On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Teaching Political Theory to Undergraduates

Abstract

This paper argues that the standard approach to teaching the history of political thought does not serve the ultimate goals of political theory education, and that alternative approaches are needed to make the history of thought appropriate for undergraduates. A history of political thought for life ought to enhance a person's capacity to act as a political animal in three ways: as a moral person, as a free person, and as a citizen. But the most common practices in teaching the history of political thought suffer from the same criticisms that have been leveled at contemporary research in political theory, thereby undermining the study of political theory for life. Teaching the history of political thought should be based on a model where classical texts serve as Socratic gadflies that provide alternative perspectives on the perennial questions posed by contemporary political practice. Two alternative models can integrate both traditional approaches to the history of political thought with contemporary political practice to produce a history of political thought for life that is appropriate to the purposes of undergraduate education in political theory.

Keywords:

• curriculum
• history of political thought
• Nietzsche
• political theory

This paper was presented at the 2004 Southwestern Political Science Association Conference. I appreciate the helpful comments of the participants in that conference, of my colleagues Richard Parrish and Lance Janda, and of John Ishiyama and the exceptionally helpful anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Political Science Education

Notes

Data may not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

MacIntyre's (1984) interpretation of Aristotle focuses primarily on the cooperative nature of the political community, relying primarily on the idea of the community as a kind of cooperation that makes virtue possible. But Yack (1993) argues persuasively that Aristotle's attention to matters such as the distribution of political power reveal an emphasis on conflict rather than cooperation. It is likely that both are right; Aristotle's politics are about both cooperation and conflict, and these problems of action within a political community are fundamental elements of the human condition, as Arendt (1958) realizes in her critique of the modern rejection of the bios politikos.

The qualification “under the circumstances” is meant not to assert the superiority of situationalist principles over deontological principles but rather to sidestep that issue. If deontological approaches are in fact to be preferred, then the deontological solution will be best under any circumstances, including the ones faced by the chooser. If the situationalist perspective is right, the qualification is necessary to distinguish relevant differences in circumstances. I sidestep the issue here because it is irrelevant to my particular argument.

The identification of the standard model resulted primarily from Cameron University's program assessment process (Johnson 2005) and is based empirically on a qualitative survey of the curriculum of political science programs at state universities in Oklahoma. To identify a standard pedagogical model in the history of political thought is, of course, to grossly oversimplify the diversity of our teaching practices, especially if based formally on such a small and unrepresentative sample of programs. But while the model presented here does not necessarily characterize all (or perhaps even any) programs in every detail, the major principles are familiar enough in most programs that the model can be said to usefully characterize the general practices of the discipline.

While these are of course caricatures of any single course, a cursory survey of syllabi available on the Internet shows that these broad outlines characterize at least a large plurality if not a majority of these courses. And while I cannot offer systematic support for the claim that political thought is typically taught this way, the claim that it is often so very much reflects my own experience as a student as well as that of a fair number of my colleagues. The temptation to see this depiction as something of a straw-man argument may reflect the many very good teachers who already embrace this approach but must also be seen as something of a denial that these attitudes do characterize at least a significant portion of the discipline.

The discipline has clearly continued in the direction that Isaac identified. As of August 2004, the five most important journals in political thought as identified by Isaac—Political Theory, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Ethics, Polity, and the American Political Science Review—had published collectively 198 articles on political theory but only four relevant to the September 11 attacks (one of which was clearly written before the attacks but published afterward) and two on the 2000 U.S. Presidential election. APSR, in fact, had not published a theory article on either topic.

To an extent I disagree with Isaac's characterization here. Kuhn's (1970, esp. ch. VI) idea of normal science does involve solving puzzles posed by theory, but the puzzles are solved with reference to empirical data. In this sense, the problem actually may be that political theory fails to do enough normal science, concerning itself with the problems of developing new theory in a sort of constant scientific revolution rather than exploring manifestations of existing theory in the real world that might reveal the theoretical anomalies that drive theory forward. Kuhn's puzzles were anomalies generated as much by the real world as by the theory itself (the black body effect, for example, was an observation that existing theory could not explain and drove the development of modern physics). In political theory, focusing too much on developing and extending Rawls rather than on exploring the relationship between Rawls's theory and real-world problems misses the opportunity to create better theory because we don't generate the kind of anomalies that move theory forward. That said, the difference between Isaac and I on this point is limited to whether the problem on which we agree is best characterized as normal science, a difference solely on interpreting Kuhn that affects only whether Kuhnian language is the best expression for the problem.

For example, the prevalence of child labor, military, and sexual slavery in Africa (UNICEF 2003).

See, for example, Dobbs 1994 and Rhodes 2003. One should not be surprised that a program influenced by Strauss should be at the forefront of teaching the history of political thought this way. While Straussians are often criticized for their obsession with the canon and textual exegesis (see Isaac 1995, 643), one must not forget that the fundamental point of Strauss's doctrine of natural right was to show that the ancients provide both the diagnosis of and the solution to the crisis of modern Western society (Strauss 1953).

No programs were included in a sixth category of programs using other historical approaches; that category will thus not be considered in that analysis.