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Abstract
Kazakhstan sits at the crossroads of Eurasia. Its foreign policy is heavily defined by geopolitics – the intersection of geography and international politics. However, there have been few studies that have systematically analyzed the rhetoric used to define its geopolitical condition. Building upon prior works on United States and Russian presidential addresses, this article examines 18 presidential addresses by Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in an effort to identify the assumptions and content of his “geopolitical code.” In particular, it focuses on four issues: the degree of emphasis Nazarbayev has placed on specific countries and regions, Kazakhstan’s geopolitical situation and position, the multi-vector foreign policy and Kazakhstan’s role in the international system, and the need for Kazakhstan to be integrated into the global economy.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. There is one exception: 2012–2013. In 2012, Nazarbayev gave two presidential addresses: 27 January and 14 December. The next president speech was given on 18 January 2014. Thus, no presidential addresses were given in 2013. However, the difference between the 14 December 2012 speech and the normal time of these addresses (the first quarter of the year) is not significant and for all intents and purposes represents his 2013 speech. Moreover, it appears that Nazarbayev sought to coordinate the timing of the December 2012 speech with the anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence (also in December) in order to present a new, grand political agenda for the country, which he called Kazakhstan-2050. To avoid confusion, this article will refer to 27 January 2012 address as 2012a and the 14 December 2012 address as 2012b. Moreover, the 2007 speech is a bit odd in that it is a two-part address in which the first was spoken live, whereas the second was given to the members of parliament as printed statement and published in print and on the president’s website as part of the 2007 address. Since it is clear that this is meant to be one address, but was separated into two parts for purposes of time, both are included as parts of the 2007 address.
2. Another inconsistency involves the length of these speeches, three of which are rather long (1997: 18,062 words; 2007: 13,862 words; 2012b: 17,427 words) and programmatic. These speeches were 2.5 and 3.5 times the average length of the others.
3. Northern Ireland was coded as part of the United Kingdom, and Taiwan was coded as a separate country.
4. Fourteen out of 27 mentions coded as “Eurasia” also refer to specific international organizations, such as the Eurasian Economic Community or the Eurasian Development Bank. The category “Former Soviet Union” also includes a variety of other phrases used by Nazarbayev to refer to the geographic space of the former Soviet republics, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Only twice, out of 27 times, is the CIS referenced in terms of the organization itself.
5. Although, geographically, the Subcontinent perhaps should represent the southern vector, this is not the case either in Nazarbayev’s conception of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy concept or in his speeches where India and Pakistan appear only rarely (five and one mentions, respectively, out of 233 country references) and South Asia is not specifically referenced at all.
6. Kyrgyzstan (4), Turkmenistan (4), Uzbekistan (3), Ukraine (2), Estonia (1).
7. Non-regional references include organizations not tied to a specific region, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations.
8. In terms of national and ethnic conflict, this chart likely undercounts the degree to which this is seen as a threat, since it only counts explicit references to it as a threat. Instead, the number of times Nazarbayev mentions the need for inter-ethnic cooperation and peace, as well as governmental policies proposed or implemented to that effect, reflects that this is in fact seen as a serious, potential problem for Kazakhstan’s well-being. However, as a threat, this is mostly addressed implicitly.
9. In the 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007 addresses.
10. Obviously, this is more applicable for the United States, Europe, and Asia than for the Islamic countries.
11. Nazarbayev’s references to the importance of Kazakhstan’s connections to the Muslim world also appear prominently in his 2006 and 2012b addresses.
12. This is mentioned by Nazarbayev in eight separate speeches from 2000 to 2012b.
13. South Korea is obviously now democratic, but its rapid economic development after the Korean War occurred under an authoritarian regime.