A Philosophy of Jewish Education in Question Marks: A Possible Reading of Michael Rosenak’s Last Speech

Abstract

Writing this article presents me with an opportunity to look closely at the last speech that my father and mentor, Professor Michael (Mike) Rosenak z”l gave before his passing in 2013. I will write about this speech from a perspective that is based on my intimate familiarity with the questions that concerned him throughout his life. I will offer a close description of this speech after articulating several of the basic concepts which accompanied my father’s teaching throughout his career. It seems to me that toward the end of his life, a new motif appeared in my father’s educational philosophy that stemmed from this process. I wish to show how this motif was expressed very gently and subtly in the final speech.

Notes

¹ This speech was delivered at Makhon Schocken in honor of his book, Covenant and Community (M. Rosenak, 2013).

² For more on his research and thought, see: Cohen (2005a, 2005b, 2007); and the articles of Harvey (2005) and Oaks (2005).

³ In the sense of “Know Him in all your ways,” it applies to “eating, drinking, clothing, work, leisure, society and the state, love and war” (Simon, 1983).

⁴ Rosenak’s use of Egan’s writings may be found, for example, in his books: Roads to the Palace: Jewish Texts and Teachings, (M. Rosenak, 1995, pp. 74–84, 234) and Tree of Life, Tree of Knowledge: Conversations with the Torah (Rosenak, M. 2001, p. 441), and in various articles.

⁵ Rosenak draws a three-way distinction between “language,” “holy literature,” and “literature.” He sees it as more accurate to describe the Bible as “language” and Talmudic literature as “holy literature.” However, this fine-tuning is not necessary for the purposes of our discussion. See M. Rosenak (2001, p. 5) and A. Rosenak (2007b, pp. 49–51).

⁶ By this he also intended to include Peter Berger’s (1967) concept of “plausibility structures” (M. Rosenak, 1995, p. 20 n. 2).

⁷ This model, even if it may be criticized analytically and philosophically, was extremely effective from an educational–practical viewpoint.

⁸ This statement, as noted, is too sharp and does not reflect the more subtle ways in which translation takes place within the community of “explicit religion”; but a discussion of this issue is beyond the framework of this article.

⁹ An echo of this dialectical idea is found in Simon (1963, pp. 213, 234–235).

¹⁰ For example, the modern aspects of “Hardal” consciousness which, despite its Haredi inclinations, are rooted in the modern experience.

¹¹ From a recording of conversations concerning this book.

¹² I have written at length on this approach and its relation to Simon’s binary model in my book (A. Rosenak, 2013) which was written in the course of intensive discussion with my father (A. Rosenak, 2007c, pp. 44–57).

¹³ See A. Rosenak (2007a, p. 46) on the concept of “incorporation”/“integration.” See also Hartman (1976, pp. 15–20).

¹⁴ “On this occasion I am deeply moved because, like many of the people sitting here, I received a socialization which says that, in practice, ‘the thing’ is lost. It has no future, or the future is shallow, or completely ‘translated.’ All kinds of things have been said about this enterprise, and we do not notice that meanwhile new generations have learned ‘the thing’ and are happy to continue it.”

¹⁵ “As one who engages in the philosophy of Jewish education (I will not say that I am a philosopher of Jewish education, because I do not know if there is such a thing), I need to do two things: first, to engage in the normative aspect of the tradition—to do what we refer to when we speak of ‘norms.’ Second, as Zvi Beckerman always says to me, ‘What is really going on?’ Examine this question and you will know the task (of Jewish education).”

¹⁶ “As is known, I tend towards normative philosophy. Those who preceded me pointed out the problems involved in a normative approach. It is too easy to say, ‘See this and sanctify it’—and to think that this will influence others, rather than to accept beliefs, opinions and truths, after or during a discussion spread over the span of an entire lifetime. I wish to point out a number of problems that exist in the project per se: One can define Jewish education—and education in general—as an attempt of adults to transmit and to sell their own worldview to the younger generation. You can blame me by saying, ‘He engages in indoctrination.’ But precisely because there is a danger of indoctrination which we wish to avoid, the present task is so much more difficult.”

¹⁷ “But I want to take education and define it in another way, one which in my opinion is quite likely: Jewish education is an attempt to deal with problems, contradictions and polarities, to see the tensions which exist in education and to engage them. To truly engage them.”

