Nigeria's Amnesty Programme as a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: A Silver Bullet?

Abstract

This paper offers a critical account of the amnesty programme introduced by the Nigerian state in 2009. It examines the impact and limitations of the amnesty as an instrument of peacebuilding, and emphasises the need for wider reforms that address underdevelopment and poverty in the Niger Delta region. The paper argues that the amnesty programme is a laudable effort but is by no means a silver bullet. It is better understood as a specific response to a resource-driven conflict that requires a broader, comprehensive resolution.

Keywords:

• amnesty
• peacebuilding
• Nigeria
• oil
• conflict
• Niger Delta

Introduction

Nigeria's resource wealth has been a major driver of conflict in the past 40 years. The Niger Delta region has been plagued by simmering grievances that blossomed over time into a popular insurgency against the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies (MOCs) (Ukiwo 2011; Obi 2006; 2010). Indigenous communities have been adversely affected by oil extraction, with destruction of local livelihoods and severe environmental pollution.

Indigenous communities have been adversely affected by oil extraction, with destruction of local livelihoods and severe environmental pollution.

Nigeria's military rulers used repression and centralised violence to suppress dissent in oil-producing communities (Eberlein 2006; Omeje 2006; Watts 1999; 2004a; 2004b; Okonta 2005). However, the militarisation of the Niger Delta paradoxically facilitated the entrenchment of a lucrative ‘conflict economy’, which extends from kidnapping oil workers for ransom, to crude oil theft (or ‘bunkering’), and the criminal activities of urban confraternity groups and local warlords (Kemedi 2003; Ikelegbe 2005).

Since 1999, democratisation has created additional cleavages, with intense resource struggles by political entrepreneurs to create and sustain networks of distributive patronage (Ifeka 2000; Gore and Pratten 2003, Watts 2004b; Obi 2006), leading to political violence and the proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta region (Human Rights Watch 1999; 2002; 2005), and the failure of social provisioning, reflected in a lack of basic amenities, high poverty and unemployment (Oluwanniyi 2010), which undermine peacebuilding efforts. At the height of the Niger Delta militant struggle in 2006, the Nigerian state suffered severe disruptions to oil activities and significant revenue losses (Nairne 2007). It is against this socio-economic backdrop that the current amnesty programme was introduced in 2009, in a bid to address the Niger Delta crisis. In this light, the amnesty programme is arguably the most prominent peacebuilding infrastructure in post-democracy Nigeria.

While it is commonly believed that the amnesty programme has promoted stability in oil production, there are underlying socio-political contradictions that undermine its effectiveness and credibility.

While it is commonly believed that the amnesty programme has promoted stability in oil production, there are underlying socio-political contradictions that undermine its effectiveness and credibility. This paper offers a critical account of the amnesty programme in Nigeria. The analysis is located within a narrative of the overarching political economy dynamics in Nigeria which are influence violence, underdevelopment and poverty in the Niger Delta region. The paper argues that the amnesty programme should be complemented with wider reforms that tackle the root causes of the Niger Delta crisis.

The next section provides a review of the amnesty programme which examines its objectives and operations. This is followed by a critical discussion of the limitations and weaknesses in the approach to amnesty in Nigeria. In conclusion, the paper identifies wider reforms that are needed for lasting peace, security and development in the Niger Delta.

The Nigerian State, Oil and Amnesty

In June 2009, Nigeria's President Umaru Yar'Adua astounded critics of the Nigerian state's woeful treatment of the perennial Niger Delta crisis by announcing a 60-day amnesty for combatants in the Niger Delta region. The amnesty was to be operationalised through a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) scheme (see Table 1). In return, the militants were expected to surrender weapons and ammunition and renounce their cause. The stated objective of the amnesty programme ‘was to contribute to “security stabilisation” in the Niger Delta through the DDR programme, as a precondition for medium and long term development’.1

Table 1 Structure of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme.

