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ABSTRACT
Understanding the contemporary identity-role construction of small states in South-East Europe is closely linked to the process of reshaping the relative geometry of regional influence of the EU-centre and its powerful marginal actors. This has become increasingly obvious since 2008 with the unraveling of the global economic crisis, Russia’s revived influence in the region, and the crisis of EU enlargement − processes that are usually perceived as challenges to the prevalent European conception of order. This paper seeks to explore the interaction of more powerful actors from both the European ‘ center’ and its ‘margins’ with the small states on the South-East margin, by developing the framework that builds on Noel Parker’s theory of ‘positive marginality’ and the updated ‘constellation theory’ by Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel. Theoretically, I propose the concepts of ‘marginality constellation’, ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ margins, to understand how small states frame their understanding of agency in world politics more broadly. Empirically, the paper delves into Croatia’s and Serbia’s foreign policies from 2014 on, to illustrate how the two countries manage their foreign policy identity narratives to respond to the shifting geopolitical centre-margin discourses of the EU and Russia in light of the crisis in Ukraine.
Acknowledgments
The preparation of this manuscript has been done as part of my work on the project ‘Political Identity of Serbia in Regional and Global Context’, No. 179076 at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, and was financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. I would like to thank special issue editors Sandra Dias Fernandes and Andrey Makarychev and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments concerning the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author
Notes
1. For a pregnant critique of the relationship between EU and Russia, see this observation by Sergei Medvedev from 2008: “The key problem will remain the systemic incompatibility between a semi-authoritarian Russia bent on ‘sovereignty’ and ‘hard power’, and the EU integration machine, with its ‘bureaucratic imperialism’, which is structurally incapable of accommodating a Russia disinclined to submit itself to integrationist pressures. Unless significant changes occur in Russia’s internal and external policy, as well as in the EU’s approach to Russia, their relationship will remain stagnant and crisis-prone”, Medvedev Citation2008, 227.
2. See Keil and Stahl Citation2014 for an overview of post-Yugoslav foreign policies.
3. Visković Citation2018 differentiates between four types of foreign policy determinants: historical, international environment, domestic (societal) system, and idiosyncratic. Also, marginal positioning can be related to the literatures on hierarchy in IR and small states status seeking (cf. Zarakol Citation2017a, ed; de Carvalho and Neumann Citation2015, eds).
4. In literature, there are various approaches to discursive positioning of the Balkans. Most notable are Maria Todorova’s (Citation2009) work on the Balkanist discourse, and Milica Bakić-Hayden’s (Citation2006) concept of “nesting orientialisms”. Also, see Kovačević Citation2016.
5. See Guzzini Citation2012 for a critique of geopolitical discourse in Europe. Visković (Citation2018) outlines the concept of foreign policy determinants (factors) that seem plausible for small states.
6. For Mouritzen and Wivel (Citation2005, 27), “EU affiliation is the primary factor determining European states” influence-capability and action space. NATO affiliation is also seen as important, but secondary in comparison”.
7. “The dynamics of the margins (their relationships, motives, and potential), and their impact upon the spaces that centers construct, show margins not only as constructed by centers, but also constructive in the overall center-and-margin order”, Parker (Citation2008, 10). For the expansion of the international society at the European periphery, see Ejdus Citation2017, ed.
8. Buden (Citation2012) for the :end of the transition paradigm”, also Jović Citation2010 and Jović and Lamont Citation2010.
9. Cf. European Union Citation2016, 33; Russian Federation Citation2015, pt. 107.
10. Compare this with the more general explanation of the Constellation theory in Mouritzen and Wivel Citation2005), 14−38.
11. “A problem that needs to be addressed here is how the nature of the relationship within the constellation, which is mostly seen as power-asymmetric, can be translated in terms of identity and marginal tactics to understand what Parker terms ‘options for gain’“ (Parker Citation2008, 13−14).
12. Cf. Zarakol Citation2017a for hierarchies and de Carvalho and Neumann Citation2015 for small state status seeking in IR.
13. Those are: 1) obtaining loyalty rewards, 2) obtaining intermediation rewards, 3) competing for rewards in “2”, 4) playing one center off another, 5) manifest emulation, 6) rent-seeking as payment for movement in or out of the center’s space, 7) guaranteeing order beyond the centre’s sphere, 8) asserting relative autonomy on the margin, 9) competitive emulation, 10) developing onself as an alternative center, 11) legitimating onself by difference, and 12) redefining others (Parker Citation2008, 13−16).
14. As Mouritzen and Wivel (Citation2005, 30) specify, outsiders’ autonomy and influence capability are highly context-dependent, whereas the would-be insiders have “the lowest influence capability and the most restricted autonomy”, and want to imitate the insiders. On the other hand, the near-core insiders’ autonomy is limited by the EU norms they get to co-shape.
15. “The would-be insiders are potential EU member states, in that they see membership as desirable and realistic, be it in the near or mid-term future (a decade). The outsiders are those that either do not want membership in the first place (‘voluntary outsiders’), or realize that their possibilities of obtaining it are negligible within the nearest decade or so (‘resigned outsiders’). Finally, there may be those who, in spite of pessimistic prospects, do nurture some wishful thinking (‘aspiring outsiders’)”, Mouritzen and Wivel Citation2005, 27.
16. For “EU-scepticism”, “EU-enthusiasm”, and “EU-indifferentism” in the Western Balkans, see Jović Citation2018b.
17. For example, since 2015 there have been a decreasing number of foreign policy statements that are harmonized with the EU CFSP, due to the support for the non-EU countries that did not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
18. Cf. Lindstrom Citation2008 for “selective appropriation” tactic in the region.
19. Three determinants of Serbia–Russia relations are Russia’s energy sources, Russian support for Serbia over the issue of Kosovo, and coordination of positions on international issues. Cf. Petrović Citation2009 15. “Some authors would characterize this policy as being based on “mythical understanding of relations between Russia and Serbia’ (Đukanović Citation2015, 94) that has been advanced mostly under former President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić. For emotions and identity in Serbia’s foreign policy toward Russia, see, for example, Patalakh Citation2018.
20. Tass Citation2017.
21. Cf. Kovačević Citation2015. Also, Ejdus Citation2014 on Serbia’s neutrality and conflict in Ukraine.
22. ‘Serbian President said that he had ‘never heard Putin object to Serbia’s wish to join the EU.’ He admitted that Serbia’s ‘joining NATO would become a problem for Russia, but this issue is not under consideration because Serbia wants to remain militarily neutral,” Tass Citation2018a.
23. “It is also interesting to note that, after joining the EU, issues related to Europe and the European Union have disappeared from the Croatian political agenda…”, Jović Citation2018a.
24. Cf. Kovačević Citation2016; Petrović Citation2012.
25. In the Russian political discourse, the CEE states are often regarded as “dwarf states” (karlikovye gosudarstva). See Kazharski CitationForthcoming.
26. This rhetorical perspective is offered, for example, by Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva (BNT Citation2018). Also see Tcherneva Citation2017. Some media also use the metaphor of Serbia as Europe’s “living room”: B92 Citation2017a.
