EU Eastern Partnership, Ontological Security and EU- Ukraine/Russian warfare

ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyse security within Europe’s Eastern Partnership as perceived from the outside – notably by Russia. It analyses the impact of Russia’s security on European security thinking in its Eastern Partnership through the lens of ontological security. Russia’s relationship with the West, based on its ontological security fears, is characterised by the collective trauma and stigma of USSR disintegration. Europe’s ontological security anxiety and fear in its relationship with Russia is caused by the wars in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Russia’s hybrid warfare. The ontological security interaction in the Eastern Neighbourhood has had two effects: (1) it heightened Putin’s emphasis on the protection of spiritual, cultural and national identity and how the stigma of territorial loss plays a strategic role on the ability to build Russian collective identity reflexively; and (2) Russia has aimed at a re-construction of Europe along different geopolitical lines, whereby Dugin’s Eurasian views have shaped Putin’s discourse. This article analyses the EU’s policy and practices following the war in Ukraine (in two phases in 2014 and 2022) in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• Eastern partnership
• Russia
• Ontological security
• Sanction regime

Introduction

The aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR opened a perspective of brighter days for a new Europe. The thirst to develop a closer relationship with its closest neighbours, and the idea of allowing other countries to integrate with the EU was not a myriad anymore. The fortunate winds unlocked a political opportunity that led to the accession negotiations with several countries between 2003 and 2005, particularly triggered by the aspiration of being the key promoters of stability and prosperity of the region. Between the aspirations and the implementation, the Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004, encountered many obstacles, especially in the East. Launched in Prague in May 2009, the Eastern Partnership, integrating Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, soon met with several obstacles. Although the initial plan was objectively designed within a discourse of stability and prosperity, soon was reviewed and replaced by a plan whose core word is resilience. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) launched in June 2016 called for the need of ‘a strong European Union like never before’ and opened the ontological security debate about ‘the European project’ which, in the words of Federica Mogherini (former High Representative and Vice-President of the EU Commission) had ‘brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy’ and was now ‘being questioned’ (EEAS 2016).

The concept of resilience, under EUGS, was rapidly absorbed by the policy agenda, according to Tocci (Tocci 2020), although it was differently captured by the security and development and humanitarian policy stakeholders. Within the security and defence arena, resilience was intrinsically connected with the idea of resistance and endurance (Tocci 2020). For the purpose of this article, this is particularly relevant as we seek to understand how resilience has been an underlying key concept when examining how EU portrays itself towards Russia and, on the other hand, how Russia behaves towards the EU when analysing this relationship through the lens of the Ukraine as an ontological battlefield.

The Eastern partnership – a ring of (almost) friends

The ENP has been developed, since 2003, with the ambition to create a ‘ring of friends’, that is an area of political stability, security and economic prosperity, comprising the countries situated to the east (that is, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and the south of the EU (that is, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia) (Commision of the European Communities 2003). Thus, one of the aims of the ENP has been to foster security cooperation. Almost two decades after the launch of the ENP, results have been mixed. Cooperation, notably in the field of security, has not advanced as much as it had been envisaged in the ENP official documents (Kaunert and Léonard 2011). Moreover, the international environment, notably in the EU’s neighbourhood, has considerably changed since the ENP was launched. Political developments, such as the Arab uprisings in the south, and the war in Ukraine in the east, have led some observers to argue that the EU is now surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’, rather than a ‘ring of friends’ (Economist 2014). As a result, the importance of security concerns on the EU’s agenda has been strengthened.

In December 2021, before the second invasion of Ukraine, the 27 EU Member States met for the EaP Summit in Brussels with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with the hope of reviving the ties between the EU and the EaP. Nonetheless, the tensions with Russia were already escalating, and most of the discussion was dominated by the real possibility of Russian aggression towards Ukraine (European Council 2021) Several bilateral meetings with the US, France, NATO and other EU member states, were held in the weeks preceding the EaP Summit to discuss economic sanctions if Ukraine’s territorial integrity was not respected (Fitzpatrick 2021; NATO 2021; Query 2021). The Summit revealed the fragility of the relationship between the EU and the EaP and highlighted the lack of EU policy entrepreneurship over the last years to consolidate its presence within the region. Belarus did not participate, a movement already foreseen given the close relationship between President Lukashenko and Moscow, and the unilateral Belarussian suspension, in early June 2021, to continue to engage with the EaP. Despite this, in the final document, the representatives of EaP countries leaders emphasised the need to cultivate the principles of the EaP built on ‘common fundamental values, mutual interests and shared ownership, responsibility, inclusivity, differentiation and mutual accountability’ (European Council 2021), and to continue to foster resilience, in reality the impact of Russian aggressive pressure across these countries was already visible.

The impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the EU’s Eastern Partnership has been significant, in particular because it significantly impacted the EU’s relationship with Russia. Zwolski (Zwolski 2017) outlined the two competing positions derived from this debate: firstly, Europe ‘threatened by expansionist Russia’ which is linked to more assertive EU responses to this threat. Sakwa (Sakwa 2015) links this with the idea of wider Europe, and EU subsumed in a wider Atlantic community. Secondly, the EU could become more ‘inclusive towards Russia’, which Sakwa (Sakwa 2015) links to the idea of greater Europe, involving Russia, but also Turkey and Ukraine as concentric circles. Zwolski underlines the implications of these two competing visions: on the one hand, Russia, has become expansionist despite efforts by the EU and NATO to develop closer ties. This suggests for the EU to stand up to Russia’s bullying neighbouring countries, outlined by the 2015 House of Lords review on the future of EU-Russia relations (House of Lords 2015). This is further emphasised by other academic works, such as Matthijs and Kelemen (2015), who note that ‘a resurgent Russia on Europe’s doorstep has finally spurred the EU to action’ (House of Lords 2015, 100), or Auer and Howorth and Menon (Auer 2015; Howorth and Menon 2015). On the other hand, Russia is portrayed as a victim of the European and Euro-Atlantic expansionism (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Kissinger 2014; Milne 2014). The EU, in this argumentation, must become more receptive to Russia’s legitimate security concerns (Sakwa 2015). Sakwa even blames Europe for systematically ignoring Russia’s attempts to create a new, more inclusive institutional co-operative frameworks. For Sakwa, Europe is ‘dead’ (Sakwa 2015).

Seeking to understand how anxieties and fears have been shaping the EU’s and Russia’s policy agenda within the Eastern Neighbourhood, in particular towards Ukraine, this article proceeds as follows: firstly, it will examine the relationship between Europe and Russia through an ontological security lens to dissect how fears and anxieties from both sides have been articulated throughout the Ukrainian war (in two phases from 2014 to 2022 onwards). This includes the rebirth of the great Russian ontology as a strategy with Eurasian ambitions. Furthermore, this article examines the interaction between the EU and Russia throughout the war in Ukraine (2014 and 2022 onwards), and how these new elements are a constant threat to the maintenance of the stability and resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Europe and Russia: an ontological security analysis

The use of ontological security, developed over the last 10 years in International Relations, has proved to be of help to better understand the emotional reasons behind the apprehensions and fears of European citizens (Steele 2008). Steele’s book builds on previous work on ontological security, such as Jennifer Mitzen (Mitzen 2006), Catarina Kinnvall (Kinnvall 2004), and Jef Huysmans (Huysmans 1998). The concept is based on Giddens’ definition of ontological security – a ‘sense of continuity and order in events’. Steele operationalises ontological security through the motivation of states. Firstly, for a state ‘to be ontologically secure’ it must ‘possess answers to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses (Steele 2008, pp. 50–51). Secondly, agents turn actions into ‘routines which contribute to their sense of “continuity and order” that is so important to their sense of self’ (ibid). Ontological security is thus ‘predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities’ (ibid). Ontological Security presents a specific type of challenge – a ‘critical situation’ — and can undermine a state’s identity (ibid, p. 2–3). It can cause anxiety and shame. Thus, unlike the Copenhagen School definition of security as survival, ontological security is ‘security as being’, a concept borrowed from the field of social psychology. The concept of ontological security is primarily driven by emotion; ‘the primary role of emotion in humans is to alert the individual experiencing the emotion that action in some situation is necessary (ibid, p. 12–13)’. Thus, emotions help coordination actions by prioritizing a selection of information.