Disarmament	Demobilisation/Rehabilitation	Reintegration
Duration: 6 August to 4 October 2009	Duration: 6 to 12 months	Duration: Up to 5 years
Collection of arms, ammunition, explosives	Ex-militants report to camp	Knowledge and skills acquisition
Biometrics	Verification and documentation	Financial empowerment
		Placement programmes
		Microcredit
	Transformational training	Education
	Peacebuilding and conflict resolution	Reconciliation with local community
	Counselling	Conflict resolution Framework/mechanism
	Career guidance	Monitoring and evaluation
	Wellness assessment	Exit from amnesty
	Reintegration classification
	Education and vocational placement
	Graduation and demobilisation
Key enablers
Disarmament camps	Transformational training centres	Partnering government agencies, NGOs and private organisations
	Rehabilitation camps	Oil and gas institutions (OGIs)
		Tracking and support system
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria—PAO, Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 54&Itemid = 55

This unprecedented move was a sharp departure from the typical use of state violence to suppress dissent by indigenous civilian and militia groups in the Niger Delta, and signified a realisation that the Niger Delta crisis required a democratic, participatory solution and not one that legitimised militarisation and brutal oppression of impoverished maritime communities. Furthermore, this action reflected a new political reality for the Nigerian state—it had to ‘pay attention’ to the people of Niger Delta, beyond empty rhetoric and cooptation of regional political actors. Shortly before the amnesty declaration, a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 2008 to coordinate the previously dysfunctional development and security interventions in the region. In addition, a new position in the Nigerian presidency called the ‘Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta’ was charged with the implementation of the amnesty programme.

According to the records of the office of the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta, up to 26,358 militants accepted the amnesty offer, and have participated in the amnesty programme since 2009. The militants were demobilised in two batches in designated camps spread across six states in the Niger Delta region. Each militant was to receive N65,000 (US$420)2 per month, and another N3,000 (US$20) daily during the reintegration phase. The forgiven militants are currently in the reintegration phase of the amnesty programme, with an emphasis on formal and vocational education, skills acquisition and entrepreneurial development. The amnesty programme has largely proceeded without any delays to its schedule in the last three years, principally due to the economic and strategic importance of peace and stability in the Niger Delta. However, the long-term impact of the amnesty is dependent on wider political and structural reforms, which I will discuss in subsequent sections of the paper.

The amnesty programme has served a strategic purpose of increasing stability in the Niger Delta region, which has enabled the state to pursue its economic interests in conjunction with the MOCs. Nigeria's dependence on petroleum is structural—up to 95% of exports and around 85% of state revenues are generated from oil and gas. Likewise,

The entire state architecture and political system is underwritten by a profitable network of distributive patronage between competing ethno-regional interests, lubricated by enormous oil rents.

the entire state architecture and political system is underwritten by a profitable network of distributive patronage between competing ethno-regional interests, lubricated by enormous oil rents. At the height of the Niger Delta crisis, oil production dropped to around 700,000 barrels per day (bpd). The relative stability that accompanied the decline in oil-related violence, conflict and criminal activities has resulted in an increase in oil production to 2.2 million bpd in 2012. However, this rosy picture is not without its incongruities. Illegal oil-bunkering (or the theft of oil from pipelines and other installations for sale on the international black market) remains extremely significant. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) says that Nigeria is losing around 180,000 bpd of crude to criminal oil-bunkering syndicates, amounting to US$7 billion per annum (Amaefule and Opara 2012). This forgone output exceeds the entire daily production of Ghana, which is 120,000 bpd. Furthermore, and in spite of the lull in violence, unemployment, poverty and inequality in the region are endemic. Up to 68% of the Delta's residents are poor, and unemployment stands at 27%, six points above the national average (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics [NBS] 2012).

The Nigerian state has devoted substantial resources to the amnesty programme. Between 2009 and 2011, the programme was allocated N127 billion (US$819 million) in the national budget. Of this amount, N3 billion was the ‘take-off’ grant, N30 billion was spent on militants' stipends and N96 billion on feeding the militants. In 2012, a massive N74 billion (US$477 million) was allocated to the amnesty programme. When this is juxtaposed with similarly humongous fiscal transfers to the Niger Delta region between 2009 and 2012—for the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, N241 billion (US$1.55 billion), and for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) N 246.6 billion (US$1.6 billion)—the scale of state largesse is astonishing. These fiscal transfers are separate from the sub-national budgets of the six core oil-producing states in the Niger Delta, which totalled N1.74 trillion (US$11.2 billion) just for the fiscal year 2012.

