Indonesia's Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia

Abstract

The Indonesian democratic transition of the late 1990s led to the formation of numerous political parties many of which are religious. Only the Islamic parties are politically significant. It is possible to distinguish two basic types of religious parties. Some are based on explicitly religious principles; others are nominally secular but are led by religious figures or appeal to particular religious communities. While Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, Islamic parties have had only limited appeal. The openness of the political system and the ability of minor parties to enter coalitions has provided their leaders access to office and patronage. Even the Islamist Justice and Prosperity Party that resembles the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has chosen political participation instead of confrontation.

I would like to thank Miriam Fendius Elman and Carolyn M. Warner, and Linell Cady (Department of Religious Studies Arizona State University) for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Research in Indonesia was supported by the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University.

Notes

1. On the Indonesian democratic transition see Bambang Harymurti, “Challenges of Change in Indonesia,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4 (1999), pp. 69–83 and Mark Woodward, “Imagining Indonesia: Democracy and Identity Politics in the Reformation Order,” Suvannabhumi Vol. 10, No. 5 (1999), pp. 5–10. Available at www.asu.edu.

2. On the economic and political crises that led to the fall of the New Order see Kees Van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesian Between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden: KLTV Press, 2001). On religious and ethnic violence see Mark Woodward, “Religious Conflict and the Globalization of Knowledge: Indonesia 1978–2004,” in Linell Cady and Sheldon Simon, eds., Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence (London: Routledge 2006).

3. For a discussion of the characteristics of failed states see Robert Bates et al., Political Instability Taskforce: Phase IV Report (Mc Clean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 2006). Accessible at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu.

4. Dwight King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (New York: Praeger, 2003).

5. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 40 No. 2 (2007), pp. 832–857.

6. Liddle and Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion,” p. 854. They do, however, acknowledge that the party is led by traditionalist Muslims.

7. See Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 13 No. 2 (2002), pp. 21–35.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947).

9. Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Richard Gunther, “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe,” in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 23–77.

10. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

11. In the early 1980s I somewhat naively asked an activist from the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party why he bothered to stand for election when the only question at issue was by what percentage the ruling Golkar would win. His reply was: “It's like this, if you have a company that builds bridges…” Such practices, which outside observers refer to as corruption, are known in Indonesian by the acronym KKN or Kolusi, Korpusi dan Nepotism (Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism). The transition to procedural democracy has done little to diminish patronage and corruption. On the role of corruption in the New Order regime see William Liddle, “Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 58, No. 1 (1985), pp. 68–90.

12. Unity and Diversity is Indonesia's national motto.

13. Liddle, “Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions,” p.68; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

14. In post-New Order Indonesia religion and ethnicity have been the primary sources of unrest. Given the enormous disparities of wealth and utter impoverishment of much of the working class in wake of the economic collapse of 1997 this is somewhat surprising although increasing resentment of the Chinese, almost none of whom are Muslim and who control much of the economy, is as much economic as it is religious or ethnic. Anti-Chinese sentiment is a given in Indonesian society, but one that ebbs and flows with the general state of the economy. On religious and ethnic violence in post-New Order Indonesia see Woodward “Religious Conflict and the Globalization of Knowledge.”

15. Gerardo Munck and Jeffrey Bosworth, “Patterns of Representation and Competition. Parties and Democracy in Post-Pinochet Chile,” Party Politics Vol. 4, No. 4, (1998), pp. 471–493.

16. On Javanese sorcery see Mark Woodward, “Healing and Morality: A Javanese Example,” Social Science and Medicine Vol. 21, No. 9 (1985), pp. 1007–1021.

17. See Totok Sarsito, “Javanese Culture as the Source of Legitimacy for Soeharto's Government,” Asia Europe Journal. Intercultural Studies in the Social Sciences and Humanities (July 2006), pp. 1–16.

18. Benedict Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 1–69.

19. Sarsito, “Javanese Culture,” pp. 8–15.

20. “Ini Masih Kerajaan (This is Still a Kingdom): Sacred Geography and Social Drama in Yogyakarta,” in Ronald Lukens-Bull, ed., Sacred Places and Modern Landscapes: Sacred Geography and Social-Religious Transformations in South and Southeast Asia (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series Press, 2003), pp. 227–246.

