Erratum

This article refers to:

On a Diet: Explaining Differences in Overhead among Public Agencies in the Era of Austerity

Article title: On a Diet: Explaining Differences in Overhead Among Public Agencies in the Era of Austerity

Authors: Jan Boon and Koen Verhoest

Journal: Public Performance & Management Review

Bibilometrics: Volume 38, Number 2, December 2014, pages 234–260

DOI: 10.1080/15309576.2015.983828

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

In the above article, published in issue 38(2) of Public Performance & Management Review, Table 7 on page 251 was presented incorrectly. The correct table appears below. In addition, there is an ellipsis in the second paragraph on page 239 that should not have been printed. The correct paragraph also appears below. The publisher apologizes for these errors.

Table 7. Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

Conditions/Solution terms	1	2	3
High formal autonomy	•	•
Performance-based target present	•		•
Frequent monitoring		○	•
Small agency		•
Task with standardizable overhead			○
Consistency	0.90	0.93	0.90
Raw coverage	0.37	0.20	0.18
Unique coverage	0.18	0.12	0.02
Overall solution consistency	0.91
Overall solution coverage	0.51
N	47

Third, rational choice theorists argue that monitoring agencies based on performance-based targets comes at a cost at the agency level because of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and a residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agencies must develop and employ systems to measure, manage, and evaluate results, which translates into additional overhead. Taking the potentially overhead-increasing effects of formal autonomy and result control together, the second hypothesis expects the (combined) effect of high levels of formal autonomy and high levels of result control to contribute to a high overhead (H2).