Plato, Thucydides, and the Education of Alcibiades

Abstract

The problem of the relationship between warmaking and the health of the city constitutes an important part of the Platonic corpus. In the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I, considered in antiquity one of Plato's most important works, Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that there ought to be a close link between justice and decisions about war. In light of this, Alcibiades’ actual advice to the city regarding the Peace of Nicias, as portrayed by Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War, is put in stark relief within the dialogue. Plato's dialogue about Alcibiades can thus be seen as offering an alternative and morally critical account of how Alcibiades could have used his talents and rhetorical skills in addressing the city on the issue of war. More broadly, it reminds us of the difference between true statesmanship focused on the common good, and political or military rule engaged in for personal benefit or ambition.

Keywords:

• Plato
• Alcibiades
• Thucydides
• Peloponnesian War
• just war
• justice
• virtue

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the fine suggestions from the journal's two anonymous referees and from Gregory Reichberg, most of which are reflected in this final version.

Notes

1. This overview of Alcibiades’ life is based mainly on Denyer 2001, supplemented by Gribble 1999; the most frequently cited Greek source for the life of Alcibiades is Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (henceforth The Peloponnesian War), which, however, must be supplemented by Xenophon's Historia Graeca. Plutarch later wrote about Alcibiades in his Bios paralleloi (most often referred to as Plutarch's Lives), probably basing much of his narrative about the adult Alcibiades on Thucydides. There were also other Socratic authors, aside from Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, who wrote about Alcibiades, but they seem mostly (as was also the case with Plato) to have made philosophical and pedagogical points, rather than give a historical account of Alcibiades’ life. These works survive in fragments, if at all (see Gribble 1999: 214–215; see also Johnson 2003).

2. Steven Forde, in Pangle 1987: 222.

3. As one of the referees for this article pointed out, this is not necessarily a problem, since Plato likely chose dialogue partners who could aptly illustrate the problems raised by Socratic dialectics – including the problem of justice and the role of philosophy in the city. For that task, characters both virtuous and vile could prove fitting. However, I do think we are confronted with a challenge here, since Plato was presumably preoccupied with proving Athens wrong in executing Socrates. Seen in that light, portraying the truly controversial Alcibiades as one of Socrates’ favorite young dialogue partners – and even as a ‘beloved’ – raises some questions about Plato's motives.

4. As one of the referees for this article pointed out, this is not necessarily a problem, since Plato likely chose dialogue partners who could aptly illustrate the problems raised by Socratic dialectics – including the problem of justice and the role of philosophy in the city. For that task, characters both virtuous and vile could prove fitting. However, I do think we are confronted with a challenge here, since Plato was presumably preoccupied with proving Athens wrong in executing Socrates. Seen in that light, portraying the truly controversial Alcibiades as one of Socrates’ favorite young dialogue partners – and even as a ‘beloved’ – raises some questions about Plato's motives.

5. My argument is not premised on Plato having read or consciously commented on Thucydides – we have no proof that he did (although it is likely that he was familiar with Thucydides’ narrative). My point is only that the general story of the Peloponnesian War as it was known by the Athenians of the early- to mid-300s, which was surely part of Plato's ‘cultural background’ (or ‘horizon’) when he wrote his dialogues – and of which Alcibiades’ machinations and eventual downfall were such an important part – receives a useful commentary in the Alcibiades dialogue.

6. Scott 2000 (esp. 81–85), drawing on Paul Friedländer, shows the parallels between this and other Platonic dialogues in which Socrates endeavors to educate young and ambitious men destined (at least in their own eyes) for greatness, especially the Lysis, where Socrates is also engaged in turning around a ‘beloved’ through conversation.

7. For a good overview of the opening of the dialogue and the kinds of problems encountered there, leading up to the discussion of Alcibiades’ counseling the city, see Bruell 2000: 19–23.

8. 107d (180) – the page references in parentheses refer to Carnes Lord's translation, in Pangle 1987.

9. Cf. Statesman: 307e–308b, where we find a pointed criticism of too little as well as too much attention to war-like pursuits.

10. Admittedly, the in bello question is primarily related by Socrates to the timing of battles and the length of time one is to fight, if we are to take Socrates’ explication in 107e and 108a seriously. So although Socrates unequivocally uses the expression ‘in what manner’ twice, it seems he is thinking primarily of picking the right moment to use force, as well as not staying at it for too long. This is, however, not unrelated to what we would call in bello concerns, namely, engaging in war in a proportional fashion, using force only to the extent it is appropriate.

11. 109c (182).

12. 126a (183).

13. 126a (206).

14. 134c (219).

15. 134b (218).

16. The phrase is used repeatedly in the dialogue, see Scott 2000: 91–113.

17. See Reichberg et al. 2006: 24–28; see also Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999: ch. 2, and Syse 2002. For a general argument emphasizing the importance of ethics and justice to considerations of power and politics in Greek thought, see Lebow 2005.

18. The reference is especially to sects. 43–61; in Thucydides 1998: 212–219.

19. I am indebted to Steven Forde's discussion of the dialogue for this interesting observation; see Pangle 1987: 232. Forde's point is that the victory won by the better statesman in Socrates’ royal tale is ‘voluntary and knowing’ (ibid.) on the part of those submitting to that statesman – it is based on admiration and recognition of greatness. Thus, Alcibiades is not told to defeat or come to peace with the kings of Sparta and Persia by means of warfare – he should rather win them over because of that superior virtue which he currently lacks.

20. This is raised by Gregory Crane in Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Crane 1998), excerpted in Thucydides 1998: 501–522, see esp. 519, with reference to The Peloponnesian War 2.65. The Periclean account of the (ideal) virtues of Athens is also brought to our attention in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, bk. 2, esp. sects. 36–41. This certainly functions, in the context of the whole History, as an important contrast to Alcibiades. Thucydides’ own (albeit nuanced and many-faceted) condemnation of Alcibiades is at its most explicit in 6.15, which deals with the lead-up to the Sicilian expedition. (I am grateful to one of the journal's referees for pointing out the relevance of Pericles to my treatment of Plato, Alcibiades, and Thucydides.), “and the importance of Crane's discussion.”