21. Gerardo Munk, Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization, Working Paper # 228, The Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, South Bend Indiana, 1996.

22. Omar Encarnacion, “Review Article. Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation,” Comparative Politics (July 2000), pp. 479–498.

23. Unless otherwise indicated data on leadership and party programs is drawn from a combination of the following sources: KOMPAS, Partai-partai Politik Indonesia Ideology, Strategi dan Program (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 1999); KOMPAS, Partai-partai Politik Indonesia Ideology dan Program 2004–2009 (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 2004); Vicent Wangge, Directory Partai Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Permata Media Komunika, 1999) and Musa Kazhim and Alfian Hamzah, 5 Partai Dalam Timbangan (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999). Data on regional election returns is drawn from KOMPAS, Peta Politik Pemilihan Umum 1999–2004 (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 2004).

24. Arend Lijphart, “Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The ‘Crucial Experiment of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 73, No. 3 (1979), pp. 442–458. See also Andreas Ufen, Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between Politic Aliran and ‘Philippinisation’ (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers, No. 37, 2006).

25. There are very few Shi'ah, most of whom are intellectuals, attracted by the rhetoric of the 1979 Iranian revolution. There are also small communities of Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect founded in the Punjab in 1889. Most other Muslims consider them to be heretical because of their belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the group was a Prophet. They are politically significant only to the extent that they are a foil for Sunni Islamists who have called for non-Sunni Islamists to be outlawed.

26. Muslims and Christians often refer to them as “devil worshippers.” There were mass conversions to Christianity after the abortive coup of 1965 when many feared they would be persecuted as Communist because they “did not yet have religion.”

27. Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) and Mark Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989).

28. On the 1955 elections see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series). All election return data viewed on Northern Illinois University Center for Southeast Asian Studies website at www.seasite.niu.edu.

29. These fears were, and are, for the most part unfounded. All but the most extreme Islamists maintain that it is impossible to legislate ritual piety and often cite the Quranic injunction “There is no compulsion in religion” in support of this position. The reformist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah has, however, destroyed graves others consider to be holy in areas under its control.

30. While this term is commonly used in the literature of Javanese very few Javanese refer to themselves as abangan. On this distinction see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960) and Woodward, Islam in Java.

31. I make this observation on the basis of ethnographic research conducted in Java between 1979 and 2007.

32. On the pesantren system see Ronald Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad. Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). In most respects pesantren resemble South Asia madrashah, though many now offer secular as well as religious education. Some pesantren graduates now hold PhDs from American and Australian universities.

33. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957–1959 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966).

34. Exactly who was responsible for the 1965 coup remains the most controversial topic in modern Indonesian history and is beyond the scope of this paper. There is an extensive and controversial literature on the subject. Some scholars, particularly Anderson and McVey, maintain that it was an internal military feud and that the communists were not directly involved. B. Anderson and R. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1 1965 Coupe in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1971). For present purposes what is significant is not who was ultimately responsible for the attempted coup and the death of a group of generals, but simply the scale and ferocity of the killings. An English translation of the Indonesian government's account of the coup is The September 30th Movement, the Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party: Its background, Actions and Eradication (Jakarta: State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995). Hermawan Sulistyo provides a detailed account of the east Java killings and the role of NU in planning and carrying them out in “The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughter (Jobang-Kediri 1965–1966),” unpublished PhD thesis, Arizona State University, 1997.

35. Kompas Research Team, Partai Patai Politik Indonesia. Ideologi, Strategi dan Program (Jakarta, KOMPAS, 1999), p. 31.

36. While a full exploration of the question is beyond the scope of this project the rapid proliferation of political parties may be characteristic of democratic transitions.

37. Tempo, July 25, 2007. Failing to be nominated, both subsequently endorsed the Islamist PKS.

38. Mahraen was the probably a fictional Javanese peasant farmer from whom Sukarno claimed to have learned his populist ideology on the basis of which he claimed to be the voice of the Indonesian people.

