ABSTRACT
The question of financing the Belt and Road Initiative sharpens the broader debates about the intentions behind and implications of the initiative, in particular, whether it represents an alternative to or within globalization (global capitalism) and the broader global order as currently constituted. This paper addresses this by examining the institutions, actors, mechanisms, and nature of the (proposed) financing of Belt and Road projects. It argues that however Chinese rhetoric on the BRI is read, looking at the financing demonstrates the structural power of the existing institutions, structures, and mechanisms of global political economy, and this will constrain Chinese ambitions to base an alternative world order on the foundations of the BRI.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/(accessed 27 August 2019).
2. Data collected from http://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn (accessed 8 January 2020).
3. This term is not defined, but presumably refers to the shorter list of 64 countries; see Liu, Zhang, and Xiong (Citation2020).
4. The locations of these branches are not evenly distributed across “Belt and Road countries”.
5. It should be noted that “efficiency” or “leanness” as a goal is clearly derived from hegemonic neoliberal and capitalist ideas of development.
6. For example, the establishment in 2019 of a BRI Debt Sustainability Framework, as part of an effort to allay concerns about “debt diplomacy” (Vineles Citation2019).