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Abstract
Although neuroscientifically informed mothering advice manuals published in the past 15 years speak in the languages of liberation, empowerment, and self-realization, I argue that they ultimately imbricate women in ever-more-dense networks of authority, expertise, and government, and contribute to the proliferation of entrepreneurial models of self-conduct that comprises the defining feature of American neoliberalism. This rhetoric situates motherhood as a practice of freedom, both drawing from and contributing to affective forces that suture freedom to economic models of conduct. Through these discourses, emotion-centric, self-interested mothering practices become a key site for the production and reproduction of entrepreneurial selves.
Acknowledgements
She would like to thank Nate Stormer, Jamie Landau, Erin Oldham, and Katy Ross for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this project. She would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful recommendations.
Notes
1. Jill Stamm, Bright from the Start: The Simple, Science-Backed Way to Nurture Your Child's Developing Mind from Birth to Age 3 (New York: Gotham Books, 2007), xi–xv.
2. Linda Alcredolo and Susan Goodwyn, Baby Hearts: A Guide to Giving Your Child an Emotional Head Start (New York: Bantam Books, 2005), xxiii.
3. Although for the most part these discourses target mothers and parents without qualification—they speak in the neutral languages of science and, as such, implicitly and explicitly frame their advice as “universal”—they make certain assumptions with race, class and gender implications. For instance, the books seem to take for granted that women, for the most part, have the option to stay with their babies for the first three years without working outside of the home. Additionally, there is virtually no recognition of situations such as single motherhood, no or inadequate health insurance, or other financial or social exigencies that might get in the way of the recommended advice.
4. See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 147–9.
5. The concept of “affective repertoires” is from Sean Watson, “Policing the Affective Society: Beyond Governmentality in the Theory of Social Control,” Social Legal Studies 8, no. 2 (1999): 227–51. Watson uses “affective repertoires” to describe the emotional sensibilities, attachments, and economies of enjoyment that are tied to, or associated with, different occupations, social roles, and subject positions.
6. Most of the back-to-basics discourse uses language of both “caregiver” and “parent,” but also fall into heavy emphasis on the role of mothers, using anecdotes featuring mothers and often using “mother” with the caveat that “mother” could be replaced with another caregiver. Even when mothers are not explicitly identified as the primary caretakers responsible for emotional bonding, these advice books circulate in a culture in which women are still the “default” caretakers and, in addition, are viewed as especially tied to and adept at nurturing, affective labor, and emotional work. For statistics and discussion on the ways in which women and mothers continue to have primary responsibility for nurturing and childcare, see Ann Crittenden, The Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the World is Still the Least Valued (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2001).
7. See, for instance, Majia Holmer Nadesan, “Engineering the Entrepreneurial Infant: Brain Science, Infant Development Toys, and Governmentality,” Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 (2002): 401–32; and Edward Zigler, Matia Finn-Stevenson, and Nancy Hall, The First Three Years & Beyond: Brain Development and Social Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
8. John Bruer, The Myth of the First Three Years: A New Understanding of Brain Development and Lifelong Learning (New York: The Free Press, 1999).
9. See Zigler, Finn-Stevenson, and Hall, The First Three Years; or for a more critical history, see Bruer, The Myth of the First Three Years.
10. Po Bronson and Ashley Merryman, “Baby Einstein is Dead! Long Live Baby Einstein!,” Newsweek blog, October 26, 2009, http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/nurtureshock/archive/2009/10/26/baby-einstein-is-dead-long-live-baby-einstein.aspx?print=true (accessed February 15, 2010).
11. In 2006, Susan Linn, director of the organization Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (CCFC), went to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with complaints about Baby Einstein's claims that its products were “educational,” citing peer-reviewed studies published in 2004 suggesting that Baby Einstein videos might actually delay, rather than enhance, infant language acquisition. The FTC declined to act, because the science was “a bit confused and inconclusive” and Disney had dropped “educational” from their marketing, only claiming that Baby Einstein offered “a rich and interactive learning experience.” Linn was not satisfied, and in 2008, a team of public health lawyers threatened Disney with a class action lawsuit if they did not refund the full price for Baby Einstein videos purchased since 2004. In September 2009, Disney issued a statement offering a full refund (of $15.99, up to four per family) for Baby Einstein videos purchased between 2004 and 2009. When Linn claimed a victory for the CCFC, Disney retaliated, accusing Linn and the CCFC of a publicity stunt and asserting the value of their product, framing the refund offer as “standard policy,” and on the official Baby Einstein website, as “a simple, customer satisfaction action.” “Baby Einstein Sets the Record Straight on Refund,” http://www.babyeinstein.com/refund/ (accessed July 17, 2011). Although, as analysts have noted, the offer differs from Disney's typical refund policy, which has a 60-day timeframe and requires a receipt. In the closing months of 2009, Baby Einstein's refund offer received considerable media attention. See Bronson and Merryman, “Baby Einstein is Dead!”
