Abstract
This introduction examines the main premises and terms of the special issue: person, agency, and representation. It argues that representation and agency stand in an internal relation: There is no agent without its personification and no agency without its possible vicarious representation. Yet, personification and representation enable agency only by at the same time complicating the integrity, authority, and presence of the agent. The introduction elucidates the inherent and conflictual relation of representation and agency by means of three early modern scenes from theology, law, and literature, and offers a brief overview of the individual contributions.
I. REPRESENTING AGENCY
Questions around representation are again at the heart of current debates. Important contemporary transformations, both political and institutional, are informed by the limitations of who is being represented in the given political, institutional, and cultural structures, as well as by the open question who can in fact represent whom – with what authority, legitimacy, and in what way. Representational democracy is once more coming under attack, when self-declared advocates of the people depict elected representatives as “enemies of the people” who fail to give voice to those whom they ought to represent. On the other end of the political spectrum, there are increasing calls for an expansion and extension of modes of legal and political representation for those whose voices are not being heard, be it people with precarious legal and political status like immigrants and refugees, silenced victims of genocide, future generations, or even non-human entities like animals and rivers.
Half a century after Hanna Pitkin’s seminal work on the concept of representation,Footnote1 and decades after a string of fundamental critiques of representation,Footnote2 it is time to rethink representation’s complexities, challenges, and open potentialities. We need to reconsider representation both in view of its problematic implications and, at the same time, in view of its necessity and fundamental productivity regarding our individual and shared agency and our various ways of living together.
Such an endeavor depends upon understanding the ways in which representation has an irreducible part in constituting what is represented by it, and on exploring the modes in which this representation can give rise to both productive and restrictive processes, enabling and stifling agency. In this way, one has to question both the ‘myth of the given’ underlying various conceptions of the represented and a static understanding of the process of representation. In the first respect, Bryan Garsten has shown with regard to political representation that representative liberal democracy should not, in fact, attempt to attain what it is often said to aim for: to re-present a united and coherent popular will. On the contrary, it should rather question and undermine the presumption that there is such a thing as the one popular will, and representative government should be the institutionalized questioning und undermining of this misconception. Not only is it impossible, as Garsten argues with Pitkin, to actually re-present the people, as there is no unity of “the people” prior to any representation and as this representation thus amounts to the representation of an absence.Footnote3 We should also attend to the productive, dynamic, and performative character of representation. As Judith Butler has suggested with her recent performative theory of assembly, we thus have to investigate the way in which the political process is one of self-constitution.Footnote4 Even the singular person as the putative basis for both a collective popular will and representative government is not a given, ready made before any representation, but rather formed and in fact constituted as such by the process of representation itself.
An essential point of departure for this volume is thus the question as to how the constitution of subjective agency and the formation of personhood depend in fundamental ways on the ability to be represented and to stand in for someone else. As the special issue shows, the fundamental bond tying agency and representation irreducibly together becomes especially visible in legal and literary notions of personhood. Such conceptions of personhood need to be retrieved in all their complexity against the problematic subjectivization of the concept that Marcel Mauss has diagnosed and connected to Enlightenment thinking. According to Mauss, we can detect an evolution of the concept of personhood in Western Europe that suggests basing personhood on the fact of a given individual consciousness.Footnote5 But this Enlightenment view of a person based on a given individual consciousnessFootnote6 is not without alternative. Not only can it be contrasted with other notions in Australian aboriginal and Native American societies, in which personhood is based on social and environmental relationships, as Mauss suggests; it also stands in tension with another Western notion of personhood based on a representational concept of the person that does not consider it as a given fact but as the complex result of a personification. As Hobbes’ Leviathan has made clear, this tradition has suggested that to be a person is to represent an other or to be represented: a person is a mask to which we can attribute words and deeds. Such an alternative conception evolved further in the legal tradition. As Hans Kelsen has characterized it in 1934, the legal function of a person is a “complex of legal obligations and rights, whose totality is expressed figuratively in the concept of ‘person’” which is “the personification of this totality.”Footnote7 Gustav Radbruch stresses the “‘fictional,’ that is, the artificial nature of all … persons.”Footnote8 If the person itself, as the basis for any representation, is already an artificial representation, then the further representation by another person surely cannot claim any direct, immediate, or substantial “presence” which is already absent from the original person to be represented. Fully understanding the function of the person in all of its social and legal implications is only possible by understanding the technique of personification, a technique that is originally a literary oneFootnote9 based on rhetorical, theatrical, and narrative devices.
