War and Peace in International Relations Theory: A Classroom Simulation

ABSTRACT

Simulations are increasingly common pedagogical tools in political science and international relations courses. This article develops a classroom simulation that aims to facilitate students’ theoretical understanding of the topic of war and peace in international relations, and accomplishes this by incorporating important theoretical concepts about the causes of war found in international relations theory into the design and implementation of the simulation. In addition to sharing a successful classroom simulation with other international relations instructors, the article makes two important contributions to the pedagogical literature on simulations. First, it shows how simulation design can be usefully based on the theoretical concepts and/or substantive problems that course instructors aim to impart to their students. Second, it demonstrates that it is possible to achieve important learning objectives with low-intensity simulations that do not require a big investment of time, energy, and resources.

KEYWORDS:

• Active learning
• classroom simulations
• international relations theory
• war and peace

Notes

See the “Simulations and Games” section of the Active Learning in Political Science Blog (http://activelearningps.com/).

For the “laboratory” comparison, see Starkey and Blake (2001); Asal and Blake (2006); Shellman and Turan (2006); and Wedig (2010).

Two recent reviews of existing IR simulations demonstrate the prevalence of role-play simulations: Baranowski and Weir (2015) and Boyer and Smith (2015).

For a discussion of “low-intensity” simulations, see Glazier (2011). For the notion of “theory in motion,” see Asal and Kratoville (2013, 13).

For a relevant literature review, see Moore (2013).

Report cited in Asal (2005, 359) and Boyer and Smith (2015, 316).

Asal and Blake (2006) and Asal (2005), respectively.

See Waltz (1979, 6–8).

The “anarchic” nature of international politics is a foundational assumption of neorealism in IR theory, and is also generally accepted by neoliberal institutionalism, the English School, and constructivism. See Waltz (1959, 1979), Bull (1977), Jervis (1978, 1999), Keohane (1984), Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993), and Wendt (1992, 1999).

This aims to reflect the common ground between neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories that see self-interested states in an anarchic international system as the basic nature of international politics. See Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984, 1986), Axelrod and Keohane (1985), and Grieco (1988).

For instance, in Round 2 the best option for each state is to defect while the other cooperates (gaining a possible maximum of $19 of enjoyment, by diverting $1 to armaments while the other side puts $0 in armaments, attacking the other side, and combining one’s $9 for enjoyment with the $10 for enjoyment of the other side). The second best option is for both sides to cooperate, so that neither side purchases armaments; both sides choose peace and end with $10 each for enjoyment. The third best outcome is that both sides defect and spend all, or almost all, of their money in armaments; war occurs, but neither side can destroy the other, so both survive but no money for enjoyment is left. The worst outcome would be to cooperate while the other side defects, leading to the loss of one’s state. Hence, the structure of preferences is defect-cooperate, cooperate-cooperate, defect-defect, cooperate-defect.

This insight is common to both neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. See, for example, Axelrod and Keohane (1985) and Wendt (1992).

The claim that simulations improve student learning tends to rest on the anecdotal evidence of instructors and/or the opinions of students reported in surveys (e.g., Shellman and Turan 2006; Pettenger, West, and Young 2014). The assessment of learning outcomes in simulations therefore generally fails to meet the scientific standard of experimental design and “Large N” empirical results. For a discussion of these limitations, see Raymond and Usherwood (2013) and Baranowski and Weir (2015).

See Starkey and Blake (2001); Asal and Blake (2006); Wedig (2010); Pettenger, West, and Young (2014); Asal, Raymond, and Usherwood (2015); and Boyer and Smith (2015).

Other relevant readings include Robert Keohane’s (1986) edited book, Neorealism and Its Critics; Michael Doyle’s (1983) article, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”; Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane’s (1985) “Cooperation Under Anarchy”; Joseph Grieco’s (1988) “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”; Alexander Wendt’s (1992) “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”; James Fearon’s (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War”; and Robert Jervis’s (1999) “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation.”.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nathan Alexander Sears

Nathan Alexander Sears is a PhD student in political science at The University of Toronto, and the Trudeau Centre Fellow in Peace, Conflict and Justice at the Munk School of Global Affairs. He was previously a Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas in Quito, Ecuador. His research specializes in international relations theory, international security, and international history.