12. Zigler, Finn-Stevenson, and Hall, The First Three Years, 10, 197. See also: Juliet Schor, Born to Buy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture (New York: Scribner, 2004); Susan Gregory Thomas, Buy, Buy Baby: How Consumer Culture Manipulates Parents and Harms Young Minds (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007); Kathy Hirsh-Pasek, Roberta Michnick Golinkoff, and Diane Eyer, Einstein Never Used Flashcards: How Our Children Really Learn—and Why They Need to Play More and Memorize Less (Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2003); Carl Honoré, Under Pressure: Rescuing Our Children from the Culture of Hyper-Parenting (New York: HarperCollins, 2008); Pamela Paul, Parenting, Inc.: How the Billion-Dollar Baby Industry Has Changed the Way We Raise Our Children (New York: Times Books, 2008); and Sally Gearhart, Why Love Matters: How Affection Shapes a Baby's Brain (New York: Routledge, 2004).
13. Baby Einstein, “About,” http://www.babyeinstein.com/en/our_story/about_us/ (accessed February 23, 2010).
14. Nikolas S. Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 193.
15. Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 2.
16. Catherine Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective Energy,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 43, no. 1 (2010): 14.
17. Lawrence Grossberg, We Gotta Get Out of This Place (New York: Routledge, 1992), 80–1.
18. Nigel Thrift, “Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect,” Geografiska Annaler 86, no. 1 (2004): 60. See also Patricia Ticento Clough, The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004); Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); and Jenny Edbauer Rice, “The “New” New: Making a Case for Critical Affect Studies,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 94, no. 2 (2008): 200–12.
19. Grossberg, We Gotta Get Out, 82.
20. Elspeth Probyn, “New Traditionalism and Post-feminism: TV Does the Home,” Screen 31, no. 2 (1990): 283.
21. Grossberg, We Gotta Get Out, 80–1.
22. Rose, Inventing Our Selves, 16–7; see also Wendy Brown, States of Injury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
23. Nikolas S. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19–20.
24. See Stephen J. Collier and Andrew Lakoff, “On Regimes of Living,” in Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, ed. Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 22–39.
25. Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation,” 3.
26. Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation,”, 4.
27. Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation,”.
28. Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation,”, 5.
29. Disciplinary technologies, or ways individuals can know and act upon their selves, include surveillance, the exercise of “infinitesimal power” over the body, including control of its movements, gestures, and attitudes, and the codification and partitioning of time and space (for instance, scheduling regimens). Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977), especially 136–43. Disciplinary power is not a repressive power that prohibits freedom and stymies self-will; rather, disciplinary power works at the micro-levels of society to shape individuals’ desires and senses-of-self to produce subjects who actively work on themselves to optimize their productivity and fitness. In Foucault's theorization, disciplinary power was deployed and activated within the spaces of institutions (including prisons, factories, and schools), with the primary objective of normalization. This normalization occurs, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain, not through top-down impositions of power, but through “something like an inner compulsion indistinguishable from our will, immanent to and inseparable from our subjectivity.” Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 33. For example, as Jana Sawicki explains in the context of motherhood, disciplinary technologies do not “seize” women's bodies and coercively impose restrictive obligations; rather, these technologies “construct new norms of healthy and responsible motherhood.” Women interiorize these norms and work to discipline their own bodies through various technologies of knowledge and power. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body (New York: Routledge 1991), 84. In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on the ways in which disciplinary power is extended and intensified in a neoliberal society marked by the increasing fragmentation of institutional spaces. See Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009); Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript Control Societies,” in Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 177–82; Majia Holmer Nadesan, Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life (New York: Routledge, 2008); and Jeffrey Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications Since 1984 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Mechanisms of power are detached from institutional contexts and become “free floating,” exercising power over life in a spatially and temporally continuous fashion, and not according to the stop-and-start rhythms created when individuals moved from institution to institution. These extensions constitute, in Jeffrey Nealon's terms, a mutation of disciplinary power. This mutation, or what Gilles Deleuze summarizes as the emergence of the “control society,” can be summarized according to two general trajectories of intensification: First, discipline becomes more and more interiorized within individuals’ bodies and, more importantly, their minds or psyches. Second, disciplinary technologies are more mobile and immanent—they are in a sense always with individuals, carried around within their own subjectivities, and continuously heard as “incessant whisperings” that come from within (Hardt and Negri, Empire, 330–1).