The contributions collected in this special issue retrace such alternative conceptions of personhood and representation that view agency and representation as inherently connected. They discuss various legal and literary forms of representing agency – speaking for, representing, or impersonating a person; acting as an advocate, a proxy, an attorney, a legal guardian, a “statement taker,” or a political representative. This set of modern figures, developing and re-actualizing a complex rhetorical, theological, and legal heritage, highlights in what way modern law and literature unfold, expose, and extend, but also limit the ways in which someone can act or speak for someone else vis-à-vis a third party. The contributions ask what it means to be able to act or speak in the place of another, or to have actions carried out in one’s own name by others—possibilities that count as vital accomplishments of modern societies while at the same time implying distinct risks and dangers haunting modernity. The contributors explore how representing agency – the agency enacted in and produced by representation – can enable us to speak and act, but also hinder us from speaking and acting. Addressing both the complex, long history around questions of representation and agency and their latest developments, the contributions include case studies of new practices, institutions, and laws of agency, as well as reevaluations of the fundamental theoretical conceptions that mark its history. A special emphasis is placed on the urgency and difficulty of speaking for those who are deemed unable to speak for themselves and on recent tendencies to extend and re-articulate the order of agency by representation in an attempt to speak and decide for comatose patients,Footnote10 give a voice to victims of apartheid and genocide, migrants and refugees, animals and rivers. If “personhood” is not constituted by individual consciousness, as Mauss claimed it was for the Enlightenment notion of personhood in Western Europe, but is rather, as Andreas Fischer-Lescano puts it, speaking with Niklas Luhmann, “a form of distinction through which a system observes the world,”Footnote11 then there is no prima facie reason why it would be impossible to consider non-human actors as persons. And yet, the ambivalences inherent in the conceptions of personhood and representation also raise the question of the potential dangers of extending those conceptions without rethinking them.Footnote12
The two terms that this special issue binds together – representation and agency – are in a way already present in the two principal meanings the OED cites under the heading of “agency” itself: 1. ‘A person or organization acting on behalf of another’; and 2. ‘Action, capacity to act.’Footnote13 In the word “agency,” the scene of representation and of action thus intersect. The inherent connection and the possible tension between these two meanings of agency are one essential crux of our collection. They can be captured by one peculiar German term drawing both aspects together: Stellvertretung. The German verb stellvertreten alludes to an act of stepping into and acting in someone else’s place (Stelle) vis a vis a third party – a constellation that is translated into English only with a certain loss when it is usually rendered as either agency or representation, thereby either highlighting the activities that the agent carries out (in the name of and for the sake of the represented) or focusing on the representative function of someone standing in for another. The prefix “ver” included in “Stellvertretung” and “stellvertreten” can refer to a movement or modification and very often has a negative connotation involving loss, error, or dispersion (as in verlaufen: getting lost). Someone taking my place and speaking or acting on my behalf, it seems to suggest, is supplementing me in a way that not only makes me present and gives me agency, but also threatens to replace or disperse me.
II. THREE SCENES FROM THEOLOGY, LAW, AND LITERATURE
The specific paradigm of representing agency captured by the notion of Stellvertretung has a particular significance and history in theology, law, and literature. To give a sense of the theological, legal-political, and literary background of the following contributions, I will introduce three scenes from the early onset of modernity, in which agency and representation seem to be intricately linked. In these scenes, we can identify how representative agency informs the constitution and production of what will become the modern subject, revealing this constitution to depend on such an operation. They show how the subject, which is itself retroactively constituted by being spoken for, is always on the brink of asserting itself as the author or source of any act of representation.