¹⁸ “What comes out of all this? We need to learn many things. We cannot define before we think; and when we engage in Jewish education, we learn that there are not only contradictions, but that there is a need to attempt to arrive at some sort of integration between these contradictions. This integration—as Jonathan Cohen already said in the name of Fackenheim—allows us to strive for perfection, without being certain that we shall ever arrive there; without thinking that there is a shortcut to perfection.”

¹⁹ “The moment that we see education as opposed to all those things which we believe, think, and know, we begin to enter a very problematic world.”

²⁰ “For example: What is more important—to know how to fix a car (because if you are unable to do so in today’s world, you run a risk, because today’s world is cruel and dangerous), or to know one of Shakespeare’s sonnets? But why do I speak about Shakespeare? One could speak about understanding a sugya in the Talmud.”

²¹ “But the moment we do this [i.e., decide that it’s worthwhile to learn a sugya in the Talmud], our path is only beginning. What if this sugya ‘doesn’t speak to me’? What if it is boring? Do I need to tell everybody that it is interesting in order to sustain the Jewish people?”

²² “‘Spontaneity.’ Everyone is in favor of spontaneity, but we also want justice! And not all of us are geniuses like those Sages who called the evening of celebration of Jewish freedom Seder night, i.e., ‘The night of order.’ Is order the opposite of freedom?”

²³ “I need to decide whether I will learn how to integrate these two things, and how I introduce ‘translation.’ And, as has already been mentioned here this evening, oftentimes this is already a translation.”

²⁴ “I did in fact mention spontaneity as opposed to order, but I can offer dozens of other examples in which I am in favor of this and that, and in which we see ourselves as committed to both this and that—but we need to learn language in order to even approach this goal.”

²⁵ “I have a very sweet granddaughter who, after a year of discussion (and many years of indoctrination on my part …) who, while we were studying together something from Parashat Mishpatim—not one of the easiest subjects—asked me about the verse ‘you shall not suffer a witch to live’ and ‘he shall surely die.’ She wondered: what is this? And I told her that the Sages interpret it in such-and-such a way, and that we understand it in such-and-such a way. She then said: ‘if we are meant to understand it in this way and not as it is written, then why do we need the written text? Things always come out too well!!’ Another translation on my part.

²⁶ And thus I may continue. When we say that everything is organization, uncovering and new interpretations, we ask ourselves—where do all these things come together? Is there some sort of dialectic between the different sides? When are we able to say “But we think that this particular interpretation ought to guide us.” Note: I did not say that we need to accept it, and that this and only this interpretation is the correct one. But who determines “this”?

²⁷ When I review everything that has been written about integration, I always remember a concept that I learned thirty years ago, from an English philosopher, who drew a distinction between implicit religion and explicit religion. This distinction became a kind of motto for me, a guiding principle. Within religion itself we find all of the contradictions. And when I introduce [these ideas] into the philosophy of education, I ask myself: What takes precedent over what?”

²⁸ “We are accustomed to thinking that when there are many contradictions and we don’t know how to act, philosophy can help us. The great philosophers were men who had answers, while I merely ask questions—so why not turn to them?”

²⁹ “And here I utilize two thinkers from the 19th and 20th centuries, who teach us that things are not so simple. If I go to philosophy and claim that philosophy is the key to wisdom—I forget—and this I learned from Hermann Cohen, the prominent German Jewish philosopher—that philosophy and philosophers have some kind of operating system, and their operating system is the intellect, the ratio; and that everything is found in the intellect. And therefore I also need to judge the philosophers, as Franz Rosenzweig did, and ask: To what did the philosopher not relate? What did he not acknowledge in his own experience? Integration needs to be at a higher level, at a place where there is room for feeling, for intellect, for revelation, for industry—for everything which engages us and helps us to understand things better, and always with the knowledge that we don’t understand much [or that there are many things which we do not understand].”

³⁰ ”This is a difficult task, and I remember a dear friend of mine who passed away a number of years ago—Seymour Fox of blessed memory—from whom I learned a great deal, who with his simple words and in his unique style would say: ‘Don’t think that this is the [whole] story. The story is never finished.’”

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Avinoam Rosenak

Avinoam Rosenak is on the faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a research fellow at the Van Leer Institute. E-mail: [email protected]