The Stoic Nature of Early Dramatistic Theory

Abstract

As Cicero details in his De Officiis (On Duties), Stoic ethical theory proceeds from a poetics of virtue according to which people act dutifully by performing the roles (personae) in which nature has cast them. Stoicism's dramatistic conception of duty fits within the theatrical dynamics of ancient rhetorical practice, theory, and pedagogy and is a noteworthy precursor to persona theory in contemporary rhetorical studies. Furthermore, the centrality of decorum to Stoic personae theory gives it a poignant rhetorical quality, especially given the circumstances during which Cicero introduced it to Roman readers.

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Ned O'Gorman, Brandon Inabinet, Johanna Hartelius, and Susan Jarratt for thoughtful questions and welcome encouragements. All translations from Greek and Latin are the author's own.

Notes

1. I italicize persona(e) only when I am dealing with its use in ancient works.

2. Also building on the work of Black, Wander, and Morris is Jensen et al. 2010.

3. For these textual sites and insights, I am indebted to Worman 2004. See also Easterling 1999 and Fredal 2006, 170–172, on Aeschines' forging of the logographer-prostitute link at Demosthenes' expense in Against Timarchos. Ober and Strauss 1992 is an excellent study of “the congruity of rhetoric and drama as public speech” (240). Demosthenes and Aeschines show up on pages 250–252.

4. Cicero in De Oratore 1.260–261 and 3.213, Brutus §142 and §313–316 (a tale of Cicero's Demosthenes-like training), De Finibus 5.5; Quintilian 11.3.6; Plutarch throughout his treatment of the life of Demosthenes.

5. Rhetoric references to Poetics: 1371b33, 1372a1, 1404a38, 1404b7 and 37, 1405a5, 1419b5; Poetics to Rhetoric: 1456a35.

6. What are the differences between êthos and persona? For one interpretation, see Cherry 1998. Cherry argues that the former refers to aspects of one's “self-representation” or “self-portrayal” in speech or writing that display phronêsis (practical wisdom), aretê (virtue/excellence), and eunoia (goodwill) (see Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378a; Cherry 1998, 386), whereas the latter refers to the “voice” and “the role or roles” one constructs for oneself in speech or writing (402, 404). I find this approach agreeable, but it is odd that Cherry does not mention that Aristotle names êthos a part of poetry, too. Cherry's main insight is that, like oratory and poetry, êthos and persona are not mutually exclusive and are often nested, one inside the other.

7. In the interest of space, I focus on Cicero and the bodily aspect of delivery. Quintilian flirts with delivery throughout the twelve books of his Institutio Oratoria, but the most extensive treatment occurs in Book 11.3. See also Tacitus' Dialogus De Oratoribus.

8. Written in 55 BCE, De Oratore is projected back into 91 BCE. For the personae Cicero assumes in his capacity as an advocate, see Vasaly 1985.

9. Shame is one of the most social of emotions; as Cicero explains, “the function of justice is not to harm people, that of a sense of shame not to offend” (§99). In his Great Speech in Plato's Protagoras, Protagoras names aidôs (shame) and dikê (justice) as essential to the maintenance of harmonious communal living. Specifically, a sense of shame and justice keep a polis in “good order (kosmoi)” and “bind” people together, “uniting them in friendship (philias)” (322c). See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1383b–1385a.