II.1 Theology and Christ’s Double Vicariousness
Giorgio Agamben has unfolded the fundamental Catholic paradigm of representing agency in The Kingdom and the Glory by re-reading the church fathers and their reflections on the intra-Trinitarian economy. His central term characterizing this economy is vicariousness, or to use the German term commonly used in theological debates on these issues, Stellvertretung.
The intra-Trinitarian relation between the Father and the Son can be considered to be the theological paradigm of every potestas vicaria, in which every act of the vicar is considered to be a manifestation of the will of the one who is represented by him. And yet, as we have seen, the an-archic character of the Son, who is not founded ontologically in the Father, is essential to the Trinitarian economy. That is, the Trinitarian economy is the expression of an anarchic power and being that circulates among the three persons according to an essentially vicarious paradigm. … It is not surprising that the same vicarious structure can be found in secular power … In other words, power has the structure of a gerere vices; it is in its very essence vices, vicariousness.Footnote14
The vicarious economy that Agamben depicts here seems to be grounded in a primordial “source” of power (namely, God, who employs representation to manifest himself and rule). By introducing this representative, the vicarious economy at the same time already opens itself up to an anarchic and circular element according to which the source might seem to be actually grounded in its own representation. Modernity seems to reinforce and radicalize this shift when man himself becomes the supposed “source” of any power that – according to Agamben – always works through vicariousness. In the history of theology, the German term Stellvertretung, used here as a translation of this vicariousness, has been debated increasingly since Luther and Grotius. In these reformation contexts, however, it has been discussed less with regard to Christ’s representation of God to mankind, and rather in view of Christ’s representation of man to God.
Luther uses the German verb vertreten (as an elaboration for the pro nobis) in a sermon from 1525 in order to describe Christ’s representative function between man and God. Luther has Christ say the following: “that I sit at his right hand and represent you (euch vertrette) and am your mediator; that all this is done for your sake, that you may likewise come to the Father.”Footnote15 What is remarkable in this scene is the fact that the place at the right hand of God is traditionally not the place of mankind, but exclusively the place of Christ, who inhabits and constitutes this position so that man can also come there. Christ posits himself as a placeholder for mankind, so that this place can first be established as that of man. Luther thus seems not to characterize Christ as representing man vis-à-vis God by stepping into a position that is already established – the position of man. Christ’s standing in for man rather first constitutes man in his specific position and relation towards transcendence.
Grotius is often made responsible for the fact that Stellvertretung is today dominantly perceived as a legal notion, since he reflected on Christ’s assumption of responsibility for humanity’s deeds in legal terminology. Stellvertretung has thus become a legal term characterizing one person’s representing another in front of a third. But it is Hobbes’s legacy that the general legal and political representability of the person is presented as the foundation for normative agency and political order.
II.2 Hobbes and the Legal Impersonation of Man
Hobbes himself links his notion of representation to the Trinitarian doctrine that God is one substance but three persons. The Leviathan which he calls a mortal God may be personated just as the true God. In fact, it is only produced by impersonation: The multitude of men only become one by being personified by the sovereign. The alleged “real unity of them all” is thus revealed as the effect of a personification, a “Fiction. The second scene I would therefore like to briefly evoke – more elaborated readings can be found in this volume – is from Hobbes’s Leviathan. Acting as a representative is, on Hobbes’s account, not a particular marginal technique, but lies at the very foundation of acting in a social sphere. To be an agent in the sense of being someone who can act with normative significance requires us to act as a person, and that means: to act as a representative and to be representable.Footnote17 Even in the case where there is no one else representing me, that is, acting involves representation: In order to act with normative significance, I have to act as and with my person and thus have to represent myself.
