Promoting Freedom of Association in China? Putting Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility into a National Context

Abstract

Using the findings of an intensive case study of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) project in China, this paper argues against the view that CSR and the state's regulations are mutually exclusive. It contests that the theorization of the transnational social movement (TSM) should not ignore the development of the state regime, which in turn is shaped by the power relations in the workplace and the community, and is embedded in the national political history. The findings of this research support the Polanyi-inspired approach which sees CSR as being embedded in the changing patterns of business–government–society relations. This approach highlights that the behaviour of the state and the engagement of civil society have actively shaped the scope and the implementation of CSR. Following this line of argument, this paper provides evidence of the dynamics and paradox of workers' and grassroots NGOs' engagement in CSR in China. The specificity of China stems from the state, on the road of China's transition from a state socialist country to being a part of global capitalism. Workers' and NGOs' frustration at the denial of freedom of association (FOA) under the CSR projects at this stage reflects well the legacy of Chinese state socialism, in particular the nature of the official trade unions and the suppressive function of the local state–global capital nexus. Therefore, the state is by no means being excluded from either business or civil society, as the orthodox view of CSR presumes.

Keywords:

• CSR
• workers’ committee
• NGOs
• freedom of association
• migrant workers
• China

Notes

1 See C. Chan (2012) for the development of labour NGOs in China.

2 The staff are called “fake engineer” (zaojia gongchengshi) as they have to have excellent computer programming skills.

3 The information was drawn from the author's experience as a MSI social auditor in August 2006 and from discussions with other experienced auditors.

4 Interview on 11 March 2006.

5 The peasants with their household registration (hukou) in rural villages were each allocated a piece of farm land after the reform in 1978. Rapid industrialization from the early 1990s dramatically transformed the farm land into industrial land. The industrial zones were all developed by village governments and rented out to the Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs) and Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs) until the mid-1990s, when larger factories were allowed to “rent” a piece of land for 30 years with a lump sum price to develop in their own capacity. The urbanization policy granted the rural population the status of citizenship, and the villages were then renamed as “communities” (shequ). The communities also accepted some migrants who gained the status of permanent citizenship by purchasing a house or getting a proper job within their territories under a quota system run by the state. However, the new citizens were not entitled to the rental income of the land and industrial estates. Share companies were set up to collect the rents and other incomes and distribute them to the villagers.

6 Informal interviews, July and September 2012.

7 See Chan and Chiu (2011) for a detailed elaboration of the similarities and differences of the labour NGOs in China and Taiwan.