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ABSTRACT
UK Orthodox Jewish educators face a number of ethical dilemmas surrounding truth-telling in the classroom. While they must comply with government legislation and high standards of professional conduct, they may also wish their practice to be informed by halachic considerations. This theoretical study explores the potential tensions that may arise when allegiances to the above areas lead to conflicting courses of action, and attempts to plot a course of appropriate conduct that can satisfy all considerations. Direct distortion is identified as an inappropriate tool, whereas omission of content that will hinder students’ Orthodox development is considered preferable to unfiltered disclosure.
Notes
1 This is distinguished from statutory legislation in that it considers the current widespread standards of acceptable practice for school teachers.
2 Confessional religious education sees religious education as a means of transmitting faith and doctrine—the ideal outcome of which is students who will believe and practice according to the tenets of the religion that their education has centered around (De Velasco, Citation2007, p. 79). “Confession” here does not refer to verbal admission of sin, but emanates from the usage to describe a church edict or doctrine (as in Schleunes, Citation2016).
3 See Sanhedrin 92b; Sotah 42a; Pesachim 113b; Sefer HaChinuch Mitzvah 74; Sha’arei Teshuvah, iii, 179; Mishnah Berurah 559,4.
4 Euphemistically dubbed “changing” [from truth]. Some have derived from this euphemism that one should only change as far as is absolutely necessary (see Aruch L’Ner, Yevamos 65b), a position discussed at length below.
5 Smag Asin 107; Responsa of Rema 11; Responsa of Chassam Sofer vi,59; Taz O.C. 565,6; Magen Avraham 166,2; Pischei Teshuva C.M. 18,4; Shulchan Aruch HaRav O.C. 156,2; Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 240,41; Mishnah Berurah 156, 4 and R. Kanievsky (Citation2014).
6 Though not directly relevant to education, it should be noted that deception in financial matters and in court is never permissible (R. Dratch, Citation1988; R. Weiss, Citation2016).
7 Rashi and Rabenu Chananel, ibid.
8 R. Nissim Karelitz, cited by R. Zilberstein (Chashuke Chemed, Bechoros 43a; ibid, Bava Kama 38a); R. S. Z. Auerbach (cited by Sofer, Citationn.d.); Mishneh Halachos (Responsa, ix, 381); Yad Eliyahu (Responsa, 48, c.f. 61); R. Y. Y. Kanievsky (Kreina D’Igresa, 203) cited by R. Frimer and Frimer, 2008; Maharam Szyk (cited by Feuerman, Citation2012; Shapiro, Citation2015); Shelah (Shavuos, Ner Mitzvah).
9 Interestingly, this point is made by James (Citation2013).
10 Sukkah, 46b; Rambam Shavuos 12,8; Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 141,1; Iggeres HaGra; Shelah, Sha’ar HaOsioys, 4, Derech Eretz; R. Kanievsky (Citation1997); R. Fisch (Citation2004); R. Silver (Citation2011).
11 Problematically though is that Sefer Chasidim (1061)—an authoritative medieval text—writes that “a man of Truth” would not take this course of action. Perhaps he is referring to a situation where “peace” is not threatened.
12 Shapiro’s (Citation2015, p. 22) translation.
13 Menachos 99b and commentaries ad loc.; Shabbos, 139a; Sha’agas Aryeh (Responsa, 1); Chiddushei HaRamban (Avodah Zara 61a); Mishnah Berurah 317,7; Beis Yosef O.C. 317,3 and C.M., 34; Rema Y.D. 124,24; Shach, Y.D. 160,22; Pri Megadem, Eshel Avraham, O.C. 406; Chaye Adam ii, 20 and ii, 26,2; Chachmas Adam, Sha’ar Issur v’Heter 76.