It seems that Hobbes introduces the legal person in terms of agency by drawing on the perspective of a third party: Whenever a subject enters into social space by acting or speaking, it necessarily appears in the form of a person to whom one can attribute actions or words. In chapter XVI of Leviathan, ‘Of Persons, Authors and Things personated,’ Hobbes describes the person in this sense: ‘A Person, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.’Footnote18 The central concept of the person is in this way established and explicated from an external perspective (‘considered as his own or another, to whom they are attributed’). Between the person representing himself, and the person representing someone else, there is no substantial difference: in both cases, the words and deeds need to be attributed to a representing instance. To be a person means to take on a public face or mask: to be represented – either by yourself or by others – in relation to others, to whom the same applies. Thus, for Hobbes the person is bound to the perspective of an ordered structure of social space, the social contract. The person is a concept of relation, not of natural substance. It seems that the second, substantial meaning of agency comes into play only in reaction to the first: As a means of anchoring and ordering the representative relation, Hobbes distinguishes between the actor and the author. Being an author is, however, itself a relational status that is constituted in distinction from, and thus as an effect of, the representative action.
II.3 Literature and the Personification of Representation
I will close with a third scene of representing agency in early modernity which foregrounds the literary character of this activity: a scene from Shakespeare’s King Lear. In this play, the theatrical figure of Kent seems to be a generalized representative and advocate of the unrepresented. He speaks not for himself, but on behalf of other figures precisely to the extent they cannot speak for themselves. When Cordelia is called upon to step forward and declare herself to her father the King, answering with “nothing,” Kent steps in. Even though he does not have a role according to the King’s protocol, Kent steps forward and takes charge of her role – in many performances literally taking her place – in order to challenge Lear and declare Cordelia’s love for him. Kent also speaks for the bastard Edmund. Ultimately, he speaks for Lear himself when Lear goes mad and when, in the end, he dies. The dying Lear is addressed as he had initially addressed Cordelia, so that Kent answers in his place in a way that Lear no longer could: “O, let him pass! He hates him much/That would upon the rack of this tough world/Stretch him out longer.” (5.3.310-314). In a literary figure such as Kent, the operation that could be called personification itself seems to be personified and is revealed to involve a necessary element of self-empowerment or arrogation. The representative Kent has to authorize himself to speak for those – Edmund, Cordelia, Lear’s ghost – who cannot speak for themselves and therefore cannot authorize him to speak for them – as Hobbes and the legal notion would seem to require. And yet, as this specific literary figure, Kent seems to embody a fundamental feature of literature itself, namely that of lending all kinds of figures and fabricated entities a voice.
III. SPEAKING-FOR-THE-OTHER-BEFORE-THE-OTHER: THE MYSTICAL FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY
All three early modern scenes are scenes of appearing before the gaze of an Other: of God, of the public, of the sovereign: „speaking-for-the-other-before-the-Other.”Footnote19 They all show how the position (Stelle) of the one who is to be represented before this gaze is not a pre-existing given, but is rather created by the very act of representing it. This creates a complex tension and points to an aporetic constellation: The representative must be authorized by a represented agent whom representation itself co-constitutes and who is in large part accessible only through its representative. The scene of Stellvertretung thus points us to what Pascal, Montaigne, and Derrida have in another context called the “mystical foundation of authority.”Footnote20
One answer to this circularity in modernity has been to re-naturalize a rational and conscious subject as the foundation of the representative arrangement. Rather than embracing the authoritative subject as a complex technical effect of rhetorical or performative techniques, legal and institutional procedures take recourse to the idea of a subject whose given intentions and natural rights serve as a foundation. At the same time, the modern differentiation of labor, the political delegation of power, and the bureaucratic and governmental techniques of the social order seem to make the representative function abundant and make its technical apparatus and its excessive proliferation undeniable.Footnote21 Against this background, returning to the idea of a given subject with its natural will, its given intentions, and its subjective rights as the foundation of any lawful representation and of the proper rules of the law of agency seems increasingly questionable.Footnote22 These early scenes of representation seem to expose the construction of Stellvertretung’s complex constellation, the act of stepping into someone’s place, as what established the position that was later, vicariously, as it were, filled by the modern subject. These scenes merely prepare the stage on which the modern subject will act; they keep legible the aporias and predicaments that make it necessary for us to rethink the place occupied by the subject and thereby also blocked from view. Perhaps such scenes can be re-read so as to question the assumptions of both agency and representation that so fatefully marked modernity – the assumptions, namely, of autonomous and pregiven agency that could actually authorize and be made present again in re-presentation. And perhaps they can open our eyes to the challenges to come: the representation of the future, and the future of representation.