Ontological security cornerstone is the analysis of autobiographical narratives and routines and how they are used as vehicles to exhale one’s anxiety (Mitzen 2006). It was also applied the ontological security lens to analyze narratives and better conceptualize and understand how different perceptions and experiences of menaces to public security fluctuate according to identity, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, location, and generation. Moreover, according to Catarina Kinnvall (2004), an ontological security approach allows us to unveil how fears and anxieties influence groups, states and to understand the psycho-socio-political effects that shape political movements, policy debate at the security level (Kinnvall 2004). Ontological security seeks, therefore, to dissect biographical narratives and repeated practices as way to understand how these practices outline political choices and its consequences. Despite the fact that physical and ontological security are theoretically different, they are nonetheless intrinsically related. Traumatic events such as being victim of violent crimes, being a victim of terrorist attacks or subject to harsh physical traumas, may transform negatively personal and collective identities and unleash the feeling of ontological insecurity. Allied to the analysis of the discourses and practices, ontological security emerges as an auspicious theoretical and empirical input not only to this particular project within the security studies arena, but similarly opens the door to novel theoretical and methodological approaches with the security studies in general acknowledging providing a more holistic approach to answer research questions. Issues related to the emergence of ontological (in) security are mainly related to the search for a self-identity that can emotionally structure the individual within its community. It turns out that when all that is socially known and inherently acquired, and when routines are disrupted, there is a destabilization and a shudder of all that gives the individual and the society where he is inserted, a sense of solidity and confidence, paving the way for ontological insecurity.

The next part of this article will establish first Russia’s ontological security, its ‘sense of continuity and order in events’. (Steele 2008), whereby it provides for the ‘predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities’ (ibid). This is very significant because a ‘critical situation’ or ‘crisis’, such as the wars in Georgia or Ukraine, can undermine a state’s identity (ibid, p. 2–3). As will be shown in this section, this provides for the ‘predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities’ (ibid). Ontological security here is primarily driven by emotions, which help by prioritizing a selection of information that fits in the interpretive frame of individuals. According to Bavel (Bavel et al. 2020), the primary emotional response during an existential crisis is fear, which can make threats appear more urgent. Psychologically, fears can change people’s behaviour if they feel capable of dealing with the threat but leads to ‘defensive reactions when they feel helpless to act’ (ibid). Moreover, people often display an ‘optimism bias’ (ibid); they believe that bad things are more likely to happen to others than oneself, which leads people to underestimate their likelihood of negative consequences. The emotional reaction to fear and threat also affects how people feel about and react to others, notably out-groups, which leads to higher levels of ethnocentrism, greater intolerance, less empathy and negative attitudes toward out-groups (ibid). A crucial consequence of these emotional reactions is political polarisation (ibid): (1) attitudinal polarization through taking extreme opposing issue positions, and (2) affective polarization, involving disliking and distrusting views from the opposing parties.

(a) Eurasianism and Russian ontological security fears

In fact, the two competing visions of EU-Russia relations by Zwolski (2017) are the ontological security fears, seen either from the EU’s point of view, or from Russia’s point of view. Zwolski (2017) outlined the two visions: firstly, Europe ‘threatened by expansionist Russia’, and, secondly, the EU as more ‘inclusive towards Russia’ (Sakwa 2015). On the one hand, Russia, as an expansionist power. On the other hand, Russia as a victim of European expansionism. These are the classic fear dilemmas – who has threatened whom first? This perception has deeper geopolitical manifestation in one of the main Russian intellectual legacies – Eurasianism. For this teleological movement, Russia is the organizing unit of the Eurasian space, playing a role of natural preponderance in the political direction of the region. Despite the different theoretical perspectives within it ideologues such as Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Alekseev, Zyuganov, Primakov, Prokhanov, Dugin, have a core role identifying a common paradigm: the idea that, due to a geographically distinctive condition, the manifest Russian destiny is the reason for the Russian historical process itself. Inspired by the pan-Slavist movement of the late 19th century, classical Eurasianism, born in the 1920s, considered Russia an intermediate continent, a homogeneous mass, distinct from both Asia and Europe and which, despite combining elements of both, it essentially constituted a cultural melting point for the Slavic and Turkmen population. This syncretism would then be the basis for specific Russian ethnicity.