The evidence presented here illustrates a peculiar feature of Nigeria's peacebuilding strategy—fiscal profligacy has accompanied the settlement of the grievances of Niger Delta communities. However, the

The state's monetisation of community grievances is unsustainable, because it implies that the state is simply paying militants to be peaceful based on oil revenues which are finite and volatile.

state's monetisation of community grievances is unsustainable, because it implies that the state is simply paying militants to be peaceful based on oil revenues which are finite and volatile. The transformation of Niger Delta militants and activists into genuine power-brokers with previously aloof hegemonic interests in the state has altered the political calculus in Nigeria. Thus, in the aftermath of the crisis that buffeted the region, the Niger Delta has emerged as a credible power bloc, exemplified by the ascendancy of Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from Bayelsa state, to the presidency of Nigeria in 2011. The political elevation of the Niger Delta has also positioned ex-militants and their acolytes as government contractors, middlemen, private militia and leading political actors. This redistribution of political power, influence and patronage has occurred against the backdrop of the deployment of the amnesty programme as the major instrument of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the restive Niger Delta. The next section provides a critical discussion of the amnesty programme.

Amnesty and Peacebuilding in Nigeria—Impact and Limitations

Using the DDR approach, Nigeria's amnesty programme has catered to two batches of Niger Delta ex-militants since 2009. Following their acceptance of amnesty and surrender of ammunition across eight Niger Delta states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo), the first set of ex-agitators, numbering 20,192, were demobilised at the Obubra Demobilisation Camp. The second set of militants, numbering 6,166, completed demobilisation in December 2011, bringing the total number of amnesty beneficiaries to 26,358.

A cursory glance at the statistics on participation in the amnesty programme (in Table 2) shows that around 85% of demobilised ex-militants are from the core oil-producing states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers which bore the brunt of the conflict. The gender imbalance between male and female participants is striking, as only 0.65% of total registered participants are female. This outcome raises questions about the exclusion of women by the amnesty programme, since women have been active participants in the Niger Delta struggle (Ikelegbe 2005).

Table 2 Participants in the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme.*

States	Male	Female	Registered
Akwa Ibom	155	8	163
Bayelsa	6,900	61	6,961
Cross River	159	1	160
Delta	3,361	–	3,361
Edo	450	–	450
Imo	297	3	300
Ondo	1,198	2	1,200
Rivers	6,958	39	6,997
NDDC	571	19	600
Total	20,049	133	20,192
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria—PAO, Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 54&Itemid = 55
*Accounts for only the first batch of demobilised ex-militants.

The recovery of over 2,700 sophisticated guns and 300,000 rounds of ammunition surrendered by 15,000 militants to the Presidential Amnesty Committee in 2009 is a notable achievement of the amnesty programme. However, the exclusion of certain militant groups, arising from the balkanisation of the militant movement itself and deep-rooted scepticism and mistrust of the state's motives, resulted in the withholding of ammunition by some militant groups, while others, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) commanders John Togo and Tamunotonye Kuna, who seemingly accepted the amnesty soon returned to the creeks, rearmed and continued their hostilities against the state (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011, 51–52).

After the demobilisation period, the PAO states that 7,556 former militants were placed in skills acquisition training centres in 33 locations across Nigeria. Militants were also sent on skills acquisition training to countries such as South Africa, the US, Russia, Israel, India, Poland, Cyprus, Poland, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In reflection of the emphasis on building skills to encourage eventual reintegration in their communities, amnesty beneficiaries were presented with the choice of a specific vocation from a diverse bouquet, for which they would receive formal training (see Table 3).

Table 3 Summary of Skills and Vocational Training for Amnesty Programme Beneficiaries.

Artisanship	Environmental and sanitation management
Oil and gas	Small-scale manufacturing
Agriculture	Creative arts and theatre
Transportation	Educational services
Information technology	Building and construction
Maritime	Professional disciplines
Culture, tourism and hospitality
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria—PAO, Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 79&Itemid = 57

As an indication of the impact of the reintegration phase of the amnesty programme, in 2012 several ex-militants were offered jobs by training centres at home and abroad after completing skills acquisition; notably, the 89 ex-militants were offered employment in Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after completing their training in maritime activities, welding and fabrication.3 In a region with high youth unemployment, the creation of jobs for previously frustrated youth is highly commendable.

