‘Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast Asia

Abstract

This article looks at the regionalization of defense relations in Southeast Asia from the Cold War to the present. The evolution of defense cooperation involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and their dialogue-partner countries has been impressive, with the formation of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM+ defense-ministerial arrangements, themselves the beneficiaries of more established dialogue processes. Despite these developments, the aim of defense regionalism in Southeast Asia has remained decidedly modest. While “action-oriented” cooperation in various nonconventional security areas has been incorporated into its agenda, Southeast Asian defense regionalism persists largely as an exercise in informal confidence building, with at best limited and incidental forays into preventive diplomacy. In conclusion, it still lacks the strategic imperative and institutional coherence befitting a model of regionalism.

This article has benefited from helpful comments from Asian Security's reviewers.

Notes

This article has benefited from helpful comments from Asian Security's reviewers.

1. As Leifer once noted, preventive diplomacy in ASEAN “is best defined in dispute-specific terms, [and] has been the notable exception and not the rule in the intramural experience of ASEAN.” In short, ASEAN is by no means “a grand exercise in preventive diplomacy,” although that has not prevented some analysts from representing ASEAN as such. Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review Vol. 12, No. 1 (1999), pp. 25–38; see p. 26.

2. See “Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Establishments to Meet the Challenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats,” Chonburi, Thailand, February 26, 2009. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/22314.pdf See also Tan Seng Chye, “ADMM + 8: Adding Flesh to a New Regional Architecture,” RSIS Commentaries No. 131/2010 (October 15, 2010).

3. The terminology, commonly used among ASEAN officials, is in this instance borrowed from the 16th ASEAN Summit (April 8–9, 2010) in Hanoi, which reportedly “carried an action-oriented and forward-looking agenda under the theme, ‘Towards the ASEAN Community: From Vision to Action.'” See Bridging Markets, Connecting Peoples, ASEAN Annual Report 2009–2010 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010), p. 3.

4. Desmond Ball, Reflections on Defense Security in East Asia, RSIS Working Paper No. 237 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2012), p. ii.

5. The convoluted and incoherent architecture that ASEAN, as midwife, has helped deliver consists in a cluttered geometry of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral configurations that defy easy categorization.

6. Personal interviews, conducted informally between 2009 and 2011, with officials from the ASEAN Secretariat responsible for implementing the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), under which the ARF and ADMM and ADMM+ are assembled. Also see Jürgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), pp. 427–449.

7. The ADMM has been described in one instance as “an important milestone for ASEAN.” See Carlyle A. Thayer, “Meeting in Hanoi,” Background Briefing: ASEAN Defence Ministers, May 11, 2010. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/31003399/Thayer-ASEAN-Defense-Ministers-Meeting-May-2010

8. The eight dialogue partners are Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States – the same membership as that of the East Asia Summit. Analysts have referred to the ADMM+8 as “an acronym to watch” and a process that “is likely to take shape as one of the more substantial pieces of Asia's multilateral security architecture.” See Ron Huisken, “ADMM + 8: An Acronym to Watch,” East Asia Forum, October 8, 2010, and David Capie and Brendan Taylor, “Two Cheers for ADMM +,” PacNet No. 51, October 20, 2010. Also see Ernest Bower, “Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting + 8 in Hanoi: The 1,000 Year Old City Hosts Warriors Bent on Peace,” Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th & K Streets (CSIS Washington) Vol. 1, No. 32 (October 13, 2010), pp. 1–4.

9. Describing the norms that underpin security regionalism in Asia, Amitav Acharya, writing in 2003, identified three “path-dependent” dispositions common to regional institutions in Asia, namely, “(1) rejection of any form of multilateral security and defense cooperation, whether with or without great power sponsorship; (2) general acceptance of Westphalian norms of sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity; and (3) a preference for ‘soft’ or non-legalistic and formalistic regional cooperation.” Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 210–240; see p. 219.

10. See Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization Vol. 56, No. 3 (2002), pp. 575–607. On the notion of tangled webs, see William T. Tow, “Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia,” ASPI Strategy Report, July 1, 2008 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute).

11. Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?” Asian Security Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 44–60

12. A recent survey by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies of Asia-Pacific elites suggests a lack of regional confidence in the region's security and economic institutions as providers of regional security and stability. Instead, regional leaders and pundits are more apt to rely on national/self-help strategies and/or global bodies such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization. See Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, and William Watts, Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism: Survey Results and Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009).

13. On Asian regionalism as process-oriented, not results-oriented, see David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,” International Security Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 148–184.

14. See Paragraph 3 of the “Singapore Declaration of 1992,” January 28, 1992. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm

15. I refer here to the ASEAN declaration, the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. Signed by the original five ASEAN member nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) on November 27, 1971, the signatories publicly stated their intent to keep the Southeast Asian region “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.” Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm

16. Sheldon W. Simon, “The Regionalization of Defense in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 5, No. 2 (1992), pp. 112–124.

17. As Carlos Romulo, former foreign minister of the Philippines, explained regarding the raison d'être behind ASEAN, “We did not phase out SEATO in order to set up another one.” The Straits Times, December 22, 1975, cited in Amitav Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance? Occasional Paper No. 14 (Toronto: Center for Strategic and International Studies, York University, 1990), p. 3. Also see Kai Dreisbach, “Between SEATO and ASEAN: The United States and the Regional Organization of Southeast Asia,” in Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong, eds., The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), pp. 241–256.

18. As Mahapatra has noted, fairly or otherwise, about the formation of ASEAN, “ASEAN was the product of Asian initiative. But it was hardly an Asian creation. Behind the Asian initiative was the American ‘support’ and ‘discreet guidance.’ Washington almost acted like a mid-wife in the birth of ASEAN.” Chintamani Mahapatra, American Role in the Origin and Growth of ASEAN (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1990), pp. 6–7.

19. M. Ghazalie Shafie, Malaysia: International Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Creative Enterprises, 1982), pp. 161–162.

20. Amitav Acharya, “Regional Military–Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations),” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 7–21.

21. New Straits Times, December 8, 1981, cited in Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States, p. 15.

22. Vice President Try Sustrisno made the remark during his tenure as Indonesia's army chief. Cited in William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Security Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 266.

23. This table was compiled by the author using data from various official government Web sites of ASEAN countries.

24. Cited in Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States, p. 7.

25. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 1–44; see p. 32. Also see Richard Stubbs, “Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Imperatives and Political Obstacles,” Asian Survey Vol. 32, No. 5 (May 1992), pp. 397–410.

26. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “National vs. Regional Resilience? An Indonesian Perspective,” in Derek da Cunha, ed., Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2000), pp. 81–97, see p. 91.

27. See “Singapore Declaration of 1992.”

28. The Clinton administration, as assessed in Steward Patrick, “America's Retreat from Multilateral Engagement,” Current History No. 99 (2000), pp. 430–439, see p. 437.

29. Sheldon Simon, “Realism and Regionalism in Southeast Asia: The ARF and the War on Terror,” in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers, eds., Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 93–109; see p. 96.

30. Ralf Emmers, “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 23, No. 2 (2001), pp. 275–291.

31. Abu Hassan Omar and Mochtar Kusumaatmatdja, respectively, cited in Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States, pp. 1–2.

32. Chin Kin Wah, “ASEAN: The Long Road to ‘One Southeast Asia,’” Asian Journal of Political Science Vol. 5, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–19.

33. It bears reminding that not everyone supported the view that Vietnam's entry into ASEAN was necessarily motivated by its desire to balance against China. For the “join ASEAN to balance China” perspective, see Nguyen Vu Tung, “Vietnam–ASEAN Co-operation after the Cold War and the Continued Search for a Theoretical Framework,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 24, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 106–120. For a contrarian perspective, see Hoang Ahn Tuan, “Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN: Economic, Political and Security Implications,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 16, No. 3 (December 1994), pp. 259–273.

34. Hari Singh, “Vietnam and ASEAN: The Politics of Accommodation,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 51, No. 2 (1997), pp. 215–229.

