Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Abstract

This article seeks to address why and how defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia has risen in the past decade. By examining multilateral defense diplomacy under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as Indonesia's bilateral defense diplomacy, this article makes three arguments. First, bilateral and multilateral defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia complement one another. Second, the focus of multilateral defense diplomacy has evolved and now reflects the blurring distinction between nontraditional and traditional security issues. Third, the rise of ARF's multilateral defense diplomacy can be attributed to the concern over China's rise, while ASEAN, considers it as among the key mechanisms to recover from the fallout of the 1996 Asian financial crisis and the recent regional arms development.

Acknowledgments

This article was initially presented at a workshop on defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore on November 30, 2010. I would like to thank the workshop participants, Bhubhindar Singh, Ralf Emmers, Tan See Seng, I'dil Syawfi, and the journal's anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments and assistance. All interpretation is my responsibility and reflects my personal views and should not be attributed to the Fulbright Program or any other government agencies.

Notes

1. See, for example, Stephen Blank, “Defense Diplomacy, Chinese Style,” Asia Times Online, November 11, 2003. Available at http://www.atimes.com; Pankaj Kumar Jha, “India's Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Defence Studies Vol. 5, No. 1 (2011), pp. 47–63; Mihoko Kato, “Russia's Multilateral Diplomacy in the Process of Asia Pacific Regional Integration: The Significance of ASEAN for Russia,” in Akihiro Iwashita, ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Slavic Eurasia Vol. 2 (Hokkaido, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), pp. 125–151.

2. See, for example, Lewis M. Stern, “U.S.–Cambodia Defense Relations: Defining New Possibilities,” National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 251 (December 2009), pp. 1–6; J. Berkshire Miller, “Brunei for Defence Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2011. Available at http://the-diplomat.com

3. A discussion of Southeast Asia's dyadic bilateral disputes is in Narayanan Ganesan, “Bilateral Tensions in ASEAN,” in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 217–229.

4. See Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 2 (2011), pp. 175–176.

5. “Formal” here is not defined as legally binding activities, but as Track 1 government-to-government activities or events. The result or output of these events could be either legally binding or not.

6. See more details on these two types of security cooperation in Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010). One could also think of the role of Track II institutions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific or the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies. But their immediate impact is often difficult to precisely measure and account for.

7. This is not to suggest that extraregional powers such as the United States and China have no influence whatsoever over regional security. Indeed, for much of Southeast Asia's history, especially during the Cold War, extraregional powers have tended to “overlay” regional dynamics. See, for example, Barry Buzan, “The Southeast Asian Security Complex,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 10, No. 1 (1988), pp. 1–16. What I am arguing here is that within the context of defense diplomacy in the past decade, it was the ASEAN member states that were behind the development of defense regionalism, as the article seeks to show. Whether or not the current US “pivot” to Asia will ultimately “transform the region” is beyond the scope of this article.

8. On the normative construction, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2001).

9. For a recent review of gunboat diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, see Christian Le Mière, “The Return of Gunboat Diplomacy,” Survival Vol. 53, No. 5 (2011), pp. 53–68.

10. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper No. 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 6.

11. For more details on the various activities under the new defense diplomacy, see Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy, pp. 6–12.

12. Military diplomacy here is defined by B. S. Sachar, “Military Diplomacy through Arms Transfers: A Case Study of China,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 28, No. 2 (2004), p. 290.

13. See Garren Mulloy, “Japan's Defense Diplomacy and ‘Cold Peace’ in Asia,” Asia Journal of Global Studies Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007), p. 3; Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy, Ch. 1. Aside from the conflict reduction role, Cottey and Forster also suggest two other roles: promoting democratic civil–military relations and supporting other states in developing peacekeeping capabilities.

14. Although, Vietnam and Indonesia have been described as aspiring hegemons in Southeast Asia. See Ralf Emmers, “Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and Vietnam,” Asian Survey Vol. 45, No. 4 (2005), pp. 645–665.