30. To say that disciplinary power works on and through affective mechanisms is not to posit affect as some sort of universal, psychic raw material. Rather, affective assemblages are understood as historically specific dynamics that both influence and are influenced by other prevailing assemblages (e.g., discursive, ideological) that comprise a cultural formation. The prevailing sensibility of the cultural formation I am describing as late capitalism or neoliberalism is varyingly articulated as an “ethos of self-governing,” a structure of feeling characterized by choice, and a rhetorical climate saturated by notions of freedom, choice, and autonomy.
31. Daniel Pink, Free Agent Nation: The Future of Working for Yourself (New York: Warner Business Books, 2001).
32. See Roger Cox, Shaping Childhood: Themes of Uncertainty in the History of Adult–Child Relationships (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Majia Holmer Nadesan, Governing Childhood into the 21st Century: Biopolitical Technologies of Childhood Management and Education (New York: Routledge, 2010). In addition, there is an enormous body of literature on mothering and the “good mother” norm. For some critical perspectives, see Sherry Burgraff, The Feminine Economy & Economic Man: Reviving the Role of Family in the Postindustrial Age (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Bantam, 1971); Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989); Lauri Umansky, Motherhood Reconceived: Feminism and the Legacy of the Sixties (New York: New York University Press, 1996); and Joan C. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Rima D. Apple, Perfect Motherhood: Science and Childbearing in America (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006); Susan J. Douglas and Meredith W. Michaels, The Mommy Myth: The Idealization of Motherhood and How it has Undermined Women (New York: The Free Press, 2004); Diane Eyer, Mother–Infant Bonding: A Scientific Fiction (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Shari L. Thurer, The Myths of Motherhood: How Culture Reinvents the Good Mother (New York: Penguin Books, 1994); and Julia Grant, Raising Baby by the Book: The Education of American Mothers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
33. See Lloyd DeMause ed., “The Evolution of Childhood,” in The History of Childhood, (New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1974), 1–74. See also Nadesan, Governing Childhood.
34. Qtd in Maxine L. Margolis, True to Her Nature: Changing Advice to American Women (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2000), 33.
35. Qtd in Maxine L. Margolis, True to Her Nature: Changing Advice to American Women (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2000), 34.
36. Nadesan, Governing Childhood, 52.
37. Nadesan, Governing Childhood.
38. Majia Holmer Nadesan, Constructing Autism: Unraveling the ‘Truth’ and Understanding the Social (New York: Routledge, 2005), 85.
39. Apple, Perfect Motherhood, 128.
40. For more on the shifts in childhood and mothering since the mid-twentieth century and a more in-depth discussion of the social and economic conditions of possibility for this shift, see Nadesan, Governing Childhood; and Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (New York: Free Association Books, 1999).
41. John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health (New York: Schocken, 1966), 15.
42. John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health (New York: Schocken, 1966), 67.
43. Qtd in Eyer, Mother–Infant Bonding, 2.
44. Beverly Birns, “Attachment Theory Revisited: Challenging Conceptual and Methodological Sacred Cows,” Feminism & Psychology 9, no. 1 (1999): 12.
45. Beverly Birns, “Attachment Theory Revisited: Challenging Conceptual and Methodological Sacred Cows,” Feminism & Psychology 9, no. 1 (1999): 12., 18.
46. Burton White, The First Three Years of Life (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), xi.
47. Burton White, The First Three Years of Life (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 9, emphasis added.
