Kazakhstan’s changing geopolitics: the resource economy and popular attitudes about China’s growing regional influence

Abstract

A US geographer examines prevailing geopolitical discourses in Kazakhstan, through a case study of attitudes toward China and its influence in contemporary affairs. As part of a broader research project, the study draws on data from participant observation, textual analysis, interviews, focus groups, and a country-wide survey administered in Kazakhstan between June 2009 and July 2011. The author investigates the divergent findings across these methods, reflecting a profound ambivalence in popular attitudes about China, and explores their implications for the political geographic literature on state-making.

Keywords:

• Kazakhstan
• China
• critical geopolitics
• popular geopolitics
• capital city
• state-making

Acknowledgements

This material is based upon work supported by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant No. 1003836. This research was also supported by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, an NSF Nordic Research Opportunity grant, an IREX Individual Advanced Research Opportunity Grant, and a US State Department Title VIII Grant for work at the University of Illinois Summer Research Laboratory on Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation, or any other granting organization.

Notes

1. Geopolitical imaginations are the social and material ways that people draw boundaries between themselves and others, and how they see themselves in relationship to variously scaled political communities (e.g. political affiliations at the local, state, or global scale) (Ó Tuathail 2006, 8).

2. A thorough review of that literature is beyond the scope of this paper (see Ó Tuathail 1996; Sharp 2000; Agnew 2003; O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005; Kuus 2007; Dalby 2008, among many others).

3. Only recently, in December 2011, was there an incident of state violence toward protesting oil workers, which resulted in the death of approximately 16 citizens. On this incident and its exceptional nature see Kramer (2011) and Koch (2013).

4. For a complete account, see LeVine (2007, 95–142).

5. This has been paralleled by a similar shift in Russia, in an environment of generally rising crude oil prices (e.g. Bradshaw 2010, 351–355).

6. Meanwhile, KazMunaiGaz has begun positioning itself for better access to Western energy markets through quietly acquiring the Romanian Rompetrol Group between 2007 and 2009, as well as full ownership of Georgia’s Batumi oil terminal and the operating rights to the Batumi Sea Port in 2008 (Socor 2012).

7. Nazarbayev speculated that “In the long term, Kazakhstan can supply up to 40% of [China’s] nuclear fuel. This is tens of billions of dollars in profit” (quoted in Muzalevsky 2011). For background on China’s program for nuclear power expansion, among the more ambitious in the world, see Thomson (2011).

8. Embodied in such things as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices regulations (discussed below).

9. The groups were conducted in Russian and all translations here are my own, though they were transcribed into Russian by a native speaker.

10. While it would have been ideal to collect data from districts directly along the border with China, this was not practical for the broad scope of the survey design. Furthermore, much of this border region is very mountainous (including the Tian Shan, Tarabagatay, and Altay, among other ranges), and is sparsely populated. While this is a shortcoming, the discussion below points to the fact that “physical” proximity to the border is less important in many ways than the perceived “social” proximity to it. As Paasi (1996, 73) has explained, “many of the representations and meanings that people living elsewhere attach to the boundary reflect a more general social consciousness and not so much their own experiences.” Insofar, as this paper is concerned with the geographical imaginaries about the border that characterize this “general consciousness,” the national sample strategy is more appropriate than a targeted sampling in Kazakhstan’s border zones with China.

11. The first, Question 19, was modeled on Kolossov’s (2010) survey to evaluate Russian geopolitical perceptions in the post-Soviet era. They were asked: “Please name up to five countries (except for the country of which you are a citizen): А … in which you would like to live in the near future (2–5 years). B … in which you would NOT like to live in the near future (2–5 years). For the others, Questions 20 and 21, the participants were given a lengthy list of countries (as well as the option to write in any not on the list), and asked to rank the four countries they most and least admired.

12. I do not dwell on the findings regarding the other countries here. However, I would underscore that they confirm the fact that Western countries hold a high degree of prestige for Kazakhstanis (with Germany, France, the US, and UK ranking in the top six), and that many Kazakhstanis do not harbor any great resentment toward Russia after the dissolution of the USSR. The least admired countries also confirm a deep suspicion of perceived “non-secular” Muslim countries (including Iran, Pakistan, and war-torn Afghanistan), as well as negative attitudes toward poorer southern neighbors, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Regarding Kyrgyzstan, it is significant to note that this survey took place only a couple of months after the summer 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan. That country’s high “least admired” ranking in Figure 3 may largely reflect perceptions of events at that time. Regional regimes and the media at their service, especially in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, have played heavily on fears of instability and violence associated with so-called “color revolutions” (Bond and Koch 2010). The 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan further supported this elite argument – which is essentially about justifying nondemocratic practices of government, but which carries strong currency among ordinary citizens.

13. Over the years, I have never heard people reference Uighur separatism/extremism in China’s Western Xinjiang province as a threat to Kazakhstan (where a sizable Uighur population also lives), nor is this articulated as a threat in the official discourse.

14. Of those specifying sources other than China, two each reported Kyrgyzstan, the USA, or “any invasion” as the source; one each identified Russia and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran); and five responded “don’t know.”

15. In the shorthand notation used in this study, FG3P8 refers to the eighth participant in Focus Group 3.

16. For similar accounts, see Wolfel (2002, 495), Follath and Neef (2010, 136), and Greene (2011).

17. Although I interviewed individuals of different ages, all the quotes presented here come from participants aged 20–30.

18. I believe this is also why one hears very little talk about Russia in Kazakhstan: attitudes are overwhelmingly positive or neutral (Table 3 indicates that 68.5% of survey respondents had a positive perception, and 28.8% were coded as “no response”). For corroboration, see Balci (2011).

19. Western media tend to contribute to the impression that Kazakhstanis bear a deep and pervasive fear of China, often drawing on the “rising China” discourse in the USA. This is particularly evident in the National Public Radio series on China, which featured a segment on Kazakhstan (Greene 2011), as well as news sources like RFE/RL (e.g. Najibullah 2010) and German media (e.g. Follath and Neef 2010). On Kazakhstan’s media, see Tussupova (2010). For a striking fusion of the two, see the commentary by Orozobekova (2011).