To hope, to lose, and to hope again

Abstract

The author's (Snyder, 1994b) recent theory of hope is introduced and discussed in the context of potential reactions to the loss of important goal objects. In particular, hope is defined as goal-directed thinking in which the person appraises his or her perceived capability to produce workable routes to goals (this is called pathways thinking), as well as the potential to initiate and sustain movement along the pathways (this is called agentic thinking). In this sense, hope is an acquisition type of thinking in that it reflects instances in which people perceive that they are capable of progressing toward desired objects. In contrast to the procurement properties of higher hopeful thinking, loss reflects instances in which goal-directed thinking is lessened or curtailed because the goal object (i.e., a thing, experience, or person) is unobtainable. At one level, therefore, losses are antithetical to hopeful thinking. At another level, however, losses are an inherent part of goal-directed thinking in that they may be built into one's expectations. The short- and long-term effects of losses on the person's subsequent hopeful thinking are discussed.