35. As a report on the ADMM Retreat in Hanoi in October 2010 noted, “Vietnam has made thorough preparations for the ADMM+ to make it a great success, Mr. [Phung Quang] Thanh [Vietnam's minister of national defense] noted. The same day, Mr. Thanh received US Defense Secretary Robert Gates who is visiting Vietnam for the ADMM+ scheduled for October 12. Mr. Thanh praised the US Defense Secretary's participation in the ADMM+ and expressed his belief both sides will work closely to boost bilateral cooperation in national defense and contribute to the success of the ADMM+. Mr. Robert Gates spoke highly of the role Vietnam played as ASEAN Chair and ADMM+ Chair while saying the ADMM+ will give the US a chance to promote national defense cooperation with ASEAN countries, including Vietnam.” See “ADMM Retreat Held in Hanoi,” Voice of Vietnam Online, October 11, 2010. Available at http://en.baomoi.com/Home/world/english.vovnews.vn/ADMM-Retreat-held-in-Hanoi/71631.epi

36. Even the most “progressive” of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), has encountered difficulties toward its realization. Intra–ASEAN economic integration has been hampered less by the need to remove tariff barriers than that of nontariff and other regulatory impediments (or “behind-the-border” barriers). See Maria Monica Wihardja, “Second-Generation Reform in Asia,” East Asia Forum, August 18, 2011. Moreover, the Cambodian–Thai standoff over the borderland surrounding the Prear Vihear Temple in 2011 has raised serious concerns about intramural security among ASEAN member nations. All this has led the ASEAN secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, to publicly concede that ASEAN is unlikely to meet its express goal of realizing the formation of the AEC – much less that of the APSC – by 2015. See Yang Razali Kassim, “ASEAN Community: Losing Grip over Vision 2015?” RSIS Commentaries 87/2011, June 2, 2011.

37. The VAP is composed of 10 action items oriented toward (a) strengthening and integrating the ASEAN members into a cohesive single entity, and (b) narrowing the developmental gap between old and new ASEAN members through practical assistance furnished by dialogue partners. See “Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting,” Kuala Lumpur, May 9, 2006. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/18412.htm

38. See Paragraph 9 of the “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting.” Available at http://www.aseansec.org/18511.htm

39. “Singapore Hosts Second ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting,” November 14, 2007. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/admm/media_release/14nov07_nr.html

40. “Minister for Defence Attends Third ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting in Pattaya.” Available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/Feb/26Feb09_nr.html

41. See Paragraph 8 of the “Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening Defence Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges,” Jakarta, May 19, 2011. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/26304.htm

42. “ASEAN Defense Cooperation Enters Higher Gear,” May 20, 2011. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/26308.html

43. The ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Tabletop Exercise (AHX) is discussed later in the article.

44. “Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Enhancing ASEAN Unity for a Harmonised and Secure Community” (Joint Declaration by 6th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting), May 29, 2012. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2012/may/29may12_nr/29may12_fs.html

45. See Paragraph 4 of the “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting.” Available at http://www.aseansec.org/18511.htm

46. Complementing these is a series of activities conducted at the nonofficial (“second track” or “Track II”) level under the auspices of the Network of ASEAN Defense and Security Institutions (NADI; http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi), the officially sanctioned network of defense-oriented research centers and think tanks that supports the ADMM.

47. See Paragraph 5 of the “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting.” Even though these activities are presumably not officially affiliated with ASEAN, it is notable the majority of them use the “ASEAN” label nonetheless to identify themselves, which suggests that ASEAN has become the default nomenclature for Southeast Asian regionalisms.

48. Carlyle A. Thayer, “Background Briefing: 7th ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force Informal Meeting,” April 7, 2010. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/29566086/Thayer-ASEAN-Chiefs-of-Defense-Force-Meeting

49. “9th ACDFIM Concludes in Cambodia,” March 29, 2012. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.bn/MOD2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1277:9th-acdfim-concludes-in-cambodia&catid=1:news&Itemid=70

50. Joshua H. Ho, “Southeast Asian SLOC Security,” in Shicun Wu and Keyoun Zou, eds., Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 173–175.