15. See Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia's Defense Needs: Change or Continuity?” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2005–6: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), p. 271.

16. Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/8), p. 119.

17. According to one scholar, the concept of “regional order” in Southeast Asia, as it was proposed by Michael Leifer, is theoretically underdeveloped and methodologically imprecise. See Yuen Foong Khong, “The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English School and Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 18 No. 1 (2005), pp. 23–41.

18. Simon, “Southeast Asia's Defense Needs,” p. 299.

19. For a fuller discussion, see Sheldon Simon, “The Limits of Defense and Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol. 33, No. 1 (1998), pp. 62–75; Sheldon Simon, “Southeast Asian International Relations: Is There Institutional Traction?” in Narayanan Ganesan and Ramses Amer, eds., International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 38–39.

20. The notion of ASEAN as a provider of “strategic space” is from Juwono Sudarsono, “Indonesia, the Region, and the World,” paper presented to the US Department of Defense Capstone Exercise, Jakarta, August 11, 2010.

21. See Laksmana, “Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile,” pp. 175–176.

22. See Andi Widjajanto, Edy Prasetyono, and I'dil Syawfi, Penguatan Komunitas Keamanan ASEAN untuk Menopang Integrasi Nasional Indonesia [Strengthening ASEAN Security Community to Sustain Indonesia's National Integration] (Jakarta: University of Indonesia, 2009).

23. One study notes that only 39 percent of maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia have been resolved. See Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes,” Harvard Asia Quarterly (Fall 2005). Available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com

24. For more details, see Andrew Tan, Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Working Paper No. 59 (Singapore: IDSS, 2004).

25. This will occur as extreme weather events, rising sea level, warming temperature, and others will overlay a litany of preexisting domestic challenges in regional countries – from unemployment, poverty, socioethnic fault lines, resource scarcity, corruption, and urbanization. See Paul J. Smith, “Climate Change, Weak States and the ‘War on Terrorism’ in South and Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp. 264–285; Christopher Jasparro and Jonathan Taylor, “Climate Change and Regional Vulnerability to Transnational Security Threats in Southeast Asia,” Geopolitics Vol. 13 (2008), pp. 232–246.

26. Jorn Dosch, “Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform,” in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2008), p. 69.

27. Donald K. Emmerson, “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia,” in Emmerson, ed., Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 11.

28. Matthew Carlson and Mark Turner, “Public Support for Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,” Asian Journal of Political Science Vol. 16, No. 3 (2008), p. 226.

29. For a discussion, see James Cotton, ASEAN and the Southeast Asian ‘Haze’: Challenging the Prevailing Modes of Regional Government, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies Working Paper No. 3 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1999).

30. See “Think Tanks and Civil Society Groups’ Statement on the Haze,” Singapore Institute of International Affairs Online. Available at http://www.siiaonline.org

31. See Herman Kraft, “RtoP by Increments: The AICHR and Localizing the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012), pp. 27–49; Lina Alexandra, “Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect,” The Pacific Review Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012), pp. 51–74.

32. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, p. 10.

33. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, p. 22. In some cases, however, as some issues become more prominent than others (e.g., disaster relief or terrorism), ASEAN and the ARF added new institutional activities to this network. Thus, some activities existed before some issues became prominent, while others were added to accommodate new realities.

34. Following Putnam, I use social capital here to mean “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests.” See Robert D. Putnam, “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America,” PS: Political Science and Politics Vol. 28, No. 4 (1995), pp. 664–665. For a longer review, see Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, “Social Capital and Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 47–73.

35. Alex J. Bellamy, “Security,” in Mark Beeson, ed., Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 189–190.

36. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Partnership for Peace in Asia: ASEAN, the ARF, and the United Nations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002), p. 536.

37. David Capie and Brendan Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defense Diplomacy in Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 23, No. 3 (2010), p. 372.

38. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, p. 28.

39. See “2nd ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security Held in Auckland,” Indonesian Foreign Ministry Web site. Available at http://www.deplu.go.id

40. See Allen S. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension,” Asian Survey Vol. 37, No. 4 (1997), pp. 299–322.