48. Burton White, The First Three Years of Life (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 13.
49. Selma Fraiburg, Every Child's Birthright: In Defense of Mothering (New York: Bantam Books, 1977), 63.
50. Selma Fraiburg, Every Child's Birthright: In Defense of Mothering (New York: Bantam Books, 1977), 63–4.
51. Feminist critics have had different reactions to attachment theory, perhaps as diverse as feminist theorizations of the motherhood relationship in general. Bracketing this diversity for the sake of summary, two major, related strands of feminist critique have emerged in response to attachment theory: critiques of biological essentialism, and critiques of what I will call here the “mother blame” hypothesis. First, feminists have tended to react negatively to the biological determinism implicit, and in some cases explicit, in attachment theory. As Susan H. Franzblau has argued, mainstream versions of attachment theory view women as “biologically predisposed” to the mothering role, and the socially conditioned obligations associated with the maternal role are situated as “a natural outcome of ‘being’ a mother” and a woman. “Historicizing Attachment Theory: Building the Ties That Bind,” Feminism & Psychology 9, no. 1 (1999): 29, 23. As she argues, “The notion that there is some inherent glue that unites mother and child simplifies, depoliticizes and removes from historical review the exploitative and oppressive conditions under which most women reproduce and mother” (29). The biological theory naturalizes the maternal role, and ignores the social pressures and negative consequences of equating “being female” with the obligations and demands of mothering. If women are biologically determined to be mothers, then there is no place to critique the social and cultural determinants of women's roles, identities, and images (see also Eyer, Mother–Infant Bonding). The theory also casts suspicion on women who do not live up to the purportedly biologically normative role of mothering—for instance, women who choose to work outside the home, or not to have children (again, see Eyer, Mother–Infant Bonding for a more in-depth analysis of the ideological consequences of attachment theory). The second critique includes challenges to a second implicit (and again, sometimes explicit) idea in attachment theory: that the mother is not only to blame for any difficulties or perceived inadequacies in the child's development into an adult, but she is also responsible for a host of other social problems. The attachment theory is an “infant determinism” argument, positing that after the first three years, the infant's intellectual, social, and emotional dispositions are largely determined. During the first three years, infants are highly malleable, and interactions with the mother mold the infant's personality and abilities, and the future of the child is permanently inscribed in its biological being. This is, Birns explains, an “inoculation model of parenting,” which “minimizes the importance of all the other factors that can influence how our children grow” (“Attachment Theory Revisited,” 19). An example of inoculation parenting can be seen in Zigler, Finn-Stevenson, and Hall's book on the first three years: the first three years “present a uniquely important opportunity for improving the lives of young children and for bettering their odds of avoiding or ameliorating the effects of various social, cognitive, educational and physical and mental health challenges many will face in years to come” (The First Three Years, 97). Proper mothering in the first three years produces a series of physical effects in the child, effects which will prepare the child to overcome or manage future risks. As Birns continues, this inoculation model is problematic for pragmatic and ideological reasons: “To believe that a loving, sensitive mother to an infant can protect a child for life against the adversity of poverty, abuse, poor schools, uncaring neighborhoods and violent television is both a theoretical and a practical mistake” (“Attachment Theory Revisited,” 19). The mother is blamed not only for the child's adult personality, lifestyle, productivity, and so forth, but also implicitly for other social ills. The mother is supposed to ameliorate the influences of these negative risks. Also, mothers can be held to blame for these social ills in a more direct sense because they can be traced back to poor mothering experiences—if a mother does not adequately bond with her child during its early years, he or she might develop into an adult who is not socially adjusted and commits crimes, or an adult without the necessary intelligence to maintain a productive job and contribute to the betterment of society. Children are, in a sense, national resources, and it is the mother's job to guarantee the productivity of these resources through early nurturing and bonding experiences.
52. Nadesan, Governing Childhood, 72; and “Engineering the Entrepreneurial Infant.”
53. See for instance Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Bio Scans and Biomedical Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Nadesan, “Engineering the Entrepreneurial Infant”; Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life; and Rose, Inventing Our Selves; and The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
54. Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 27.
55. Stamm, Bright from the Start, x.
56. Stamm, Bright from the Start, x–xii.
57. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 1.
58. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 12.