51. Ian Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation,” in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2009 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 36–58; see p. 41.

52. According to Brigadier-General Ngien Hoon Ping, the Singapore Armed Forces' director for joint operations, “The [first] AHX [co-hosted by Indonesia and Singapore] will strengthen ASEAN's capacity and capability to marshal quick and decisive military responses to natural disasters in our region.” He then quickly added, “The AHX will also build trust and confidence amongst our militaries, enabling future co-operations, and contributing to peace and security in our region.” See “Singapore and Indonesia Co-Host First ASEAN Militaries' Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise,” July 12, 2011. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2011/jul/12jul11_nr.html

53. For example, an air force officer who flew sorties in the early phase of the EiS initiative recounted to this author the lengths to which his team would go to camouflage its operating procedures so as to ensure their counterparts from the other participating countries in the CMPT onboard their aircraft – undoubtedly intelligence specialists, the author's interviewee alleged – would learn as little of their “secrets” as possible. The interviewee facetiously noted that CMPT members probably spent more time checking on each other's aircraft and operating procedures than actively looking for pirates! (personal interview, December 2007)

54. Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defense Community?” Pacific Affairs Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 159–178.

55. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, “Introduction: ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration,” Zulfaqar: Jurnal Asia Pertahanan Keselamatan Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010), pp. 1–4; see p. 3.

56. Donald K. Emmerson, “Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN,” Japanese Journal of Political Science Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 165–185.

57. Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991).

58. See the article in this issue on the FPDA by Ralf Emmers.

59. C. Fred Bergsten, Open Regionalism, Part 3 of Working Papers on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Issue 57 (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997).

60. The point has been made by Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way' to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way,’” The Pacific Review Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319–346.

61. David Capie and Brendan Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defense Diplomacy in Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010), pp. 359–376.

62. Ball, Reflections on Defense Security in East Asia, p. 19.

63. Ball, Reflections on Defense Security in East Asia, p. 19.

64. “Leon Panetta: U.S. to Deploy 60% of Navy Fleet to Pacific,” BBC News: US and Canada, June 2, 2012. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18305750

65. Ralph A. Cossa, “US 1, China 0,” PacNet #35, June 6, 2012.

66. Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 263.

67. Capie and Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defense Diplomacy in Asia.”

68. A concern some defense officials of ASEAN countries have registered to Ambassador (retired) Tan Seng Chye, who directs the NADI secretariat. The author is indebted to Ambassador Tan for sharing his impressions (personal interview, May 14, 2012).

69. See “Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Cooperation for Stability and Development of the Region,” Hanoi, May 11, 2010. Available at http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/jointdeclarationoftheaseandefense-nd-14614.html?cid=229

70. “ADMM-Plus New Platform for Security, Defense Cooperation,” Xinhua, October 13, 2010. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-10/13/c_13554103.htm; and Ron Huisken, “ADMM Plus Cooperates on Security and Defense Issues,” East Asia Forum, October 19, 2010.

71. See “Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures,” held in Honolulu, November 4–6, 1998, and in Bangkok, March 3–5, 1999, p. 20. Available at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-statements-and-reports/152.html

72. The ARF-ISG-CBM/PD serves as a clearinghouse and catalyst, so to speak, for proposals on confidence building and preventive diplomacy. It constitutes the third tier of the pyramid of ARF activities at the intergovernmental (or Track I) level, with the Ministers' Meeting and the ARF-SOM making up the first and second tiers, respectively.

73. “Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures,” pp. 1–2.

