particular cases or “generating potential generalizations from particular cases”. Testing hypotheses on large or random samples is recommended practice, and the lopsidedness in terms of the contexts on which TS has long been based runs counter to this and biases the findings. Non-Western realities and conceptualizations do not necessarily (seek to) offer “solutions to some current trends that challenge the development of translation theory”, but they do contribute to a more accurate representation of present-day and past translation around the world and can therefore help recalibrate the discourse on translation.

It is worth considering whether the spread of Western ideas and practices of translation is the result of inherent merit and/or universal applicability, or a function of historical power relations. Chesterman acknowledges that the debate raises issues of “institutional power and democracy”. This is the ethical dimension of some of the inequities of scholarship. Dirlik (2013, 23) even suggests that resistance to presumptions of universalism might be directed as much at how foreign hegemony threatens “to deprive the local of its identity” as at “the specific content of Euro/American culture”. Yet there are unresolved issues of substance in TS that go beyond identity politics.

Boyden (2011, 178) suggests that calls to make TS more inclusive have in fact mainly emerged in the West. It is ironical that none of the ten keynote speakers at three conferences in 2013 related to rethinking TS or power in the field (in Wales in September, South Korea the following month, and the Low Countries in November) are from non-Western translation cultures or specialize in their study (with the borderline exception of one Turkish scholar). Although this surge of interest in re-envisioning TS is welcome, without greater representation from “minor” cultures it risks smacking of trendiness or even appropriation of the “Other”. Conversely, the apparent “semi-silence” on the part of some non-Western scholars (at least in the literature available in European languages) in relation to the field's neglect of non-mainstream traditions might reflect not only a drifting away from their cultural and intellectual predecessors, but also an internalization of Western norms and perceptions (including that of Western superiority) and a concomitant aspiration to emulate the mainstream. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that alternatives to central standards can remain tied to or parasitic on the values or practices they seek to resist.

Chesterman notes the lack of a widely accepted definition of translation and calls for “a standardized terminology”. I would argue that a standard definition (whose standard?) would overlook subtle differences and that cultures have the right to define translation in their own way – even though this complicates matters for researchers.

Admittedly, a focus on local alternatives does entail risks. One example is authoritarian societies' use of an emphasis on tradition or local values to stifle progress and resist “outside” ideas. Cultural self-assertion and the recuperation of alternatives should not signify a retreat into nostalgia or a denial of commonalities (Dirlik 2013, 37). To avoid the risk of fragmentation, the onus of demonstrating the nature, value and potentially broader implications of practices and conceptualizations that are localized in time and space lies with relativists. For their part, universalists at least have a responsibility to keep an open mind. And there is more common ground here than might be immediately apparent. I agree with Chesterman that “an imaginative openness to alternative hypotheses, alternative interpretations” does not mean “abandoning a critical attitude”.

Levi (1992, 109) argues that the problem is how to “elaborate a paradigm which hinges on knowledge of the particular whilst not rejecting formal description and scientific knowledge of the particular itself.” How then can we link and reconcile the particular and the “general”? One approach is to avoid this dichotomy by focusing on their interactions and shifting focus as appropriate to the study of a specific research question – “By means of this principle, the local comes to be a ‘particular modulation’ of the global and, at the same time, a ‘different’ version of macro-social realities” (Werner and Zimmerman 2006, 42).

We stand to lose a great deal intellectually if we insist on the universal or typical at the expense of the situated and particular. Instead we need a meta-discourse that is attentive to site-based practices and debates and brings them together to identify genuine commonalities and differences, historicizing translation practices and thinking and recognizing specificity without reifying difference in an unproductive manner. This has the potential to augment our understanding of translation and its complexities and to make TS less hierarchical.

Note on contributor

Judy Wakabayashi is professor of Japanese translation at Kent State University. She is co-editor of Asian Translation Traditions (2005), Decentering Translation Studies: India and Beyond (2009) and Translation and Translation Studies in the Japanese Context (2012).