The Soviet disintegration of the 1990s created a power vacuum in the heart of Eurasia and promoted the recovery of Eurasianist geopolitical thinking. The renewed importance given to geopolitics by the new Russian elites represented a form of rupture in the metapolitical perception and the overcoming of the Soviet paradigm. As Dugin points out, any attempt to save the old ‘Great Soviet Space’ or the idea of a ‘second world’ between North and South is bound to fail because it goes against the polarization inherent in modern geopolitics (Auer 2015). According to Tsygankov: ‘[a] the opposite of the communists, whose dream is to restore the Soviet Union, and of the nationalists, who aim at building Greater Russia as an ideal, […] the Eurasianists favor the idea of an “Eurasian empire”, unlike the Russian and Soviet Empires, built by strengthening geopolitical power and building a Turkish-Slavic community’ (Tsygankov 1998, 337).

In the 1990s, Eurasianism functioned mainly as an aggregating paradigm for a certain coalition between communists and the extreme right that opposed the pro-Western liberal position, seen as harmful to the autonomy and interests of the Russian state. Thus, Eurasianist theory provided an immediate response to the main challenges facing Russia with a chaotic transition and the degradation of its international status. Based on classical works, such as Savitsky’s and Florovsky’s Exodus to the East (Florovsky 1996), and more recent, such as Zyuganov’s The Geography of Victory (1998), Eurasianism owes its success to its hybrid character, being seen as a third way of politics Russian. Referring to those two works, Charles Clover clearly illustrates the plasticity of this geopolitical paradigm when he notes that: ‘Eurasianism therefore has the capacity to be imperial without being nationalist, messianic without being excessively chauvinistic […] absorbing everything that is radical in the effervescent melting pot of post-Soviet thinking’ (Clover 2009).

Internal instability, hesitations about the political-economic model to follow and the search for geopolitical reorientation marked the transition period, resulting in a strategic uncertainty that reflected the retreat of Russia’s borders and power factors. As Brzezinksi said, the collapse of the Russian Empire created a power vacuum in the heart of Eurasia, the geopolitical rupture was exacerbated by the internal social crisis, and Russia saw its international status deteriorate rapidly, becoming considered little more than a regional Third World power (Brzezinski 2016, 88). To get back on the international stage, Putin’s Russia was forced to re-imagine its identity around a new shared future. Inevitably, the more malleable the post-Soviet Russia’s identity, the easier it would be to define pragmatic objectives adapted to the new challenges of the State, society and ruling elites. The geopolitical framework designed within Eurasianism reinforces this, a hybrid character that allowed the Russian State to justify the renewed assertiveness and, at the same time, accomplish one of the tacit functions of all geopolitical theories – to justify power projects. The new Eurasianism thus presents itself both as a civilizational alternative to the Russian collective destiny, separate from the West, as a polarizing alternative in the international system capable of challenging the Western hegemonic model.

In the most recent formulation given to him by Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism today represents a fundamental part of the contestation of Western capitalist hegemony for a certain multipolarism, not in the name of the return to a bipolar world, but of a radically different Weltanschauung (worldview): “Multipolarism is not opposed to unipolarity from a single ideology capable of claiming a second pole, but it does so from multiple ideologies, cultures, worldviews and religions that (each for specific reasons) have nothing in common with Western liberal capitalism (Dugin 2013). Thus, this multipolarism is conceived as a vector of the ‘geopolitics of land mass’ as opposed to the ‘geopolitics of maritime mass’ and, therefore, antithesis of ‘monopolarity’ in all its aspects: hard (imperialism, neoconservatism and direct domination of States), soft (multilateralism) and criticism (alterglobalism, postmodernism and neomarxism). On the one hand, Dugin presents Eurasianism as political philosophy that combines tradition, modernity and elements of what he calls original postmodernism. On the other hand, it is treated with a project of economic and strategic integration in the north of the Eurasian continent. It is a concept of a geopolitical nature, materialized in the Eurasian blueprint, but with implications that go beyond the geostrategic field and extend to the ideological, philosophical, sociological and political fields. Furthermore, it is always seen by Dugin as the basis for a multipolar response to the challenges of modernity and to offer them ‘an adequate response in view of geopolitical, civilizational, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities’ (Dugin 2013, 14).

(b) The Great Russian Ontology

To interpret the new assertiveness of Russian foreign policy, it is necessary to revisit the main paradigms of Russian identity. The symbolic construction of Russian identity includes elements as varied as: the imperial and Eurasian vocation, the messianism and the heritage of the Third Rome, the patrimonial, paternalistic and collectivist tradition of power, as well as the ambivalence of its international orientation, guided by periods of proximity and distance from the West, and a strong mark of Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism as geopolitical matrices (Laruelle 2008; Tydlitátová n.d.). It is also this amalgamation that justifies the pragmatism of concrete political options. From these elements, the idea of Russian exceptionalism (spetsifika) is reinforced, that is, Russia as a distinct and distinctive entity.

