‘Italy’s involvement in PSO: between self-interest and the logic of appropriateness’

ABSTRACT

What factors shape a state’s willingness to get involved in Peace Support Operations (PSO), a notoriously risky and costly activity? Do states contribute personnel out of a desire to support the cosmopolitan values embodied in PSO, or out of self-interested behaviour? Are those decisions based on normative, rule-based motivations, or rather on instrumental calculations of national interest? The end of the Cold War opened up new policy options for decision-makers, with Rome showing a strong determination to be more active in that field. Italy purposefully developed a reputation as a security provider, building, along the process, a distinct external self-identity as a natural ‘peace-maker’. Which factors explain Italy’s evolution from its early guarded support to UN (United Nations) peacekeeping operations, to its current rate of participation? This article argues that Italy makes instrumental use of PSO to gain international visibility and upgrade its ranking, but its strategic narrative, when addressing the general public, relies on a secondary script that adheres to the rhetoric of cosmopolitan rules that prevail in multilateral settings.

KEYWORDS:

• Italy
• PSO
• peacekeeping
• self-interests
• logic of consequences
• logic of appropriateness

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. This article builds on a previous published work: ‘The Rationale of Small and Medium-Sized States for Involvement in PSO: The Case of Italy and Portugal’, European University Institute, EUI RSCAS; 2017/15, ISSN: 1028-3625, 2017.

2. Often, the governmental interpretation is not shared by all political actors, namely by the opposition parties. Such divergences are mirrored in the contents of parliamentary debates (Ignazi, Giampiero, and Coticchia 2012). There is also a disconnect between the official script and the interpretation by public opinion on the aims and role of the operations.

3. Before the ISAF, Italy´s major contribution was the ‘Nibbio’ Mission, within the framework of the US-led, counterterror mission OEF. Its participation in that operation started in October 2000 and ended in December 2006.

4. Currently renamed Train Advise and Assist Command (TAAC).

5. Thanks to Rome’s effort to assure the continuity of the Air Policing mission over the Baltic Republics, for the first time an Italian general was appointed commander of the Joint Force Command of Brunssum, one of NATO’s most coveted military posts (Marrone and Camporini 2016, 7).

6. Italy’s election as a non-permanent member for the 2007–2008 period occurred after it volunteered to strengthen the UNIFIL.

7. The pacifist frame has practical implications, as it negatively affects the definition of the RoE, caveats, the training and equipment (Coticchia and Giacomello 2011, 151).

Additional information

Funding

This study was conducted at Research Center in Political Science [UID/CPO/00758/2013]; University of Minho and supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Tecnology (FCT) and the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science through national funds, as well as by POPH (Programa Operacional Potencial Humano), and the European Social Fund/FSE (European Union).