ABSTRACT
Does language have a role to play in conceptual development, and if so, what is that role? Understanding the contents of another person’s mind parallels the development in early childhood of mental state language. Does the conceptual understanding get reflected in and drive the language development, or does the language allow the representation of propositional attitudes like belief? The paper reviews the evidence and sets up the terms of the debate, focusing on the syntax for mental states. It also asks whether syntax development could serve as a scaffold for other concepts that are described by propositions rather than labels. Finally, it reviews experimentation on the syntax of embedded clauses, where subtle phenomena are acquired for which it is impossible to imagine nonverbal counterparts: here, language is human thinking.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative.
2 All were part of the School Readiness Research Consortium curriculum intervention project, funded by NICHD (P01 HD048497).
3 There is continued controversy over whether using verbs of communication simply presupposes mental states. However not all false complements under communication verbs entail false beliefs: they can also be used for deception e.g., “The mother said she bought paper towels” (because she was concealing the birthday cake). In addition, the children in these studies were chosen for training precisely because they failed to understand false beliefs and false complements.