Despite the Nigerian government's rhetoric on the success of the amnesty, the question arises of whether it has been inclusive and whether it addresses the underlying grievances of the Niger Delta indigenes which manifested in violence and criminality. Previous attempts to ‘forgive’ Niger Delta militants in 2004 and 2007 were plagued by poor implementation. Cash for arms deals, which purportedly involved the exchange of arms for cash payments, did not make a dent on the conflict, and only aided more stockpiling of weapons by armed groups, ironically funded by cash transfers from the Nigerian state.4 The present amnesty programme differs from previous attempts in its depth, given the level of organisation, political commitment and delivery of stated objectives. However, it has been dogged by criticisms of poor planning and implementation, large-scale corruption and the exclusion of important stakeholders (Oluwanniyi 2011; Ojeleye 2011; Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011; Nwozor 2010; Akinwale 2010).

Firstly,

Critics argue that the amnesty programme is too top-down and susceptible to the discretionary influence of powerful ex-militant commanders without reflecting local needs and aspirations.

critics argue that the amnesty programme is too top-down and susceptible to the discretionary influence of powerful ex-militant commanders without reflecting local needs and aspirations. This undermines the government's credibility, as the ex-commanders appear to have been more interested in newfound access to state patronage than in addressing the needs of their local fighters (Oluwanniyi 2011, 51). Similarly, the monetisation of the grievances of oil-producing communities by undue emphasis on monetary payments to ex-militants is a questionable approach. Coupled with the wider access to political patronage for ex-militant commanders, these substantial monetary transfers paradoxically reinforce the vicious cycle of conflict that the amnesty was designed to break. They place unrealistic expectations on the provision of state largesse and employment, and raise the prospect of arms proliferation and further violence in the long term as job opportunities and easy money fail to materialise and idle youth seek refuge in the conflict economy. Relatedly, corruption and nepotism have taken root in an otherwise laudable initiative. The amnesty appears to have created a new ‘peace industry’ in Nigeria, with the emergence of contractors, consultants and mediators or ‘peace ambassadors’ who have cynically positioned themselves to benefit from state largesse. A damning review of the rehabilitation component of the amnesty programme in 2010 revealed that 80% of the programme budget had been expended on payments to consultants and contractors, while just 20% was devoted to the rehabilitation of ex-militants (Oluwanniyi 2011, 52).

Another important criticism of the amnesty is the exclusion of important conflict actors, which fuels grievances and could result in inter-communal strife. The scale of the amnesty programme, which has targeted about 27,000 former combatants in a region with high poverty and youth unemployment, is far from adequate and has created disaffection among militant groups that feel excluded from the entire exercise. For instance, the failure to include several MEND warlords and neutralise MEND's infrastructure created room for aggrieved MEND elements to continue with their violent struggle. While leading MEND commanders such as Generals Boyloaf, Ateke Tom, ‘Young Shall Grow’ and Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo) have embraced the amnesty and rapidly established themselves as regional power-brokers, the detention and trial in South Africa of Henry Okah, another central figure in the group, points to the exclusionary, divisive legacy of the amnesty programme. This has allowed aggrieved MEND elements to carry out sporadic, deadly bombings such as the Independence Day 2010 bombing, and engage in criminality, including kidnapping and oil-bunkering (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011, 52–53).

Grassroots community, civil society and vulnerable groups, such as women and children, that shunned violent struggle have also been inadvertently excluded from state largesse, while continuing to grapple with the adverse effects of oil activities, particularly environmental degradation and the loss of livelihoods (Nwozor 2010; Oluwaniyi 2010). The failure of the local and federal governments to address environmental management issues (Christian Aid et al. 2004; Adekola and Mitchell 2011; Edu 2011) and institute a systematic approach towards providing public infrastructure and social goods has also reduced the effectiveness of the amnesty programme (Akinwale 2010, 207). Furthermore, delays in paying militants' allowances and allegations of government insensitivity have undermined the integrity of the programme (Oluwanniyi 2011, 50). Aggrieved amnesty beneficiaries have resorted to public demonstrations, issuing threats, engaging in violent protests, destroying public property, and in some cases have returned to criminality as a result of their frustrations (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011, 53).

