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Abstract
Right intention is one of the staple criteria of traditional just war theory. In classical terms, right intention is met when a belligerent aims to achieve a just and peaceful order. I will address the problem of determining when a belligerent has satisfied the criterion of right intention. I will argue that right intention is determined by observing a belligerent's acts during and after a conflict. Intention is not merely a private mental act known ultimately only by the people who express the intentions of their governments. Rather, right intention is a communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined. I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this way of determining intention by concentrating on the stated intentions of the Allies before World War II and of the U.S. before the First and Second Gulf Wars. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that the international community can check a belligerent's stated intentions both while the war is in progress and after the war has ended. I will argue that how well a belligerent conforms to the jus in bello and, when appropriate, to the jus post bellum, provide the international community with much of the information it needs to determine whether or not right intention has been met.
Notes
1. The passage of Thomas Aquinas just cited refers explicitly to Augustine.
2. The idea of just war as statecraft is scattered throughout Ramsey's work, but the best place to begin is Ramsey 1968: 3-18 and 259-78.
3. See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas (1994: 127).
4. See, for example, Anscombe's argument that intentional killing in warfare ‘is a moral action description whose applicability does not eo ipso prove the wickedness of the deed’ (1982: 18).
5. In claiming this I am doing no more than assuming human imperfection, which is certainly exacerbated in violent circumstances. An example of this would be the excessive bombing of fleeing troops. Technically speaking, this is not a criminal tactic, for enemy troops are legal targets, but it would not appear to fit the criterion of proportion. For more on this, see Langan (1991: 361-5).
6. John Stuart Mill assumes this theory of intention is correct and it is one of the reasons why he felt it necessary to distinguish motive from intention. Fernando R. Tesón (2011, this issue) finds merit in this distinction, as the reader can see elsewhere in this journal issue. It will be obvious to the reader that the theory of intention I defend is somewhat at odds with the theory of intention and motive defended by Tesón. Pace Tesón, I believe that Mill's distinction between intention and motive is neither as philosophically neat nor as sound as the theory of intention proposed by Anscombe. However, though we differ on the alleged value of Mill's distinction, we agree that the standard of intention demanded by most just war theorists can put too much stock in the agent's subjective state. In fact, one of the purposes of this essay is to expose that danger and counter by showing the objective – public – nature of intention.
7. Scholars on both sides of the fence agree that Saddam Hussein's history of deceit made it impossible to trust him. For examples on the pro-war side, see Brown (2003) and Condron (1999). For examples on the anti-war side, see Lobel & Ratner (1999) and White & Cryer (1999).
8. Michael Howard (1978) has made a strong case for this being the bête noir of all liberalism.
9. The argument is repeated on p. 63.
10. The state of perpetual war, which accurately describes the period in which Kant lived and wrote Perpetual Peace, must have been a constant thorn in his side when he wrote about human progress, so he had to tackle the problem head on. In Kant's essay the blame falls largely on the heads of state. The great masses only desire peace, but the rulers ‘can never have enough of war’ (Kant 1970: 93). In seeking to put an end to the fighting between the various nation-states, Kant formulates a set of preliminary articles designed to ensure peace. These articles are not very startling in their proposals, the most daring being the abolishment of standing armies, but even this was not too far-fetched in a time where army mobility was very restricted. The definitive articles, however, are another matter. Republicanism, argues Kant, is the key to peace. If every polity could be republican, there would be no wars. This conclusion is drawn mainly from the idea that the ordinary citizen is peace-loving and not a war-monger like the rulers of states. Also, a ‘pacific federation’ should be created in order to end ‘all wars for good’ (104). Perpetual peace will come one day, according to Kant, for the progress ordained and preserved by providence will see to it. One key in ensuring this progress is that humanity holds itself to the institution of what can only be called ‘Philosophendom,’ a place where ‘the maxims of the philosophers on the conditions under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states which are armed for war’ (115).
11. For more on the role of penance in just war, see Cole (2002).
12. Stefano Recchia (2009) makes a good argument that belligerents who conquer ‘outlaw’ regimes may permissibly institute a trusteeship in the immediate aftermath of the war. As social disorder lessens, shared responsibility should increase.
13. Iasiello argues that special regard must be given to children and the environment (Iasiello 2004: 44-7). While I have no wish to see anyone, or anything, abused in a post war situation, I see no reason to single out anyone or anything for special concern. All people and the environment they live in are part of the post-war world. Children and trees have no more moral standing than adults. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that systematic abuse of children or of the environment would say something rather unwholesome about the victors.
14. See, for example, Powers (2008) for an argument from a scholar who thought the invasion unjust and Elshtain (2008) for a scholar more favorable to the Bush Administration.