39. BBC News, July 9, 2001.

40. Paige Johnson Tan, “Indonesia Seven Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp. 88–114.

41. On the 1999 elections and political parties laws see Kevin O'Rourke, Reformasi. The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen Unwin, 2002), pp. 197–203.

42. On the 2003 changes to the election laws see IFES, “Overview of Legal Framework for 2004 General Elections in Indonesia,” available at www.ifes.org, and Daniel Dhakidae, Partai Partai Politik Indonesia Ideologi dan Program 2002–2009 (Jakarta: KOMPAS, 2004).

43. Porno-aksi is an extremely vaguely defined term that can refer to anything from women wearing “excessively” revealing clothing to couples kissing in public.

44. Mark Woodward, “Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy,” SAIS Review (September 2001).

45. Megawati's popularity in Bali can be attributed to the facts that she is one-quarter Balinese and that unlike most Muslim politicians she is willing to attend Hindu Balinese temple rituals.

46. On Wahid's political thought see Mark Woodward, Islam, Pluralism and Democracy: Abdurahman Wahid (Tempe, AZ: Consortium for Strategic Communication White Paper Series, 2007). For a more general biography see Greg Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid: Muslim Democrat Indonesian President: A View from the Inside (Hanalulu [sic]: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).

47. Effendy Chorie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU eksperimentasi Pemikiran Islam Inklusif Dan Gerakan Kebangsaan Pasca Kembali Ke Khittah 1926 (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002), pp. 221–228.

48. Musa Kahim and Alfian Hamzah, 5 Partai dlam Timbangan (Bundung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999), pp. 244–245.

49. Abdurahman Wahid, personal communication.

50. Pilgrimage to holy graves is a very important part of Javanese Islam, and Islam nearly everywhere except in regions controlled by Wahabis.

51. See Vincent Wangge, Direktoru Partai Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Permata Media Komunika, 1999), pp. 90, 102, 116.

52. In 1999 there were three minor NU based parties: Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (SUNI), Partai Nadhlatul Ulama (PNU) and Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU). They are important only because they illustrate the personalistic basis of Indonesian politics. All of them were founded and led by kyai who had quarreled with Wahid about political or theological matters. SUNI and PNU had platforms that were more explicitly religious than PKB. There were only minor differences between PKB and PKU, which was founded and led by Wahid's uncle Yusuf Hasyim. This rivalry, like that between PDI-P, PNI-M and PP, was a family affair. All of them received less than 1 percent of the vote in 1999, though both PNU and PKU gained seats in parliament. Only PNU, reconstituted as Partai Nadhlatul Ulama Indonesia (PNUI) gained parliamentary seats in the 2004 election.

53. Amien Rais is Professor of Political Science at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University and holds a PhD from the University of Chicago. He was one of the most significant figures in the Reformasi (Reformation) movement that led to the collapse of the Suharto regime. He is known as a very conservative, almost puritanical Muslim and also as a political and economic pragmatist. In many respects he resembles Malaysia's former Prime Minister Muhatir. PAN's core support base, like that of the Muhammadiyah organization, is urban and middle class. The party's platform emphasizes religious values in a general sense, but calls for tolerance and nondiscrimination. It emphasizes regional autonomy, good governance, and economic reform. Perhaps because of Rais's training as a political scientist, it had among the most specific of any of the parties' agendas, addressing issues including globalization, relationships between national and provincial governments, and the role of a “clean” government in the regulation of a market economy. When he founded PAN, Rais used his political and academic credentials to bring some prominent Christians, including Chinese, into the party. The Party's secretariat also included many important Muslim intellectuals, many of whom are more theologically moderate than Rais.

54. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962). On Masyumi in the 1950s and on the party system of that era more generally see William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).

55. On DDII and its place in Indonesian Islamic discourse see Robert Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims,” Indonesia Vol. 64 (1997), pp. 77–103.

56. Laskar Jihad was founded in 2000 by Jafar Umar Talib who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1980s. When visiting DDII headquarters in 2000 I inadvertently encountered a Laskar Jihad recruiting rally attended by approximately 200 young men.

57. Tim Penelitian, Partai-Partai Politik in Indonesia (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 1999), p. 53.