Furthermore, the cost of executing the amnesty programme is substantial, and, due to volatile oil revenues, the government's commitment to maintaining cash payments and support to militants to abandon violence will be put under pressure. Aside from these economic concerns, other ethnic groups that are perceived to be excluded from the distribution of state largesse may turn to violence, in expectation of some form of monetary settlement. The commitment of the region's political elite to genuinely supporting the amnesty in the medium term can also be questioned, as political electioneering in the Niger Delta has been linked with violence, criminality and arms proliferation (Human Rights Watch 2002; 2005; Omeje 2006).

Above all, the continued use of military force in the Niger Delta undermines the avowed commitment of the Nigerian government to peace, and prevents a wider engagement with local communities on their grievances against the state and MOCs.5 As a direct consequence of the violence and conflict that have plagued the region, the militarisation of the Niger Delta has created a siege mentality among indigenes and legitimised the instrumentation of violence by militant groups to confront the Nigerian state and MOCs (Obi 2010; Watts and Ibaba 2011; Idemudia 2009; Ukiwo 2011). The Nigerian military continues to maintain a significant presence in the region, although its mandate has recently been changed from suppressing a popular insurgency to ‘providing security to oil installations, tackling oil bunkering, illegal oil refining, oil pipeline vandalism and sea piracy’.6 While maintaining security over oil installations is of strategic interest to the state and MOCs, this should not be at the expense of peacebuilding. Security initiatives would be much more effective if local stakeholders—communities, former combatants, youth groups and civil society activists—were actively involved and considered important partners in protecting oil investments in the region.

Security initiatives would be much more effective if local stakeholders—communities, former combatants, youth groups and civil society activists—were actively involved and considered important partners in protecting oil investments in the region.

The Akassa model of institutionalised community ownership of oil resources, in which the Akassa community has enjoyed a good relationship with Statoil and regularly works with law enforcement agencies to protect the company's facilities in the area, shows that conflict between local communities, MOCs and the state is not inevitable (Ukiwo 2011, 27). Thus, ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local people in the Delta is crucial to the long-term interests of the Nigerian state and MOCs operating in the region.

The preceding discussion clearly illustrates the limits of the amnesty programme as a peacebuilding infrastructure, while noting the relative progress it has made in improving peace and stability in the Niger Delta region.

In order to be truly effective, and address the multiple, complex grievances that underlie the Niger Delta conflict, amnesty must be complemented by political, economic and structural reforms.

In order to be truly effective, and address the multiple, complex grievances that underlie the Niger Delta conflict, amnesty must be complemented by political, economic and structural reforms. In the following section, we discuss the wider reforms that could strengthen and deepen the impact of the amnesty.

Beyond Amnesty: Addressing the Root Causes of the Niger Delta Crisis

As the discussion of the amnesty programme in Nigeria above suggests, a pragmatic approach towards peace, security and development in the Niger Delta region is needed. As a matter of principle, this approach must strike a balance between economic, structural and political reforms which allows policymakers to identify entry points for policy reforms that target incremental, progressive changes over time.

The most paramount constraint on peacebuilding and development is the failure of social provisioning in the Niger Delta, which has aggravated class and social inequalities.

The most paramount constraint on peacebuilding and development is the failure of social provisioning in the Niger Delta, which has aggravated class and social inequalities. There is an urgent need for redistributive investments in infrastructure and social amenities, provision of key public goods such as education and healthcare, microcredit and soft loans for petty commodity production, and public investment in agrarian activities. By providing basic amenities to the teeming population, the popular view of the state as inherently corrupt and ineffective would be gradually displaced. Importantly, the emphasis must be on creating sustainable livelihoods for local communities. This requires a two-pronged approach of creating an enabling environment for the emergence of backward linkages arising from oil activities (including supply of raw materials, labour and support services), and creating non-oil employment in agriculture, fisheries and small-scale manufacturing. The government and oil industry should work closely with other development partners to create jobs and opportunities, using existing community development (CD) initiatives of the oil companies, and also scaling down national employment interventions such as the You Win programme to a regional level. The introduction of a Local Content Act in 2010 to support indigenous participation in the oil industry must go beyond creating white collar jobs to supporting vocational skills such as those gained by beneficiaries of the amnesty programme.