74. “List of ARF Track 1 Activities.” Available at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-activities/list-of-arf-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year.html

75. “ASEAN Regional Forum Defense Officials' Dialogue Opens in Vietnam,” Xinhua, March 18, 2010. Available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/IntlMilitary/2010-03/19/content_4132831.htm

76. “ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue Opens in Da Nang,” Voice of Vietnam, May 18, 2010. Available at http://english.vov.vn/Home/ARF-Defense-Officials-Dialogue-opens-in-Da-Nang/20105/115648.vov

77. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment, Department of National Defense, The Philippines, “ARF Security Policy Conference.” Available at http://www.dndph.org/press-releases/arf-security-policy-conference

78. Ministry of Defense of Brunei, “ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue,” December 9, 2011. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.bn/MOD2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1192:arf-defense-officials-dialogue&catid=1:news&Itemid=92

79. “ASEAN's Disaster Relief Exercise More Real than Ever with Japan's Natural Disaster,” Jakarta, March 16, 2011. Available at http://www.aseansec.org/26032.htm

80. They include: Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, bilateral maritime exercises held between America and various Asian states; Cobra Gold, a Thai–US bilateral army exercise that has since grown to include Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore from ASEAN as well as other Asian countries; Cope Tiger, a trilateral air exercise involving Singapore, Thailand, and the United States; Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism, maritime counterterrorism exercise held between America and various ASEAN members; and, Rim of the Pacific Exercise, the world's largest international maritime exercise involving the United States and a big number of Asia-Pacific countries including some ASEAN members. Ironically, despite the received wisdom that ASEAN states favor security multilateralism over America's longstanding preference for bilateralism, the participation by ASEAN militaries in some of the aforementioned exercises with the US military, it has been reported, is in fact quite the opposite: The ASEAN states tend to favor bilateral rather than multilateral military exercises and exchanges with their US counterpart because of the perceptibly higher level of knowledge and technology transfers they stood to receive from bilateral engagements with the United States. See Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection,” NBR Analysis Vol. 14, No. 2 (August 2003).

81. The author is indebted to Kwa Chong Guan, co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), for sharing his firsthand impressions on discussions at the ARF-ISG-CBM/PD meeting in Wellington in May 2012.

82. Nur Maszawani Abdullah, “MINDEF Officials Attended ARF DOD Meeting,” May 9, 2012. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.bn/MOD2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1328:mindef-officials-attended-arf-dod-meeting&catid=1:news&Itemid=70

83. See Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 7–17; Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia's Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy No. 11 (January 2011), pp. 27–50; and William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, “What Is Asian Security Architecture?” Review of International Studies Vol. 36, No. 1 (2010), pp. 95–116.

84. As Leifer has put it, the ARF represents an extension of ASEAN's model of regional security. See Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996). The same could be said of the ADMM+8.

85. The OSCE employs an elaborate system of confidence- and security-building measures to manage and even control military activities through a relatively sophisticated surveillance apparatus that provides early warning indicators. See Zdzislaw Lachowski, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe, SIPRI Research Report No. 18 (Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)/Oxford University Press, 2004).

86. See Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Can ASEAN Centrality Be Maintained at East Asia Summit?” The Nation, November 7, 2011; Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN Centrality: A Year of Big Power Transitions,” East Asia Forum, March 6, 2012.

87. Richard Woolcott, “An Asia Pacific Community: An Idea Whose Time Is Coming,” East Asia Forum, October 18, 2009. On a more recent note, several leading figures in CSCAP, the second-track grouping that supports the ARF, have privately intimated to this author their concerns over CSCAP's continued policy relevance should the grouping continue to focus solely on the ARF when it is the ADMM+8 or the East Asia Summit that has proved the more forward-looking institution. However, their views represent neither the official position of CSCAP nor the consensus within the grouping. Personal interviews with a number of CSCAP members at the sidelines of the 37th CSCAP Steering Committee meeting, May 30–31, 2012, Kuala Lumpur.

88. Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan Responds to China's Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision,” International Affairs Vol. 85, No. 4 (July 2009), pp. 837–856.

89. Alternatively, it has been argued that the structure of multiple platforms furnished by ASEAN offers China and the United States greater flexibility in their mutual engagements, which could help reduce the risks posed by their mutual security dilemmas. “The complexity of [ASEAN's] geometry,” Cha notes, “is a useful tool for muting regional security dilemmas.” Cha, “Complex Patchworks,” p. 28.

90. I borrow the term from Deepak Nair, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 31, No. 1 (April 2009), pp. 110–142.

91. The phrase is taken from Yuen Foong Khong, “Review Article: Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia-Pacific?” The Pacific Review Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 289–300; see p. 291.