In the case of Russia, whenever the identity debate has resurfaced, the West has played the role of the ‘Other’ (Evans 2008). This image not only created a duality between the West and Russia, which led to their mutual constitution based on contrasted images, but it also facilitated the identification of answers to the question ‘Who are we and where do we stand?’. Together, the current recourse to Russian exceptionalism serves as an instrument of foreign policy, justifying the logic of contesting Western hegemony and legitimizing renewed political-military assertiveness. As stated by Richard Sakwa: ‘The symmetrical image of neo-revisionism Russian, made possible by its re-emergence as a preponderant actor in the international system, is in the attempt by other States to treat Russia as “other”, based on its history of geopolitical exceptionalism’ (Sakwa 2011, 934).

‘Russia is the protector of the territorial integrity of each of the post-Soviet countries. […] Countries in the region adjacent to Russia can preserve their territorial integrity only if they maintain good relations with Russia’ (Dugin 2013). The spatial dynamics of the Russian ethos has been recovered by Putin, and the wars in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) demonstrate this well. This dynamic is the same that drives the pursuit of an ‘independent foreign policy’ capable of supporting the ‘anti-hegemonic aspirations’ of the Russian state. In 2012, in a speech on the theme ‘Russia and the changing world’, Vladimir Putin clearly underlined the importance given to autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy. This change is projected in the contestation of legal geographies through a posture that is based on Russian ‘exceptionalism’ and its central role in the international system. Russia is a great power, this is how it becomes aware of itself and this is how the internal logic of power is justified: ‘Our foreign policy […] reflects Russia’s unique role on the world political map, as well as its role in the history and development of civilization […] [and] we intend to be consistent, proceeding from our own interests and objectives instead of decisions dictated by others’ (Putin 2012). Despite claiming that Russia renounces confrontation, this is put into perspective when the ‘core interests of Russia and Russians’ are threatened, which was invoked in 2008 (Georgia) and 2014 (Ukraine) with recourse to the protection of ‘Russian or Russian-speaking world’.

The stigma caused by territorial loss with dismemberment of the USSR and the long period of the Cold War led to a void of Russia’s collective identity. This fact not only provoked the start of a controversial national political debate launched by Boris Yeltsin, but also exposed the enormous emotional wounds in a territory (Putin 2012). The disintegration of the USSR made Russia feel as if it was an inferior, misfit country, on the wrong path and only now returning to the universal family of ‘superior’ nations. In the late 90s, the image of the West as a model to be imitated became discredited. With the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power, the search for an alternative model and new national values began. First, the emotion was expressed that, with the departure of Boris Yeltsin, ‘Russia would get up from its knees’. Then the motto appeared showing Russia as an ‘Energy Superpower’. And finally, Vladislav Surkov developed the idea of ‘Sovereign Democracy’, according to which Russia is a democratic state, with its own national particularities, that should be respected and nurtured – and, would not accept any lessons from the West on what should be the righteous model of democracy and how to shape it. The debate about Russian identity in between Westernisers, Slavophils and Eurasians and its consequences for modern Russian politics shows different angles of the bonds between East and West (Baspehlivan 2016; Tsygankov 2016, 5). Visions that Russia could be a meeting point between the European side and the Mongolian part of the continent are quite vivid in Dugin’s political strategy and Putin’s geopolitical agenda (Makarychev 2018; Shlapentokh 2020).

Ontologically speaking, a shaken, disturbed, and divided Home, is no longer a Safe Home. This is an important factor when examining how Russia portrays itself towards the EU and how the EU, on the other hand, responds to this. This dynamic shed light on the ultimate geopolitical goals of Putin towards Europe. As previously discussed, Putin’s long-term objective is to restore Russia’s greatness: bring back old USSR territories and stop these countries from integrating into NATO or the EU. To this end, the Kremlin has been engaged in a process of re-acquiring influence over its old territories since the 90s. It started with the partial occupation of parts of Moldova by Russian troops in 1990, igniting a conflict with Georgia in 2008, and continuing with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine. It culminated with the invasion of the whole country of Ukraine in 2022. Russia invasion of Ukraine was justified with a common heritage or common values, and a special military operation aimed at de-nazifying Ukraine. It was about showing who was in charge in the Eastern neighbourhood and exerting power over Ukraine’s choosing of an EU or NATO path. Yet, it had an important influence over the EU’s interaction with Russia over Ukraine.

