War, Moderation, and Revenge in Thucydides

Abstract

Thucydidean politicians recognize the difficulty posed by the uncertainties of the future in times of war, yet they differ sharply in their conclusions about how best to respond. Thucydides’ analysis of the rhetoric of wartime decision-making focuses upon the deterioration of political culture under a major national crisis, as well as the role of effective leadership in countering this tendency. The dilemma of Thucydidean politics is how to ensure a deliberative process that will not be taken captive by the pressures and emotions of war, and the demagogic leaders who seek to exploit such pressures and emotions for their own ends. By studying the failures and successes of the past (as documented and analyzed in his History), decision-makers in the future can better understand the political dynamics of wartime decision-making and the corrosive forces that crises too often produce. Thucydides’ narrative analyzes the political, social, and moral psychological dynamics that produce aggression, violence, and the desire for domination and revenge. On his view, these are not inevitable products of human nature, merely dispositions that normative institutions are designed to check. Rather he portrays human nature as running amok when such checks are weakened. What can restrain ‘human nature’ are the norms and institutions that promote communal as opposed to factional or individual interests.

Keywords:

• Thucydides
• political deliberation
• demagogy
• revenge
• moderation
• wartime rhetoric

Notes

1. Page references to Thucydides’ History in the following are to Thucydides 1972.

2. This is the Athenian response to the Melian plea for mercy after the Athenians tell them their choice is either to accept Athenian domination or death.

3. On argumentation in Thucydidies’ speeches, see Gommel 1966.

4. On Thucydides’ use of speeches, see Finley 1986: 13–15.

5. There is a huge secondary literature on Thucydides, including monographic accounts of virtually every aspect of his methodology, narrative, and ideas. See, for example, Adcock 1963, Connor 1984, Erbse 1989, Finley 1963, Finley 1968, Forde 1989, Hornblower 1987, Hunter 1973, Luce 1997, Price 2001, Rusten 1989, Woodhead 1970.

6. On Thucydides and Pericles, see E. Bayer's article ‘Thukydides und Perikles’ in Hertzer 1968.

7. See M. I. Finley, ‘Introduction’, in Thucydides 1972: 28.

8. On the workings of Athenian Democracy, see Ober 1989 and Sinclair 1988.

9. For the context of the debate at Sparta, see Debnar 2001.

10. On Periclean Rhetoric in Thucydides, see Yunis 1996: 59–86.

11. See Loreaux 1986.

12. On the psychological and rhetorical dimensions of demagogy, see Hunter 1986 and Hunter 1988.

13. For detailed analysis and different views of the Mytilenean Debate, see Andrewes 1964, Cogan 1981, Cohen 1983, Macleod 1978.

14. For Cleon and Diodotus as portrayed by Thucydides, see Saar 1953 and Yunis 1996.

15. On Thucydides’ presentation of Cleon, see Yunis 1996: 87–92. For the best discussion of demagogy in Thucydides and Athens more generally, see Finley 1985: 38–75.

16. The passage, as well as Cleon's speech as a whole, conflates the language of punishment and revenge.

17. This is the standard format for an Athenian trial in this period.

18. This is a common, and apparently very effective, technique in the Athenian law courts.

19. For two views of the relation between the events in Plataea and Mytilene, see Cogan 1981 and Cohen 1983.

20. The attempt to purse political rivals or enemies through the courts is common enough at Athens. In times of internal and external political crisis, however, this tactic can lead to civil war.

21. In the temples they invoke the institution of ‘asylia’, or asylum, that is supposed to afford them protection as long as they remain in the sacred precinct.

22. On tyranny, see Meier 1990: 36–49, 169–171.

23. For what is still one of the best accounts of Athenian imperialism, see de Romilly 1963.

24. On Thucydides’ account of the decision to invade Sicily, see Yunis 1996: 101–109.

25. Professor John Woo's phrase.