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS
Rüdiger Campe and Friedrich Balke open the issue with historical and theoretical reflections on representation and agency. With “Actor, Orator, Person: Passion of Representation or Representation of Passion,” Rüdiger Campe (Yale) outlines a Hobbesian theory of the person by exploring the tension and connection between the two interpersonal models Hobbes uses in the Leviathan, the actor and the orator, and their respective histories in poetics and rhetoric. Friedrich Balke (Bochum) raises fundamental questions about the nature and possibility of representation via readings of Hobbes and Rousseau, in light not only of their stance towards representation, but of their own advocatory agency in their writings. While Hobbes, performing a scene cross-examining the people of the social contract, ultimately speaks for the sovereign and for sovereignty, Rousseau aims to limit any advocacy in the name of “being oneself,” and yet he needs to involve the reader and mankind as his own advocates.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Malte-Christian Gruber, and Christoph Menke extend such theoretical reflection to contemporary debates on questions of the legal agency and representation of non-human entities. With his contribution on “Nature as a Legal Person: Proxy Constellations in Law,” Andreas Fischer-Lescano (Bremen) uncovers the notion of the legal person as an artificial “character mask” and discusses the options for extending it to non-human entities such as animals and rivers. Fischer-Lescano brings Bruno Latour and his “Parliament of Things”Footnote23 together with Jacques Derrida and others who strive to transform the traditional concept of the “legal subject”Footnote24 in order to argue for the legal entitlement of natural agents via proxies. In “Why Non-Human Rights?” Malte-Christian Gruber (Luzern) discusses the function and limits of human rights and makes the case for a rethinking and expansion of such rights. Christoph Menke (Frankfurt/Main) responds to Gruber in “Why Rights?,” suggesting that the best move in the current situation may not be a broader application of the concept of subjective rights to further entities, but a re-thinking of the very notion of subjective rights itself. Arguing that the history of emancipation in the Western tradition has up to now been one of inventing ever new rights, Menke questions the very form of subjective rights, which has restricted the possibilities for participation its was invented to enable.
Petra Gehring and Anne Fleckstein use particular cases to raise larger questions about the connection between representation and agency. In her “Writing for others in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa,” Anne Fleckstein (Bochum) examines the function of writing-for, which certain functionaries deemed “statement takers” take upon themselves in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. While these statement takers have to adhere to a standardization necessary for the purpose of the Commission, they simultaneously need to encourage and give written shape to the particular witness accounts. In this double function, the statement takers appear as personifications of specific forms of media like writing itself. In her “Presumption of Agreement,” Petra Gehring (Darmstadt) discusses questions of agreement in the field of end-of-life decisions. She explores problems with the notions of both will and will-by-proxy for persons near death and incapable of agreeing to medical procedures, while addressing the larger philosophical implications of representation as a ‘dispositif’ in the Foucauldian sense.
As all of these contributions show, agency and representation stand in an internal and yet conflicted relation. They share the sense that by exploring concrete legal, political, and literary configurations, we may understand the ways in which agency and representation enable and disable, expand and constrain our capacity to appear and disappear in our deeds and words, to act or refrain from acting, to separate and distinguish ourselves from or to participate with others to whom we are intrinsically linked.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This special issue is based on a set of contributions first presented and discussed at an International Symposium on Representing Agency hosted by the Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung, Berlin and generously funded by the DFG. Special thanks are due to Susan Morrow for her invaluable help with complex challenges of translations and her excellent editorial work in this volume.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Katrin Trüstedt
Katrin Trüstedt is Assistant Professor in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures at Yale University. Her research engages with modern German and English literature and is situated at the intersection of literature, philosophy, and law. She is the author of The Comedy of Tragedy, which was published with Konstanz University Press in 2011 and awarded the Martin Lehnert Prize of the German Shakespeare Association, and co-editor of Happy Days: Life and Knowledge in Cavell (München: Fink, 2009). She has published various papers on Shakespeare, Schiller, Kleist, Kafka, Kraus, Beckett, Joyce, Schmitt, Blumenberg, Cavell, Müller, and Derrida in journals such as Telos, Law and Humanities, Law and Critique, Modern Language Notes, Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie, Athenäum, and the Brecht Yearbook. Katrin is one of the general editors of the journal Law and Literature. Currently she is preparing her second book on figures of “Stellvertretung” (advocacy, agency, representation, substitution) in theater, law, and literature.
Notes
1 Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967).
2 To name just a few, see Foucault’s historicization of the representational paradigm, Derrida’s deconstructive account of the opposition of presence/representation, Bourdieu’s critique of the representative circularity of power, Gayatri Spivak’s critique of the inherent violence of representation and its tendency to patronize. Cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, 1970); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14. no. 6 (1985): 723–44; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–314; see also Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito, “Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization,” in Law and Globalization from Below, eds. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1; Samera Esmeir, Juridical humanity. A Colonial history (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 72–80 and 285–91; cf. also Friedrich Balke’s and Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s contribution in this volume.
3 Bryan Garsten, “Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty,” in Political Representation, eds. Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, Alexander S. Kirshner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 90–110.
4 See Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); on the critical distinction between self-constitution and self-representation see 168f.
5 See Marcel Mauss, “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self,” in The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, eds. Seven Collins, Steven Lukes, Michael Carrithers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1–25.
6 In his contribution to this volume, Friedrich Balke traces the extent to which this informs e.g. Jean Jacques Rousseau’s conception.
7 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 173.
8 Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie [1932]. Studienausgabe, ed. R. Dreier and S.L. Paulson (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1999), 124–25 (my translation); see also Georg Jellinek’s phrasing: “A being is elevated to legal personality . . . . The state creates the legal personality.” Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte [2nd ed. 1905], ed. J. Kersten (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 82, emphasis added (my translation).
9 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s contribution in this volume.
10 See Petra Gehring’s contribution in this volume. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
11 Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s contribution in this volume. See also Niklas Luhmann, “Die Form Person,” in Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 142–54.
12 See Christoph Menke’s contribution in this volume.
13 See OED Online, “Agency,” https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/3851?redirectedFrom=agency [accessed August 25, 2019]. In the first entry, which points to the ‘laws of agency’ or representation, that is, legal norms regulating the operations and competences of one person acting on behalf of another, the capacity to act seems to be relational and detachable, something distinguishable from any given person as it is transferred to a proxy, procurator, or patron. The second entry, on the other hand, which coincides with the philosophical discourse on action and capacity, seems to locate agency as a substance somehow inside a subject as the capacity to act or make choices – a capacity that, however, needs to be ascribed and assigned.
14 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 138–9.
15 “[…] das ich sitze zu seyner rechten und euch vertrette und eur mitler sey, das alles solchs umb eur willen von myr geschehen sey, damit yhr zum Vater auch komen mochtet.” Martin Luther, “Predigt am Sonntag Vocem Jocunditatis, 21. Mai 1525,” in Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 17/1 (Weimar: Herman Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1907), p. 254, my translation.
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 113.
17 See Rüdiger Campe’s contribution in this volume.
18 Hobbes, Leviathan, 111.
19 Rüdiger Campe, “An Outline for a Critical History of Fürsprache: Synegoria and Advocacy,” DVjs 82, no. 3 (2008): 355–81, here: 355; see also Friedrich Balke’s contribution in this volume.
20 Jacques Derrida, Force de loi. Le “fondement mystique de l'autorité”/Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” Cardozo Law Review 11 (1990): 919–1046.
21 On the implications of the expansion of bureaucratic representative functions see Kerstin Stüssel, In Vertretung: Literarische Mitschriften von Bürokratie zwischen früher Neuzeit und Gegenwart (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2004).
22 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano’s contribution in this volume.
23 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
24 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . .: A Dialogue, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 74.
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