Ukraine as a battlefield: EU-Russian interaction in 2014 and 2022 onwards

This section examines the interaction between the EU and Russia throughout the war in Ukraine (2014 and 2022 onwards), and how these new elements are a constant threat to the maintenance of the stability and resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, armed fighting started in eastern Ukraine in early 2014. The previous year, demonstrations in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, over President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to reject an agreement for closer economic integration with the EU were violently suppressed by state security forces. The departure of President Yanukovych led to a Russian intervention in the autonomous republic of Crimea, initially, which was subsequently followed by operations in Donetsk and Luhansk. Following the staged referendum of 16th of March 2014, Russia officially annexed Crimea. Within two weeks, Russian-backed agitators and military personnel occupied government buildings in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk, with the ambition to also stage a so-called referendum in eastern Ukraine. After significant protests leading to clashes, Ukraine ordered ‘anti-terrorist operations’ to re-capture control, which largely failed until representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the self-declared People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk signed the Minsk Protocol in early September 2014.

Towards the end of 2021, Russia started a large-scale military build-up near the border with eastern Ukraine, causing great concern in Ukraine, the EU and the Western world. On 21 February 2022, President Putin decided to recognise the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine as independent entities and to send Russian troops into those areas. This followed a confirmative vote by the Russian Duma on 15 February 2002. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine. Until the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, eastern Ukraine had been in a state of semi-frozen conflict with occasional military skirmishes. The EU, Russia, and many EU Countries, including France and Germany, were unable to reach an agreement throughout the course of their negotiations. Towards the end of February 2022, the United States issued a warning that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine, citing Russia’s expanding military presence at the border between Russia and Ukraine as the primary evidence. After that, President Putin gave orders to send soldiers to the cities of Luhansk and Donetsk, stating that the forces’ mission was to ‘maintain the peace’. A few days later, in response, the United States government decided to impose penalties on the affected areas as well as the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline (The White House 2022; Vakulenko 2022). However, just prior to the invasion, U.S. and Ukrainian leaders remained at odds regarding the nature and likelihood of an armed Russian threat. Ukrainian officials downplayed the possibility of an incursion and delayed the mobilisation of their troops and reserve forces.

On 24 February 2022, during a final effort by the United Nations Security Council to dissuade Russia from attacking Ukraine, Vladimir Putin announced the beginning of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine targeting Ukrainian military assets and cities across the country. (undefined) This invasion would take place across land, sea, and air. Joe Biden, the Vice President of the United States, called the attack ‘unprovoked and unjustified’, and he issued severe sanctions against top Kremlin officials, including Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov, four of the largest banks in Russia (Holland, Mason, and Bose 2022), and the oil and gas industry in Russia in coordination with European allies. During an extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly on 2 March 141 of the 193 governments that are members of the UN voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia immediately withdraw from Ukraine (UN News 2022).

The European Council in its various formations has been meeting regularly to discuss the situation in Ukraine. It condemned the invasion harshly: ‘The use of force and coercion to change borders has no place in the 21st century. Tensions and conflict should be resolved exclusively through dialogue and diplomacy’ (European Council conclusions, 24 February 2022). EU leaders asked Russia to on numerous occasions to immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. In response to the military aggression, the EU significantly expanded its sanctions against Russia. The table below shows the nine rounds of sanction on Russia from February until the end of December 2022.