Extreme poverty and social inequality manifest in vicious struggles for various forms of state patronage. The availability of public goods (education, health, potable water, and energy and transport infrastructure) would reduce the intensity of these demands on the state, and also shore up its legitimacy and credibility. This calls for more innovative ways of providing public services that avoid the waste and ineffectiveness of government initiatives such as the NDDC. For instance, the use of community-based public expenditure tracking to monitor social and direct labour schemes for infrastructure projects would put the millions of idle, unemployed youth to work. The use of ‘inclusive’ models of creating sustainable livelihoods that extend beyond direct monetary transfers to individual militants would also enhance the impact on women, children and other vulnerable groups that may have seen little or no benefits from the amnesty programme. Nigeria's federal legislature is currently debating a new Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that would create a Host Community Development Fund to provide a fixed portion of oil revenues for the development of host communities. The discussion here has shown that there is an enormous, steady flow of oil largesse to the Niger Delta political elite and power-brokers through various channels. Creating new mechanisms to funnel oil revenues to the region will not reduce poverty or unemployment if these revenues are simply being cornered by the regional elite, and if sub-national and federal governments do not improve their capacities to deliver development projects and manage oil revenues in a transparent, efficient manner. The emergence of anti-corruption legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act 2011, Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2007 indicates a growing awareness of the importance of resource revenue accountability and transparency. This growing scrutiny of natural resource management in Nigeria should be extended to the sub-national level with the adoption and enforcement of similar legislation while strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial agencies to tackle deep-rooted political corruption. In order to justify the massive flow of oil revenues to the Niger Delta states and create broad incentives for peace in the region, oil revenue transfers must be matched with effective public spending that delivers sound, sustainable development projects that create jobs and reduce poverty.

In order to justify the massive flow of oil revenues to the Niger Delta states and create broad incentives for peace in the region, oil revenue transfers must be matched with effective public spending that delivers sound, sustainable development projects that create jobs and reduce poverty.

In addition, alternative property rights in the exploitation of oil should be considered, including private ownership of oil-bearing land, increased royalties to landowners and oil-bearing communities, and investment schemes for the oil-bearing communities, such as the Akassa community initiative. The role of political actors in diverting royalties and compensation for oil spillage intended for impoverished indigenes must also be curtailed. The Land Use Act should be abrogated, to reverse the ingrained practice of the expropriation of oil-bearing land by the state, and address the grievances of Niger Delta oil-bearing communities regarding land alienation and environmental damage. Customary rights of the Niger Delta communities to the ownership of oil-bearing land should be legally recognised, and the process of granting oil licences should be more inclusive and participatory, with the adoption of innovative models of resource governance such as ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC).7 Compensation for land acquisition and oil spillage must be reviewed upwards to meet international standards,8 and implemented within a coherent state policy on the usage of oil-bearing land. Given the scale of gas-flaring by MOCs, the federal government should introduce strong penalties, and enforce robust sanctions to discourage gas-flaring and associated air, marine and land pollution. The failure to prevent and remediate environmental damage arising from oil activities has put the fragile ecosystem of the Niger Delta in peril and will remain a sore point if the Nigerian government and MOCs do not adhere to global environmental standards.

The role of corporate practices of the MOCs in the festering crisis in the Delta also requires a novel approach towards community engagement which addresses issues of environmental damage and poverty alleviation in oil-producing communities.

The emphasis must be directed away from monetary rewards to youth and other social actors, to agrarian production, small business enterprises and other resource-based petty economic activities.