58. Three other Masyumi based parties have contested elections but have secured even fewer votes than the PBB. PartaiUmmat Islam (Islamic Community Party or PUI) was founded in 1998 as the electoral vehicle of two prominent Muslim intellectuals Deliar Noer and Arbi Sanit. This is an unlikely combination as Noer is a moderate Islamist and was formerly a member of Masyumi while Sanit is closely associated with Abdurahman Wahid and Nadlahtul Ulama. Both men are, however, from Sumatra, both are Western educated and both are well known proponents of democracy and critics of the Suharto regime. The party's platform emphasized confidence building, particularly with respect to the Chinese minority which had been the target of serious outbreaks of ethno-religious violence in the final days of the Suharto regime, Islamic brotherhood and building alliances with other Islamic parties. PUI received only 0.25 percent of the vote in the 1999 election and did not contest the 2004 elections.

Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi, or MB) was founded as a “mass organization” in 1995 by journalist and novelist Ridwan Saidi. It is a “modernist” Islamic party that draws most of its support from alumni of the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim University Student's Association). From its inception NM was highly critical of the Suharto regime. The party's program emphasizes the establishment of civil and judicial rights, the clear differentiation of powers of the three branches of government, and a “people's economy.” It does not advocate the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of Islamic law. It received only 0.14 percent of the vote in the 1999 election and did not contest the election in 2004.

Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (Indonesian Political Party Masyumi, or PPIIM) acquired the name but not the support base of the 1950s Masyumi. It was a small shari'ah based party led by Abdullah Hehamahua, an engineer and DDII activist who had, prior to 1996 been living in exile in Malaysia and Singapore. The party received less than 0.22 percent of the vote in 1999 and did not contest the 2004 elections.

59. Gatra, May 8, 2007.

60. Gatra, August 7, 2007.

61. A new party related to the PPP is the Partai Bintang Reformasi (The Star of the Reformation Party, or PBR). It is the electoral vehicle of the highly charismatic Muslim preacher Zainuddin who left PPP in 2002 following a dispute with party leader and Indonesian vice-president Hamzah Haz. While Zainuddin is closely linked with NU, the party describes itself as Islamic but non-sectarian, meaning that it is not affiliated directly with any particular Muslim group or theological orientation. The party's platform makes frequent references to Islamic morality and values and explicitly opposes atheism, secularism, communism, and pornography. It endorses freedom of religion and does not call for the establishment of an Islamic state. It carried 2.44 percent of the vote in the 2004 election.

62. See PKS Departmen Kaderisasi, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2005).

63. Kompass, 17 July, 2007.

64. Jakarta Post, 20 June 2007. Like Indonesia's Islamic parties, its Christian parties also go beyond a religious platform in order to attract votes. In the 1999 elections three Christian parties, Partai Kristien Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Christian Party, or KRISNA); Partai Katolik Indonesia (the Indonesian Catholic Party, or IKP) and Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (the Democratic Love of Country Party, or PDKB) contested the elections. While these parties can be understood as representing Christian communities they do not have specifically religious agendas. PDKB gained five seats in parliament (1.08 percent) and IKP one (0.22 percent). Neither the PDKB nor the IKP contested the 2004 elections. The Partai Damai Sejatera (Peace and Prosperity Party, or PPP), a Christian party with strong support among the Batak people of Sumatra, received 2.3 percent of the vote and 13 (2.36 percent) seats in parliament. Many Christians (and Hindus) voted for one of the two large secular parties, PDI-P and Golkar.

65. Kompas, July 17, 2007.

66. The following account is based on profiles of the two candidates that appeared in Kompas on August 1, 2007.

67. Kompas, August 1, 2000,

68. The Prophet Muhammad's birthday is among the most important holy days for traditional Indonesian Muslims. PKS and other Islamist groups consider it to be an unlawful religious innovation. I cannot say who started the rumors, but heard them on numerous occasions.

69. Sabili, July 2007.

70. Kompass, July 17, 2007.

71. Even local party workers are well paid. A faculty member at the State Higher School of Islamic studies in Cireborn in Central Java explained that a worker for PAN or PKB would make three to four times his salary and get a very nice car. Indonesian definitions of what a very nice car is are very similar to those of Americans.

72. Nurcholish Madjid, personal communication.