Table

Phases in the Sanctions from February 2022 until December 2022	Outline of the measures
First package: 22 February 2022	individual sanctions against members of the Russian State Duma who voted in favour of the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk restrictions on economic relations with the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts restrictions on Russia’s access to the EU’s capital and financial markets and services
Second package: 25 February 2022	individual sanctions against Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov and members of the Russian State Duma and National Security Council, among others economic sanctions covering the finance, energy, transport and technology sectors suspension of visa facilitation provisions for Russian diplomats and other Russian officials and business people
Third package: 28 February and 2 March 2022	individual sanctions against Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov and members of the Russian State Duma and National Security Council, among others economic sanctions covering the finance, energy, transport and technology sectors suspension of visa facilitation provisions for Russian diplomats and other Russian officials and businesspeople
Fourth Package: 15 March 2022	individual sanctions against Roman Abramovich and German Khan, among others prohibition on all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises prohibition on the provision of credit-rating services to any Russian person or entity prohibition on new investments in the Russian energy sector prohibition on exports to Russia of luxury goods prohibition on imports from Russia to the EU of iron and steel
Fifth Package: 8 April 2022	prohibition on imports from Russia of coal and other solid fossil fuels closure of EU ports to all Russian vessels prohibition on Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering the EU prohibition on imports from Russia of wood, cement, seafood and liquor prohibition on exports to Russia of jet fuel and other goods a series of targeted economic measures sanctions against 217 individuals and 18 entities
Sixth Package: 3 June 2022	prohibition on imports from Russia of crude oil and refined petroleum products (with limited exceptions) SWIFT ban for an additional three Russian banks and one Belarusian bank suspension of broadcasting in the EU for Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24 and TV Centre International sanctions against 18 entities and 65 individuals, including individuals responsible for the atrocities committed in Bucha and Mariupol
Maintenance and Alignment Package: 21 July 2022	prohibition on imports of Russian-origin gold reinforcement of export controls of dual-use goods extension of the port access ban to locks clarification of existing measures, for instance in the field of public procurement, aviation and justice sanctions against 54 individuals and 10 entities, including the mayor of Moscow and Sberbank, a major financial institution
Eight Package: 6 October 2022	a price cap related to the maritime transport of Russian oil for third countries restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology prohibition on provision of crypto-wallets to Russian persons prohibition on trade in arms, civilian firearms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment prohibition on imports from Russia of steel products prohibition to provide architectural and engineering services, IT consultancy services and legal advisory services to Russia sanctions against 30 persons and 7 entities
Ninth Package: 16 December 2022	prohibition on exports of drone engines restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology prohibition on investments in the mining sector prohibition on transactions with the Russian Regional Development Bank prohibition on the provision of advertising, market research and public opinion polling services suspension of the broadcasting licenses of four additional Russian outlets The EU has also sanctioned an additional 141 individuals and 49 entities.

While the tension escalated in Ukraine, the number of sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia also increased, mirroring the need to rapidly contain Russian advances on Ukrainian territory. In the wake of the illegal annexation of Crimea, several economic and diplomatic sanctions were adopted, including targeted restrictive measures to specific individuals. The EU’s reaction to the advances of Russia, and to the exponential threat crescendo, revealed a response that balanced between fear and cautiousness. Fear because the second invasion of Ukraine was a realisation of old and repressed aspirations regarding the grandness of Russia, and a dream driven by Putin’s aspirations of reviving old borders. And cautiousness, because the idea of having an offended, weak Russia was as frightening as the invasion itself. In 2016, the EU reaffirmed its expectation that Russia would respect international law and the principles underlying the European security system.

Following Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics, the EU imposed the first wave of sanctions on 22 February 2022 (Council of the European Union 2022). The military assault was met with additional packages of progressively severe sanctions, which were approved on the 25th and 28th of February, the 2^nd and the 15 March, the 08 April, the 3 June and 21st of June, and the 22nd of July (Council of the European Union 2022). The eight package was approved on 6 October 2022 as a direct reaction to the unlawful annexation of Ukrainian areas Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson by Russia. The latest package was approved on the 16 December 2022. The combined effect of the sanctions is unprecedented in both its scope and its nature. These restrictions include sanctions imposed on individuals as well as on entities; severe financial and trade restrictions; restrictions on Russian media broadcasting; and restrictions aimed at particularly sensitive industries such as aviation, energy, and high technology.

These events have greatly impacted on the success of the EaP. Since 2009, the line shaping the Eastern Partnership have served as the guiding framework for the EU’s policy with its eastern neighbours. Stronger agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have been finalised. Much of this had to do with changes in the participating nations that the EU could do nothing to avoid, such as Belarus’s fall into a more oppressive dictatorship, although the EU was not able to stop these unrelenting developments. After a time of rising indifference on the side of the EU, symptoms of ‘partnership disillusionment’ started to show, even in neighbouring nations that were really favourable towards the EU (undefined). This was the case despite the fact that the EU had become more indifferent. In addition, the heterogeneity of the neighbourhood instead of bringing up the common elements, it instead underlined the differences between the supposed ‘ring of friends’. This was a challenge for the Eastern Partnership.