The emphasis must be directed away from monetary rewards to youth and other social actors, to agrarian production, small business enterprises and other resource-based petty economic activities. Within the global oil industry, a universal compact that guides individual oil companies on gas-flaring standards, oil spillages and other forms of ecological despoliation is needed to improve the credibility of the oil-companies operating in the Niger Delta. Engagements between local communities and oil companies should be structured around FPIC, mutual respect and consent, local participation, community empowerment and corporate accountability. Such participatory, open engagement is needed to tackle the menace of oil-bunkering and reduce the attractiveness of the conflict economy for youth in the region.

Furthermore, the underlying tenets of the Nigerian federation must be revisited to address structural issues such as fiscal federalism and minority rights. In the first place, the viability of Nigeria as a unified political entity is being tested in the face of increasing agitation for self-determination by various ethnic groups9 and the impact of popular struggles on the legitimacy of political leadership. The tenets of the Nigerian nation have never been fully addressed, and the arrival of petroleum on the national scene lubricated an extensive network of state patronage while concealing deep fissures in the polity. The insurgency in the Niger Delta shows that this compromise is now untenable. There is an imperative need to address the national question, and minority rights within the federation. Thus, the clamour for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to discuss the tenets of the Nigerian nation is not out of place. The political system must protect the rights of ethnic minorities while reducing the excessive powers enjoyed by the federal government. The politics of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has created an anomaly of a powerful, distant federal government and weak states that depend solely on statutory oil revenue allocations. The adoption of a truly federal structure and extension of the principle of derivation, where federating units retain a majority of derived revenues, would blunt the tensions between the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta and the Nigerian state by instituting a more equitable and fair allocation of oil revenues and encouraging states and regions to be less fiscally dependent on the centre. Fighting corruption at all levels is central to repairing the broken trust between Nigeria's political leadership and the teeming masses. This cannot be achieved without strong political will to undertake difficult reforms, which has been lacking so far. Above all, political reforms aimed at strengthening the electoral process would go a long way to enhance the credibility of the state. Deepening democracy requires credible institutions—political, legal and legislative—that can engender socio-economic development and manage natural resource wealth for the benefit of Nigeria's multi-ethnic population.

Conclusion

Nigeria's amnesty programme is a bold and unprecedented move by the ruling elite to restore stability in oil output and revenues that arise from the turbulent Niger Delta region, which are central to the current system of resource appropriation. This paper has provided a detailed examination of the amnesty programme, including its impact and limitations, and offered policy recommendations on broader economic, political and structural reforms that could deepen and strengthen the effectiveness of amnesty as a peacebuilding intervention. There are several key lessons to be learned from Nigeria's experience with the amnesty, which may be relevant for other peacebuilding initiatives in fragile, resource-rich states. These are now discussed.

The first point is the transparency and accountability of state institutions charged with implementing amnesty programmes. The size of oil revenues devoted to Nigeria's amnesty programme warrants greater scrutiny of the activities of the Presidential Amnesty Office (PAO) and other relevant state institutions, as the amnesty should not be seen as another conduit for accumulating state largesse. Corruption and poor administration by amnesty officials only serve to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the amnesty itself, and weaken the legitimacy of the state. In this light, it is imperative to ensure that monetary and material benefits are paid to ex-militants in a timely fashion, that amnesty beneficiaries' and broader stakeholder needs and concerns are fully recognised and that skills acquisition and reintegration activities are matched with viable employment opportunities, which in turn requires the commitment and full participation of the oil and gas sector and other local industries in the Niger Delta.

The second lesson from Nigeria's experience with amnesty is to ensure the inclusion of important conflict actors in the process of peacebuilding. It is essential to continue the dialogue with aggrieved elements of the militant community, and possibly extend the amnesty programme to previously excluded militant groups, in order to break the cycle of violence in the region. The role of social, political and community institutions in the Niger Delta in ensuring that grievances are addressed without recourse to violence will also be instrumental in peacebuilding, security and overall stability.

Thirdly, amnesty may not immediately address security concerns in conflict-affected areas. Certainly, security challenges remain in the Niger Delta, particularly illegal oil-bunkering, which appears to be on the increase, and other criminal activities such as sea piracy, pipeline vandalism and kidnapping. This underscores the need for a participatory approach to building peace and security which involves local communities, youth groups, ethno-cultural associations and civil society.