41. Alice D. Ba, “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011), p. 278.

42. The litmus-test argument is explored in Evan A. Laksmana, “Is China Failing SE Asia's Litmus Test?” The Jakarta Post, June 10, 2010. The Mischief Reef incident and its implications for Southeast Asia–China relations are elaborated in Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 21, No. 1 (1999), pp. 95–118.

43. Cited from Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia–China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement,” Asian Survey Vol. 49, No. 4 (2009), p. 600.

44. On ARF's formation and its concern with the regional balance of power, see Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), Ch. 5.

45. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China,” p. 300.

46. Simon S. C. Tay, Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post–Crisis Divide from America (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

47. This is partly why by 2005, the US military had access rights as well as facility use and repair and bunkering arrangements with the five original members of ASEAN. See Simon, “Southeast Asia's Defense Needs,” p. 271; Joey Long, “Great Power Politics and Southeast Asian Security,” in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 230.

48. This ambivalence stems from the potential economic benefits coming from China's booming economy, on the one hand, and a simmering distrust attributed to geographical proximity, historical enmity, previous interference into Southeast Asian domestic politics, unresolved territorial disputes, and rising economic competition, on the other. See Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 4 (2007), pp. 809–832; Martin Stuart-Fox, “Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 26, No. 1 (2004), pp. 116–139.

49. This statement was given in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations on September 27, 2011, in New York. See “A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa,” Council on Foreign Relations. Available at http://www.cfr.org

50. For more details, see David Arase, “Nontraditional Security in China–ASEAN Cooperation: The Institutionalization of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism,” Asian Survey Vol. 50, No. 4 (2010), pp. 808–833.

51. I borrow and combine these two concepts from Kai He and Yuen Foong Khong. See Kai He, “Does ASEAN Matter? International Relations Theories, Institutional Realism, and ASEAN,” Asian Security Vol. 2, No. 3 (2006), pp. 189–214; and Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post–Cold War Strategy,” in J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allan Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 172–208.

52. Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” pp. 131–133.

53. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, p. 24

54. Robert Karniol, “Meeting Sets Up Wider Exchange of Intelligence,” Jane's Defence Weekly, May 24, 2000.

55. Officially, because these meetings are considered informal, they are classified as “outside the ASEAN framework.” But the nature of the meetings, procedures, and the list of participants still include ASEAN defense establishments within a multilateral nuance and were acknowledged as part of the process leading to the creation of ADMM. See, for example, “Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting,” ASEAN Secretariat Web site. Available at http://www.asean.org

56. For more details, see “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action,” ASEAN Secretariat Web site. Available at http://www.aseansec.org

57. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, p. 25.

58. This figure is based on the author's ongoing research data set constructed from various Indonesian Foreign Ministry and ASEAN-related documents.

59. The logic and theoretical basis of the argument that growing economic interdependence does not eliminate distrust and in fact decreases national autonomy and in turn exacerbates perceptions of vulnerability is in Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 219–223.

60. Details on the Asian financial crisis's immediate impact to the Singaporean economy are in Kee-jin Ngiam, “Coping with the Asian Financial Crisis: The Singapore Experience,” in Tzong-shian Yu and Dianqing Zu, eds, From Crisis to Recovery: East Asia Rising Again? (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2001), pp. 146–153. This is perhaps why some believe that Singapore was and still is the champion behind the ASEAN Economic Community plan.

61. Though, of course the respective political elite within ASEAN member states were initially more concerned about maintaining domestic stability and restoring their economic growths. For a discussion on the immediate political impact of the crisis, see Etel Solingen, “Southeast Asia in a New Era: Domestic Coalitions from Crisis to Recovery,” Asian Survey Vol. 44, No. 2 (2004), pp. 189–212.

