Speaking the Unspeakable: “The Implicit,” Traumatic Living Memory, and the Dialogue of Metaphors

Abstract

This essay makes two points: (a) Dualities between implicit and explicit—like the older ones between body and mind, primary and secondary process, nonverbal and symbolic, inner and outer, unconscious and conscious, emotion and cognition, and so on—can be understood as poles on a complex continuum of experience or as aspects of complex experiential systems; and (b) metaphor in dialogue can create a process of understanding between people and aspects of their experience that seem, on the face of it, to be very far apart or even beyond comprehension.

Questo saggio pone due questioni: (1) le dualità tra l'implicito e l'esplicito – come le precedenti tra corpo e mente, processo primario e secondario, non verbale e simbolico, interno ed esterno, inconscio e conscio, emozione e cognizione, e così via – possono essere comprese come poli di un complesso continuum esperienziale o come aspetti di sistemi esperienziali complessi; (2) la metafora nel dialogo può creare un processo di comprensione fra persone e aspetti della loro esperienza che sembrano apparentemente molto diversi o persino al di là della stessa comprensibilità.

Cet essai met de l'avant deux points: (1) que les dualités entre l'implicite et l'explicite –tout comme les anciennes dualités entre le corps et l'esprit, les processus primaires et secondaires, le non-verbal et le symbolique, l'intérieur et l'extérieur, l'inconscient et le conscient, l'émotion et la cognition, et ainsi de suite – peuvent être comprises comme étant des polarités dans un continuum complexe de l'expérience, ou comme étant des aspects des systèmes expérientiels complexes, et (2) que la métaphore dans le dialogue peut créer un processus de compréhension entre les personnes, des aspects de leur expérience qui semblent être à première vue très éloignés, ou même au-delà de la compréhension.

Dieser Essay behandelt zwei Punkte: 1. Dass die Dualität zwischen implizit und explizit – sowie früher jene zwischen Körper und Geist, Primär- und Sekundärprozess, nonverbal und symbolisch, unbewusst und bewusst, Emotion und Erkennen und so weiter – als ein komplexes Kontinuum von Erfahrung, das jeweils an einem Pol endet, oder als Aspekte eines komplexen Systems von Erleben verstanden werden kann. 2. Dass die Metapher im Dialog einen Prozess des Verstehens zwischen Menschen und Aspekten ihres Erlebens erzeugen kann, der auf den ersten Blick als sehr weit entfernt oder sogar jenseits des Verständnisses erscheint.

Este ensayo desarrolla dos puntos: (1) las dualidades entre implícito y explícito –como aquellas más antiguas entre cuerpo y mente, proceso primario y secundario, no-verbal y simbólico, interno y externo, inconsciente y consciente, emoción y cognición, etc.- pueden ser entendidas como polos de una compleja continuidad de la experiencia o como aspectos de sistemas complejos experienciales, y (2) la metáfora en el diálogo puede crear un proceso de comprensión entre personas y aspectos de su experiencia que a primera vista pueden parecer muy apartados el uno del otro, o incluso inasequibles a la comprensión.

Keywords:

• dualism
• implicit
• memory
• metaphor
• neuroscience
• trauma
• unspeakable

Notes

¹Contemporary neuroscience identifies the amygdala as that part of the brain responsible for visceral responses to stimuli—responses that often occur faster than reflective thought.

²See psychoanalyst–neuroscientist Leslie Brothers (2001) for an acute and astute critique of this and other efforts to fuse the discourses of neuroscience and of psychological experience. She called the resulting mixture “neuroism” and faulted it both for its implied and sometimes explicit reductionistic mind–brain reductionism. Even more, she claimed, neuroism ignores the social nature of the mental.

³More recently, Pally (2005) described neuroscientists as less dualistic with respect to consciousness: “Neuroscientists use the term ‘nonconscious’ rather than ‘unconscious’. The psychoanalytic term ‘unconscious’ implies that experience is repressed or split off for defensive purposes. Neuroscientists do not typically address repression or other defenses. Instead nonconsciousness and consciousness are seen as existing on a continuum from the full nonconscious, to the barely imperceptible to consciousness only of the present moment, to ‘reflective’ consciousness”.

⁴For two striking clinical examples of this kind of clinical work, see Gotthold and Sorter (2006) These authors do express concern that dramatic moments are being privileged over “moving along” in the work of the Boston Change Process Study Group, and even more that the theory is being overextended, as if psychoanalysis needed nothing else.

⁵At that time I wrote, “Our history resides in our whole being” (Orange, 1995, p. 120). This view places me closer to the ideas of Eugene Gendlin (1979) and of Lynn Preston (2008) than to the implicit-explicit dualists.

⁶The film makes no distinction between metaphor and simile. Its interest is in the power of poetic language to connect people and to say what one otherwise does not know how to say.