Science, Society, and Water Resources in New Zealand: Recognizing and Overcoming a Societal Impasse

Abstract

The Canterbury Regional Council, which manages 70% of New Zealand's irrigated land, has struggled to control the burgeoning demand for water resources as more land is converted to highly profitable, water-intensive dairy farms relying on groundwater. At the centre of Canterbury's struggle over water resources and their effective management are two competing groundwater science models. The different approaches and their implications for water management have led to a situation commonly described as a ‘science impasse’, with scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders increasingly focused on ‘how to break the gridlock over science’, particularly in one of the region's major watersheds, the Selwyn. In keeping with the traditional logical positivist, linear approach to science, the expectation is that if the scientists can get the science right, then the ultimate goal of water sustainability will be made more likely, since the ‘facts’ will guide policymakers towards proper decisions. Yet, our research found that while stakeholders do focus tightly on the dominant role of science and scientists when discussing solutions to the impasse, the underlying reality is a societal impasse grounded in the overarching adversarial setting, the logic of the wicked problem set, and the ultimate goal of sustainability. Seeing the ‘impasse problem’ from this new perspective means that getting only the physical science right addresses the symptoms, not the underlying causes of the impasse. This article develops why the traditional instrumental, linear approach to science is unlikely to work in this case, and why an alternative approach to science—civic science—offers promise as a way forward. A final section turns to the kind of steps most likely required for transition of the Selwyn watershed's ‘societal impasse’ dynamic from an adversarial setting to an effective collaborative governance arrangement conducive to the civic science enterprise.

Keywords:

• Water resource management
• policy gridlock
• impasse
• collaboration
• civic science
• governance

Notes

The other possibility here is the use of hierarchy or national authority. Two stakeholders suggested that the ‘national government might need to step in and swing a big stick’ to force a resolution of the impasse. Yet, neither think it is the best way forward as a first step, in part, because it undermines ECan's authority and it is likely not to be considered legitimate by most people (interviews 16 March 2009B, 20 March 2009F). Another stakeholder suggested that the national government write a new law that explicitly inserts the precautionary principle into the RMA, thus giving ECan greater power to stop water consents when scientific uncertainty precludes a clear sense that the water abstraction will not harm the environment. Yet, the ascent to power of the conservative National Party in early 2009 makes this course of action unlikely for some years to come.

The purpose of the LGA 2002 is to empower local government to promote social, economic, and environmental well-being of their communities.

Empirical support for the analytical bias of academic disciplines can be found in Barke & Jenkins-Smith (1993). Similarly, others discuss biases in academic disciplines and the effects on public policy (e.g. Cohen, 2006), while the public administration literature has long recognized that many experts, scientists included, are susceptible to the ‘trained incapacity’ problem, wherein experts in a particular field or discipline become less skilled at recognizing or seeing the broader ‘big picture’ implications of their decision-making (Knott & Miller, 1987).

See www.wet.org.nz.

The concept here is that participants are dedicated to facilitating meaningful change while including existing livelihoods in the plans for the ‘place's’ future, all while recognizing that modifications to such livelihoods will be needed to achieve the ultimate goal of long-term problem-solving success.

Daniels & Walker (2001, p. 184), Weber (2003, p. 87).

Daniels & Walker (2001, pp. xviii, 181), Weber (2003, p. 87).

Daniels & Walker (2001, pp. 184, 187), Weber (2003, p. 89).

Daniels & Walker (2001), Weber (2003, p. 237).

Daniels & Walker (2001, p. 184), Weber (2003, p. 88).

Daniels & Walker (2001, p. 184).

Daniels & Walker (2001, p. 181), Weber (2003, p. 88).

Daniels & Walker (2001, pp. 72–73), Weber (1998, pp. 115–116, 2003, pp. 4, 77), and Sabatier et al., (2005, p. 195).