The EU’s approach to its eastern neighbours, particularly Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, can no longer use the EaP as a guiding framework since it has outlived its usefulness. In recent years, the EU has been struggling to meet the challenge of providing its eastern neighbours a vision and an orientation for their future with and within the EU, partially due to the fact that the EU has not invested in developing a robust and politically advantageous policy for its Eastern neighbours. Nonetheless, the war of aggression in Ukraine and the aggressive strategy of Russia, geared against the whole security order in Europe, has directly impacted against the core interests of the EU and its vision of the security of the neighbourhood. The future order of Europe as a whole, as well as the EU’s new self-identification as a geopolitical player, is inextricably linked to the outcome of their effective incorporation. The future of the EaP has therefore become a pivotal area for the foreign policy of the EU, and for the security of the external borders of the EU, thus, the security of the Home.

Conclusion

Putin aims to provoke a feeling of disruption and insecurity through acts, images and narratives, derives from the masterful management of the cognitive and normative maps (Kinnvall 2004), both of the Self (Russia) and the Other (EU), and of Russia as ontologically stronger than Europe. As James Kirchick argues, ‘The End of Europe’, has been set in motion by several different reasons, amongst them the economic crisis, the lack of social cohesion, the ‘so-called’ migration wave and Brexit, but decisively by dispirited Europeans and aggressive Russians (Kirchick 2017). Contrary to what happened throughout the Cold War, Russia is not interested in spreading the communist message across the continent or pursing the military control of Europe; the objective is now to reshuffle and reshape the Continent’s liberal and security order.

Over the last decade, Putin’s Russia has sought to re-establish itself on the world stage by projecting power across the Middle East and Africa, harking back to the height of Soviet influence in the 1970s and 1980s. The Kremlin see this as Russia’s right in the world. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the encroachment of so called Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine highlight the tendency by Moscow to further its regional goals in a more aggressive interpretation of the ‘near and abroad’ policy or in Soviet parlance ‘Spheres of Influence’. Where does the Russian military doctrine and strategy come from? It has been derived from the Soviet armed forces, which, based on a Marxist perspective, war was viewed ‘as a socio-political phenomenon … [where] armed forces are used as chief and decisive means for the achievement of political aims’ (Glantz 1995 p. xiii). After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks established a militia-type volunteer army, which, for instance, fought against the Basmachi insurgents in Central Asia (Statiev 2010, 25). Subsequently, Leon Trotsky transformed the Red Army into a regular army with hundreds of thousands of soldiers. After the end of World War 2, the Soviet leadership used militias extensively to suppress nationalist insurgents in western Ukraine (ibid, 97–123). Militias were subsequently used as a tool of Soviet counter-insurgency efforts to tap into local knowledge and intelligence. Thus, militias played an important role of the regular army and the party closely supervised them (ibid, 26). The collapse of the Soviet Union facilitated nationalism in the former Soviet space. Ethnic conflicts prompted Moscow to intervene in former Soviet republics, whereby Russia had inherited most of the Soviet military capabilities, yet its army was trained to fight a conventional war against NATO. An example for Russia’s new foreign policy approach in the post Soviet space is the case of the insurgents from the Russian-speaking region of Transnistria, who fought a short war against the former Soviet republic of Moldova during 1992. While the Moldova-based Soviet/Russian 14th Army was officially neutral, it covertly supported pro-Russian Transnistrian militias. During the 2008 Georgian war, Russian forces were helped by local militias in their support of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Several thousand South Ossetians and volunteers from North Caucasus, as well as up to 10,000 Abkhazians, participated in the war (ibid).

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was first and foremost a warning that prior EU’s policies on Russia were inconsistent and lacked a pre-emptive vision regarding Putin’s aspirations, especially after the feeble sanction measures applied to Russia in 2014. The two invasions of Ukraine provide a wealth of lessons that the EU must rapidly absorb to engage in a more articulated strategy towards the countries of the Eastern Partnership that are in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis Russia’s aggression. Furthermore, this has been underlined with Russia’s continued efforts to foster regional cooperation dialogues in the EaP area. The EU will only be able to maintain its relevance in the region, and reduce its ontological anxiety towards Russia if it can muster the political will to develop and carry out a comprehensive strategy for the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the European Commission [Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Jean Monnet Chair EU CT, Jean Monnet Module EUHYBRID, Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism]