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Abstract
This article reviews orders of intensionality and demonstrates how intersubjective confusions can emerge whenever we try to imagine what others think we think they think. By offering an adaptation and reconfiguration of the Interpersonal Perception Method (IPM), a couples therapy questionnaire developed by Laing, Phillipson, and Lee, the article clarifies how and why interpretation troubles can recur within interpersonal relationships. It also provides a highly practical and teachable method for systematically managing multiple orders of intensionality, and, hopefully, for minimizing some of life's interpersonal discord.
Notes
[1] I first want to acknowledge in gratitude William K. Rawlins, whose graduate Interpersonal Communication seminar at Purdue in 1997 inspired my first attempt at this adapted analysis method. Second, a very brief, weaker attempt at some of these ideas, one that sought to analyze “direct” and “metaperspectives,” appeared in the Iowa Journal of Communication 35 (2003) 263–70. Third, I want to thank the students in my Fall 2013, COM 301 Interpersonal Communication class at Grand Valley, whose capacities and questions kept me inspired and led me to develop this particular advancement. Fourth, I need to acknowledge that an earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy of Communication Division at the 2014 National Communication Association annual convention. Fifth, I want to thank Grand Valley State University and the Pew Teaching and Learning Center for generous travel grants and financial support for this research. Finally, I need to express thanks to Valerie V. Peterson for her thoughtful assistance in the preparation of the manuscript, and I wish to recognize John Dowd, Jermaine Martinez, and Katarina Johnson for proofing during the final stages.
[2] Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 83.
[3] Well beyond the scope of the present essay would be an investigation into the extent to which both science and religion, as requiring fourth order intentionality, are subject to the possibilities of deep-seated intersubjective confusions.
[4] Richard L. Lanigan, The Human Science of Communicology: A Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1992).
[5] Lee Thayer, Pieces: Toward a Revisioning of Communication/Life (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Press, 1997).
[6] Ronald David Laing, Herbert Phillipson, and A. Russell Lee, Interpersonal Perception: A Theory and a Method of Research (New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, 1966); Also see Ronald David Laing, Self and Others (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 99–107.
[7] Ronald David Laing, Knots (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1970).
[8] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 60.
[9] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 62.
[10] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 62.
[11] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 60.
[12] The technical term “agreement” or “disagreement” refers to persons’ intersubjective experiences, not necessarily to some external “fact of the matter” which the larger world needs to recognize and accept. If two people agree, for example, that one of them is “not greedy,” or that one of them “is beautiful,” or that one of them “dances well,” such agreements are not necessarily hooked into “objective features” of the world. Their agreements are registers of the degree to which intersubjective experience, filtered through various levels of interpretation, is possible and/or felt to be possible.
[13] The word “know” often entails the truth of the grammatical complement, meaning that I can know that X is the case, only if X is factually the case. The words “believe” and “think,” in contrast, refrain from making such commitments. Nevertheless, people can incorrectly claim to “know” something, especially another's perspective. In these cases we say that those persons “merely think they know.” See David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (Great Britain, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 115–42; 234–82; also Talbot J. Taylor, Mutual Misunderstandings: Skepticism and the Theorizing of Language and Interpretation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992).
[14] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 62.
[15] See Laing, Phillipson and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 62.
[16] For illustration of the usefulness of an alphabetically-ordered color-coding schema for marking direct perspectives (“Blue”), metaperspectives (“Green”), and meta-metaperspectives (“Yellow”), see my video, titled, “Comprehending Orders of Intensionality,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs1rO1LgGCQ
[17] Simone and Jean-Paul agree. Each understands. Both have the feeling of being understood. And, both realize that they are understood, i.e., that the other understands.
[18] Wayne and Alice agree. Wayne understands but Alice misunderstands. Moreover, each of them has the feeling of being misunderstood. Alice fails to realize that Wayne understands that they agree. Wayne realizes that Alice misunderstands that they agree.
[19] The couple disagrees over whether Fred is a good lover. Both of them misunderstand this. Fred has the feeling of being understood, whereas Wilma has the feeling of being misunderstood. Fred fails to realize that he is misunderstood while Wilma realizes that Fred misunderstands their disagreement.
[20] Romeo and Juliet agree. Both of them misunderstand. Moreover, both have the feeling of being misunderstood. Juliet realizes that Romeo misunderstands that they agree, and Romeo realizes that Juliet misunderstands that they agree; both realize that they are misunderstood.
[21] Sven and Jeremiah disagree. Sven understands but Jeremiah misunderstands. Both have the feeling of being misunderstood. Jeremiah fails to realize that he is understood but Sven realizes that Jeremiah misunderstands their disagreement.
[22] Maurice and Margret agree. Maurice misunderstands while Margret understands. Both Maurice and Margret have the feeling of being understood. Maurice realizes that he is understood, and yet, Margret fails to realize that Maurice misunderstands that they agree.
[23] The couple disagrees. Betty understands but Barney misunderstands. Both have the feeling of being misunderstood. Barney fails to realize that Betty understands that they disagree, while Betty realizes that Barney misunderstands that they disagree.
[24] Olivia and Wilber disagree. Wilber misunderstands, whereas Olivia understands. Olivia has the feeling of being misunderstood whereas Wilber has the feeling of being understood. Wilber realizes that he is understood (i.e., that Olivia understands that they disagree). Olivia realizes that she is misunderstood (i.e., Wilber misunderstands that they disagree).
[25] See Corey Anton, “On the Consequences of Our Interpretations: Summarizing One of Lee Thayer's Contributions to Human Communication Theory,” Anekaant: A Journal of Polysemic Thought 3 (2015): 43–48.