59. Stamm, Bright from the Start, ix.
60. Stamm, Bright from the Start.
61. Stamm, Bright from the Start, xv, emphasis added.
62. Stamm, Bright from the Start, xviii, emphasis added.
63. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 131.
64. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 132.
65. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 134.
66. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 133.
67. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 146.
68. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 287.
69. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 56–7.
70. Rose, Powers of Freedom, 36.
71. Alcredolo and Goodwyn, Baby Hearts, 34.
72. See Rose, Governing the Soul, especially “Adjusting the Bonds of Love,” 155–81.
73. Alcredolo and Goodwyn, Baby Hearts, 53.
74. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 56.
75. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 81, 131.
76. This framing of affective labor as intentional work that is continuous, at least for the first three years of a child's life, is especially interesting in the context of the United States’ failure to guarantee women paid or adequate maternity leave. In this social context, the inducements to devote an entire three years exclusively to affective labor are especially problematic. Women without the social supports to involve themselves in this intensive disciplinary parenting work will, in this framing, be responsible for the maldevelopment of their children, or at least the children's failure to live up to their potentials.
77. Sarah Nettleton, “Wisdom, Diligence, and Teeth: Discursive Practices and the Creation of Mothers,” Sociology of Health & Illness 13 (1991): 102, 107.
78. Probyn, “New Traditionalism.”
79. Holly Engel-Smothers and Susan M. Heim, Boosting Your Baby's Brain Power (Scottsdale, AZ: Great Potential Press, 2009), xvi.
80. Lauren Lindsey Porter, “The Science of Attachment: The Biological Roots of Love,” Mothering 119 (July/August 2003): 7–8.
81. Qtd in Pamela Paul, “Getting Sharp: Want a Brainier Baby?” Time, January 8, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1147180,00.html (accessed July 17, 2011).
82. Alcredolo and Goodwyn, Baby Hearts, 41.
83. Alcredolo and Goodwyn, Baby Hearts, 42.
84. Alcredolo and Goodwyn, Baby Hearts, 43.
85. Rose, Governing the Soul, 88.
86. Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture—From the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994). Martin ties this feeling of empowered powerlessness to systems thinking: “Imagine a person who has learned to feel at least partially responsible for her own health, who feels that personal habits like eating and exercise are things that directly affect her health and are entirely within her control. Now imagine such a person gradually coming to believe that wider and wider circles of her existence—her family relationships, community activities, work situation—are also directly related to her personal health. Once the process of linking a complex system to other complex systems begins, there is no reason, logically speaking, to stop” (122). The neuroscience discourses work along these lines—brain images visualize the “truth” that everything a mother does, feels, or thinks influences her baby's brain (and, as articulated in these discourses, her own identity and happiness), and everything is an outcome of her “choice.” Women have complete and total power to shape their own destinies and those of their children, but the fact that everything, intentional or unintentional, casual or serious, and so forth contributes to this shaping is ultimately disempowering and anxiety-producing.
87. In “Engineering the Entrepreneurial Infant,” Nadesan has already traced out how brain-based discourses focusing on early childhood opportunities for cognitive enhancement link up parents’ desires for successful, intelligent babies who exceed the norm with corporate and state desires for adept information workers. As an extension of Nadesan's analysis, I argue that the renewed attention to affect allows us to extend Nadesan's argument and understand the focus on building emotionally stable babies as a project of building flexible, adaptive workers who are not only cognitively equipped to succeed in the information age, but are also emotionally equipped to handle the uncertainties and fluctuations of a “flexibilized” neoliberal economy. For more on flexibilization, see Martin, Flexible Bodies.
88. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 131.
89. Stamm, Bright from the Start, 138.
90. Martha Brant and Pat Wingert, “Reading Your Baby's Mind,” Newsweek, August 15, 2005, 35.
91. Jean Mercer, “Great Big Ol’ Surprise: Baby Einstein Doesn't Work,” Psychology Today blog, October 25, 2009, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/child-myths/200910/great-big-ol-surprise-baby-einstein-doesnt-work (accessed February 23, 2010).
92. Ulrich Beck, The Brave New World of Work (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), 3.
93. See Daniel Pink, Free Agent Nation, 12–14, 83.
94. Dean, Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies, 123.