WAGING DEFENSIVE WAR: THE IDEA AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPORTANCE

Abstract

During the 20^th century some versions of just war doctrine came to restrict the condition of just cause to defense, that is, these just war doctrines now hold it to be a necessary condition for the moral justifiability of any war that it be undertaken for defensive purposes. These purposes need not be self – defensive but may be defensive of the welfare and legitimate rights of other polities and groups. Some reasons for war are obviously not defensive, for example, the acquisition of territory or the assertion of imperialist control. But the boundaries of defensive warfare are unclear. I will consider two important cases in which this lack of clarity is proving to be morally significant: namely, preventive and punitive warfare undertaken for the sake of the goal of defense. I will argue that the normative rationale for limiting just cause to defense does not allow these as legitimate forms of defense. That rationale moves towards the view that one should not intend the deaths of enemies but only the restraint of their wrongdoing, and preventive and punitive warfare appear to involve intending the deaths of enemies.

Keywords:

• defense
• intentional killing
• just cause
• punishment
• preemption
• preventive war

Notes

1. According to the standard way to refer to Thomas Aquinas's works, which can be used in any edition or translation, this quote is from Summa Theologiae 2-2, q. 40, a. 1. This question addresses the morality of warfare.

2. For more on this argument see Boyle (2005: 253–4).

3. See Anscombe (1981: 51–3) for a brief, compelling statement of this aspect of the role of public authority.

4. That extension from the political use of force domestically to its use against outsiders is famously made by St. Augustine and quoted by Aquinas (1947) in the extension of the ‘power of the sword’ discussed in Romans 13 from domestic life to evils generated outside a political community. The domestic analogy in these texts is from domestic political authority to the authority to make war, not from the individual right to self-defense to a communal right of defense.

5. See Boyle (2005: 245) for an account of punishment within the Catholic moral tradition.

6. See for contrast Walzer (2000: 62–3).

7. I believe there are other grounds than the two I have articulated in the paragraphs above. In particular, I believe that the orientation towards peace that will be the overarching goal intended by a country making war with ‘right intent’ is much more difficult to maintain if punitive actions are permitted. Avenging wrongs is close enough to vengeful, destructive action; see Boyle (2005: 249) on right intent as a classical condition for just war, see Aquinas (1947).

8. The pro tanto/simpliciter distinction, of course, arises because bellicose actions are not justified simply because they are undertaken for the sake of a just cause; other conditions, such as proper authority and right intent, or modern conditions such as last resort and proportionality that specify or replace the medieval condition of right intent, are obviously also necessary. Moreover, the conduct of war can be morally flawed by the unwarranted actions of soldiers and by the immoral tactical and strategic decisions of commanders and political leaders. In fact, I think that the requirement of right intent excludes approved tactical and strategic decisions that violate non-combatant immunity. Such actions cannot be directed towards peace.

9. The British bombing of German cities starting in late 1940, when Britain had few options for responding to Germany's early success in World War II is an example. Walzer (2000: 255–62) discusses this as a case of justified action in supreme emergency.

10. Walzer (2000: 80–6) exemplifies the concepts of prevention and preemption effectively by discussing the Israeli action in the Six Day War.

11. For an account of the overriding importance of the good of peace in controlling medieval just war doctrine see Finnis (1996: 15–39).