Perhaps the most significant message to be learnt from Nigerian experience is that amnesty is not an end in itself—and wider, complementary efforts are still required to resolve resource-driven conflicts. Economic, political and structural reforms can deepen and strengthen the effectiveness of amnesty as a peacebuilding intervention. The discussion presented here challenges the perception that the Niger Delta is being starved of oil revenues. What has been demonstrated by this paper is that enormous state largesse is being funnelled into the Niger Delta, particularly through the amnesty programme. However, these resources are not reaching the poor, marginalised communities that are in desperate need of help. The pervasiveness of accumulation through access to state patronage, political corruption and impunity are intrinsic to the political economy of oil in Nigeria, and not peculiar to the Niger Delta. Thus, the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives such as the amnesty programme is constrained by the national political economy. Amnesty in the Nigerian context is best understood as a specific response to a crisis that still requires a much broader, comprehensive resolution.

Amnesty in the Nigerian context is best understood as a specific response to a crisis that still requires a much broader, comprehensive resolution.

In order to be successful, peacebuilding initiatives in fragile states such as Nigeria must engage with multifarious grievances that manifest themselves in violent conflict. The nature of the state itself is perhaps the most crucial determinant in a successful peacebuilding and development strategy. Where predatory interests dominate the state, and there are impunity and collapsed institutions, amnesty cannot be the magic solution to socio-political crises. The lure of unearned income derived from oil is simply too significant in a society scarred by extreme deprivation. In conclusion, the crux of the argument presented here is that the amnesty programme is a laudable initiative, but no silver bullet, and must be complemented by broader socio-economic, structural and political reforms that address the deep-seated grievances that have resulted in violent conflict in the Niger Delta.

Notes

¹ Federal Government of Nigeria, Niger Delta Amnesty Programme: http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 54&Itemid = 55

² All Nigerian naira vs. US dollar exchange rates are calculated using the current official Central Bank of Nigeria rate of N155/US$1.

³ Information provided by the PAO: http://www.nigerdeltaamnesty.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 260:send-forth-ceremony-for-30-niger-delta-youths-offered-employment-in-united-arab-emirates&catid = 36:news&Itemid = 18

⁴ For a critique of the ‘cash-for-arms’ initiatives by the Rivers State government and previous unsuccessful attempts to use amnesty as a peacebuilding tool, see Osaghae et al. (2007) and Human Rights Watch (2005).

⁵ There is ample evidence, as shown by Frynas (1998; 2000; 2001), Omoweh (2005) and Eberlein (2006), that oil minorities initially channelled their grievances towards the state and MOCs through the legal system in spite of the state's approach towards militarisation of the Niger Delta region. However, the failure to obtain fair, equitable settlement within the legal system facilitated the increasing use of violent means to confront the ‘petro-military alliance’.

⁶ In 2012, the federal government announced changes to the composition and mandate of the Joint Task Force (JTF) which suggest that the amnesty programme has reduced militant activities in the Niger Delta and that the role of the military should reflect the transition from conflict to peacebuilding in the region.

⁷ FPIC has been used in Latin America to protect indigenous rights in engagements with extractive companies. It has increasingly featured in the global discourse on extractive-sector governance, reflected in the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Equator Principles on financing extractive-sector investments. Weizner (2011) offers this description of FPIC: ‘Free, prior and informed consent means that Indigenous Peoples have the right to agree to or to reject activities or plans affecting their ancestral territories, and in cases of agreement, to determine the conditions and terms for proceeding.’

⁸ Under existing legislation, compensation is only paid when environmental pollution is caused by negligence of the oil companies, and not by sabotage. The local communities complain that the compensation for damaged land is inadequate, and the cumbersome legal system offers little relief for estimating the true cost of environmental damage. The oil companies have exploited loopholes in the existing legislation by arguing that many oil spills are acts of sabotage. However, this determination is made not by state regulators, or independent arbiters, but by the oil companies themselves, leaving the system prone to abuse and manipulation.

⁹ See Osaghae (1998), Ukiwo (2003) and Osaghae and Suberu (2005) for discussion of ethno-regional competition, minority rights and the rise of sub-national ethnic militias that challenge state authority and champion sectional interests.