Effects of jurors’ gender and attitudes toward intellectual disability on judgments in cases involving disabled juvenile defendants

Abstract

Because many juvenile offenders are intellectually disabled and have their cases tried by jurors in adult criminal court, it is important to understand factors that influence jurors’ judgments in such cases. Using a mock trial methodology, we explored the relations among jurors’ gender, attitudes toward intellectual disability, and judgments in a criminal case involving an intellectually disabled 15-year-old girl accused of murder. Men mock jurors’ judgments were not influenced by their preexisting biases, but women's were: the more women favored special treatment for disabled offenders, the less likely they were to suspect the disabled juvenile was guilty and the less likely they were to convict her. Implications for actual cases involving disabled juvenile defendants are discussed.

Keywords:

• juror decision-making
• gender
• intellectual disability
• juvenile offenders

Acknowledgements

We thank Prof. James R. Larson Jr., Prof. Allison D. Redlich, and Prof. Linda J. Skitka for their helpful suggestions on this project; Maria Vargas, Megan Cummens, Ilse Salinas, and Krupa Patel for their research assistance; Alison Perona for legal expertise and consultation on jury instructions; and Court TV for donating the trial videotape from which the stimulus trial materials were derived.

Notes

The research described herein was conducted at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

1. Considering the 200,000 juveniles who were prosecuted as adults in 2007 (Griffin et al., 2011), and that 7–15% of juveniles in the legal system are intellectually disabled (Kazdin, 2000), we estimate that at least 14,000–30,000 disabled juveniles are tried in adult criminal court on a yearly basis. In fact, because the average IQ for juvenile offenders is consistently at least one standard deviation below the population average (Burnett, Noblin, & Prosser, 2004; Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman, & Geier, 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005), even more are probably in the borderline range of intellectual disability (i.e. IQs ranging from 71 to 84; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).

2. Henry et al. (1996) found that participants were not familiar with the phrase ‘developmental disability’ and therefore used the term ‘mental retardation’ in their measure. Following Henry et al. and others who have done the same (e.g. Bottoms et al., 2003), we used ‘mental retardation’ in our experimental materials to facilitate participants’ understanding, even though we prefer to use terminology such as ‘intellectual disability.’

3. Results from a series of logistic regression analyses mirrored the results of these correlational analyses. Specifically, when juror gender, the similarity and exclusion scales, and the same treatment and special treatment scores were entered simultaneously into separate equations predicting suspicions of guilt and verdicts, the only variable to emerge as a statistically significant predictor was special treatment score. For each unit, increase in endorsement of special treatment for disabled offenders, participants were 73% less likely to suspect the disabled juvenile was guilty, B = −1.31, SE = .59, Wald (1, n = 40) = 4.92, p = .03, OR = .27 (all other Bs = −1.35 to .72, SEs = .51–1.02, Walds [1, ns = 40] ≤ 1.96, ns), and 65% less likely to convict her, B = −1.04, SE = .49, Wald (1, n = 40) = 4.60, p = .03, OR = .35 (all other Bs = −.72 to .29, SEs = .39–.90, Walds [1, ns = 40] ≤ 1.28, ns). Follow-up analyses were conducted to examine whether relations between attitudes toward intellectual disability and suspicions of guilt or verdicts differed for women as compared to men. Results revealed that Special Treatment scores were related to women’s suspicions of guilt, B = −1.69, SE = .79, Wald (1, n = 29) = 4.57, p = .03, OR = .19, and verdicts, B = −1.14, SE = .55, Wald (1, n = 29) = 4.26, p = .04, OR = .32, but not men’s suspicions of guilt, B = −1.29, SE = 1.35, Wald (1, n = 11) = .92, ns, or verdicts, B = −.46, SE = 1.28, Wald (1, n = 11) = .13, ns. No other significant relations emerged for women, all other Bs = −.20–1.92, SEs = .47–1.33, Walds [1, ns = 29] ≤ 3.17, ns, or for men, all other Bs = −1.85–.70, SEs = 1.00–1.91, Walds [1, ns = 11] ≤ 1.18, ns. When juror gender, the similarity and exclusion scales, and the same treatment and special treatment scores were entered simultaneously into an equation predicting trial venue, only gender emerged as a statistically significant predictor, with women being more than seven times as likely as men to recommend that the disabled juvenile be tried in juvenile rather than adult court, B = 2.02, SE = .94, Wald (1, n = 40) = 4.65, p = .03, OR = 7.53 (all other Bs = −.41 to .05, SEs = .47–.92, Walds [1, ns = 40] < .25, ns). It should be noted, however, that if it were not for the fact that these analyses mirror those in the text, and that the analyses did uncover significant effects, they should be interpreted with caution because of small sample size and limited power to detect statistically significant effects.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by an American Psychology-Law Society Grant-in-Aid and a Psi Chi Graduate Research Grant.