Teaching Ethics Using Simulations: Active Learning Exercises in Political Theory

Abstract

Simulations are an excellent tool for teaching and have been used in many disciplines including in various subfields of political science, notably in international relations. We focus on the value of employing simulations in the classroom to complement the pedagogy surrounding political theory and related fields such as professional ethics and moral philosophy. Simulations, we believe, provide a unique educational benefit to the teaching of these subjects by supplying a concrete context for students to engage in ethical decision making, encouraging them to relate theory to practice. Simulations can achieve this goal, we argue, if they provide students with an immersive experience that confronts them with ethically significant choices. Further, we claim, game design theory and practices offer a useful tool set for designing simulations that can do exactly that. In this article, we discuss the educational benefits of using simulation to teach normative theory and present the principles that guide us in designing these simulations, drawing on some ideas in game design theory. Finally, we present a primaries campaign management simulation we have written and ran.

Keywords:

• Active learning
• simulations
• small groups
• role playing

Notes

Notes

1 There is a difference between using simulations designed for learning, as we discuss them here, and using games, such as the board game Diplomacy, for pedagogical purposes. Even though we are fans of using games for learning, and the way we design simulations draws on game design, there are limitations to the way that commercial games can be pedagogically useful, since they are created with different aims.

2 We define active learning by following Kosslyn and Nelson (2017, 165): “Learning is active to the extent that it engages the cognitive processes associated with comprehension, reasoning, memory, and pattern perception” (original emphasis). Active learning is commonly contrasted with “passive” learning, such as listening to a lecture.

3 This has been our experience, and such reports are not uncommon in the literature (see, for example, Emenaker 2014, Baranowski 2006, Oros 2007, Shellman and Turan 2006, Gorton and Havercroft 2012), although there is room to question whether students’ evaluations, on their own, are a good standard for measuring the effectiveness of simulations. See the related discussion by Raymond and Usherwood (2013), especially pp. 160–61.

4 There is relatively little discussion of simulations in the context of ethics or political theory pedagogy, whereas in the fields of professional and applied ethics, simulations are more common. Nonetheless, there are some insightful exceptions, such as Asal and Schulzke (2012) and Ahmadov (2011). Of particular note are political theorists who use the reacting to the past technique for creating simulations that were developed in the discipline of history. See Carnes (2014) and Gorton and Havercroft (2012).

5 We have run this simulation, and others like it, for both undergraduate and graduate students at Harvard University.

6 See Kosslyn and Nelson (2017).

7 (Frederking 2005, Baranowski 2006, Emenaker 2014, Raymond and Usherwood 2013, Levin-Banchik 2018, Baranowski and Weir 2015, Shellman and Turan 2006, Oros 2007, Gorton and Havercroft 2012).

8 Such courses are often required for first-year students. For example, at Harvard, as part of the general education curriculum, students are required to take a course designated as “ethical reasoning.”

9 There is a vast literature on moral psychology that is relevant to courses on political theory. Some of the concepts that we have found useful to explore in introductory courses on normative theory include those of cognitive bias, system 1 and 2, WEIRD morality, “point and shoot” morality, and bounded ethicality. Among the readings that we assign are Kahneman (2011), Haidt (2013), Greene (2013), and Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011). The main way simulations support engagement with these materials is by offering an opportunity for students to experience these biases and interrogate them. Therefore, it is not uncommon for our debriefing sessions to focus on a specific decision made by a student and consider whether the decision was affected by biases, automatic thinking, social pressures, and so forth.

10 This idea is the premise of the pedagogical approach called Giving Voice to Values, developed by Mary Gentile. See Gentile (2010).

11 The importance of treating judgment as a skill has been recognized by philosophers at least since Kant, when he wrote: “no matter how complete the theory may be, a middle term is required between theory and practice, providing a link and a transition from one to the other” (from the essay “On the common saying: this may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice,” quoted and discussed in Ypi 2009, 340–41).

12 The majority of the literature on game design focuses on video games. This kind of theory is useful, but we have drawn on our knowledge and acquaintance with tabletop game design, because these games are designed for a context much like the one we have in most classrooms: groups of 4 to 6 students, sitting together around a single table, interacting with each other. It is also much easier to produce, and revise, materials for tabletop games. Nonetheless, there is no reason that our exercises could not be implemented digitally or online, which can have its benefits. For some useful resources on game design theory, see Juul (2011), Salen and Zimmerman (2004), Elias, Garfield, and Gutschera (2012), Juul (2013), Engelstein (2017), Burgun (2015), Lerner (2014), and Burgun (2013). For those interested specifically in tabletop gaming, a nice review of the genre of board games that we are interested in is offered by Woods (2012).

13 (Gee 2004, Dickey 2007, Dickey 2006).

14 This principle is not typically called the golden rule in the game design literature, but it is nonetheless prevalent. For example, game designers often discuss “ludonarrative dissonance” as a failure of design that is equivalent to violating what we call the Golden Rule (Hocking 2009). The literature on game design was once divided between theorists who focused on rules and those who focused on narrative, and part of the disagreement regarded the definition of games. See Juul (2011), Salen and Zimmerman (2004), and Burgun (2013). Regardless of this controversy, there is widespread agreement among game designers that games are more compelling when whatever narrative they have matches the rules and structured interactions.

15 In this regard, our simulations are closer to role-playing games than board and card games.

16 The realism has a cost, as uncertainty makes it harder to map choices to moral theories. Overall, we believe the benefits are worth the cost, although it may not be a good fit for every exercise, topic, or instructor.

17 This feature is valuable but it can also create tempting pitfalls. We believe instructors should avoid relying on dice as merely a device to produce random results or add excitement. It is crucial that the die rolls connect choices with results in a manner that sends a message consistent with the substance of the simulation.

18 (Gee 2004, Juul 2013).

19 Debriefing is often noted as a necessary component for simulations. See Stangl et al. (2011), Wedig (2010), and Druliolle (2017). For an empirical study that provides evidence for the educational benefits of simulations when coupled with debriefing, see Levin-Banchik (2018).

20 Longer simulations and exercises can have additional benefits that the short exercises we discuss here cannot produce, inducing students to spend much effort and time teaching themselves a subject that would be helpful for the simulation (Carnes 2014, Gorton and Havercroft 2012). We do not mean to underestimate the added value of such exercises, but we note here that, in relation to the goals we mention in this article, namely, relating abstract moral and political theory to concrete situations using immersive active learning, shorter simulations can be just as effective. The main point of the simulations we are discussing here is not to recreate accurately an historical event or urge the students to learn in depth all sides of an historical argument or the workings of a complicated institution (such as the UN). Instead, our simulations aim to provide an immersive experience that gives students an opportunity to make difficult moral decisions. Our experience, as well as the tremendous success of tabletop games, suggest that such immersive experiences can be had in relatively short sessions. In addition, in other fields of political science authors have found that short activities can have a significant positive impact on learning outcomes. See Emenaker (2014) and Baranowski (2006).

21 On the importance of character creation for immersion, see (Dickey 2007, 258): “Because they have great input into the development of the characters, players often feel an emotional proximity to their character.”

22 We created different variants of the scenarios, one for Republican candidates and another for Democrats. Some of the times we ran it, groups rolled the dice to determine whether their candidate is a Republican or Democrat. This was exciting for students and delivered the implicit message that we are not trying to create a false balance between the parties. However, in some classes we had only one Democrat and five Republicans, or no Democrats which means that the sense of the competition between groups was undermined. In addition, the need to have both versions of each scenario for every group proved a logistical challenge. Therefore, at other times we assigned groups to parties ahead of time and split the class evenly.

23 This is the motivating question of the scenario presented in Appendix II. In addition to exploring this question as an issue for normative theory, it also provides an opportunity to engage the issues of moral psychology that we have discussed earlier, since the framing of campaign pledges as “promises” can trigger automatic moral reactions that may not really be there under an alternative framing or after a more thorough examination of the issue.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tomer J. Perry

Tomer J. Perry is Assistant professor of Social Science and Philosophy at Minerva Schools at KGI and a democracy research fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School. Tomer specializes in political theory. Tomer received his PhD in Political Science from Stanford University in 2016. Tomer's primary research interests are in democratic theory and global justice, but he also engages various topics such as nationalism and sovereignty, ancient political thought, ethics pedagogy, and game design. Tomer's research responds to the contemporary crisis of democracy, from the deterioration in democratic standards to declining trust in democratic ideas and institutions, by articulating new foundations for democratic theory.

Christopher Robichaud

Christopher Robichaud is Senior Lecturer in Ethics and Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Director of Pedagogical Innovation at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics. He received his doctorate in philosophy from MIT. His interests surround ethics, political philosophy, and social epistemology, with a focus on examining the role of truth and knowledge in well-functioning democracies, and on understanding what the post-truth age of politics is. Dr. Robichaud has been a member of the faculty since 2006. Previously, he has taught philosophy courses at Texas A&M University, the University of Vermont in Burlington, and Tufts University.