62. For more details, see Yongwok Ryu, The Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN's Concept of Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Working Paper No. 148 (Singapore: RSIS, 2008); Graeme Cheeseman, “Asian-Pacific Security Discourse in the Wake of the Asian Economic Crisis,” The Pacific Review Vol. 12, No. 3 (1999), pp. 333–356.

63. Overall, Southeast Asia spent one third less on defense in 1998 than it did the year before. For more details, see Sheldon Simon, “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities,” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., The Many Faces of Asian Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 49.

64. For more details, see Richard Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia,” RSIS Working Paper No. 126 (Singapore: RSIS, 2007).

65. Richard Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), p. 51.

66. Robert Hartfiel and Brian L. Job, “Raising the Risks of War: Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes in East Asia,” The Pacific Review Vol. 20, No. 1 (2007), pp. 3–4.

67. Paul Bracken, “Technology and the Military Face of Asian Security,” in Simon, The Many Faces of Asian Security, p. 78.

68. More than 900 supersonic combat aircraft were acquired in Asia between1997 and 2004 alone. See Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).

69. For more details, see Eric Heginbotham, “The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic Politics, and Grand Strategy,” International Security Vol. 27, No. 2 (2002), pp. 86–125; Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia's Changing Strategic Landscape: Recent Trends and Future Challenges,” The Indonesian Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 4 (2009), pp. 534–541.

70. This has been dubbed as a “suboptimal race.” See Charles Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,” International Security Vol. 28, No. 4 (2004), pp. 44–84.

71. Capie and Taylor, “The Shangri-La Dialogue,” p. 360; Simon, “Southeast Asian International Relations,” p. 55.

72. See Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 221.

73. See Idil Syawfi, “Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pemenuhan Tujuan-Tujuan Pertahanan Indonesia (2003–08)” [Indonesia's Defense Diplomatic Activities in Support of National Defense Goals] (master's thesis, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2009).

74. For more details on the TNI's foreign-policy role vis-à-vis China, see Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999), Ch. 4.

75. Figures are taken from Syawfi, “Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia.”

76. See Laksmana,” Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile,” p. 168, for details on the “defense gap” between the requested and appropriated defense budget for the TNI. On Indonesia's geopolitical vulnerability and increasing operational demand, especially in the maritime domain, see Evan A. Laksmana, “The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia's Geopolitical Architecture,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region Vol. 7, No. 1 (2011), pp. 101–105.

77. For more details, see Evan A. Laksmana, “Variations on a Theme: Dimensions of Ambivalence in Indonesia–China Relations,” Harvard Asia Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011), pp. 24–31.

78. For details on Indonesia's “Confrontation” with Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, see J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

79. Indonesian parliamentarians recently argued that the DCA could potentially infringe on Indonesia's territory and endanger its security as it might allow Singaporeans to train with a third-party force on Indonesian soil – and because allegedly almost half of the training area “turned out to be protected forests.” See Markus Sihaloho, “No Extradition Treaty with S'pore Due to ‘Unacceptable Clause’: Lawmaker,” The Jakarta Globe, June 7, 2011.

80. Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 129.

81. Amitav Acharya, “The Strong in the World of the Weak: Southeast Asia in Asia's Regional Architecture,” in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 177.

82. This critique of ASEAN's regionalism – dubbed as “regional delusions” – is most explicitly and fiercely, even somewhat emotionally, articulated in David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006). For a more balanced discussion on ASEAN regionalism, see Jurgen Ruland, “Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: ‘Multilateral Utility’ or ‘Hedging Utility’?” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 1 (2011), pp. 83–112.

83. For a historical and longer discussion on Southeast Asia's political and economic regionalism, see, for example, Denis Wei-yen Hew, ed., Brick by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007); Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will (London: Routledge, 2006).

84. There have been numerous published materials that fall under these two camps within the last 10 to 15 years. For recent works representing these two camps, see Hiro Katsumata, ASEAN's Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Yukiko Nishikawa, Human Security in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2010). A good review of the literature on regional security in Southeast Asia is Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers, eds., Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2006).

85. See Bruce Russett and John R. O'Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).