Progress on Freedom of Religion or Belief?: An Analysis of European and North American Government and Parliamentary Initiatives

Abstract

Threats to and violations of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) have been increasing around the world for the last two decades. This has prompted governments to implement initiatives to promote FoRB and to condemn violations. Drawing on data and findings of the Commonwealth Initiative for Freedom of Religion or Belief (CIFoRB), this article presents an analysis of recent legislative, parliamentary, and executive branch initiatives in the U.S., Canada, U.K., and Norway to prioritize FoRB, for the lessons they afford on effective policy action. After an overview of these states' initiatives, this paper concludes with an assessment of their success.

Keywords:

• Religious freedom
• human rights
• parliaments
• United States
• Canada
• United Kingdom
• Norway

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), drafted in 1948, was a strong statement for FoRB in the post-Holocaust and post-World War II world. Article 18 states:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.¹

This international commitment to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), while not uncontroversial at the time of the UDHR’s drafting, laid the foundation for FoRB rights in international law in the latter half of the 20^th century. It remains the most universal expression of the fundamental human right to FoRB at the international level. Language nearly identical to Article 18 of the UDHR was subsequently adopted as the first portion of a more elaborate guarantee of FoRB, reaffirmed in 1966 in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).² To the original freedoms to have and to manifest FoRB contained in UDHR Article 18, the ICCPR Article 18 added protections from coercion, the possibility of limitations in instances where FoRB might conflict with the rights of others, and a provision on the liberty of parents to educate their children in religious matters.

Against these origins and the 20^th-century backdrop, there has been no shortage of statements from governments about the benefits of promoting FoRB. At the same time, there have been few efforts made to invest in better understanding the agendas and implications and the subtle consequences these statements may be having on religious affairs overseas. Are such efforts exacerbating situations in fragile and politically tense environments, worsening the very problems they are designed to resolve? Is the framing of FoRB as an issue of religious persecution hindering solutions? Is it possible that religious freedom advocacy is not the answer to violence and oppression, and that it might mask the true causes of conflict, and harden lines of division between communities? What happens when a state celebrates religious freedom, but then denies it to those religions it does not like? Finally, given that in the West, FoRB is tied to democracy, development, and security, what happens when it is thought of differently in non-Western settings such that it is not believers that are protected, but a religion or faith community writ large?

There can also be more general problems with prioritising FoRB rights. Perhaps most obvious is that organized religions should not be forced into unhealthy competition with each other to gain recognition as a “particularly persecuted category” and thus attract the attention of the political process, lest a competition for victim status be encouraged. This has been an issue in both the United States and Canada, where there has been a perception of prioritization of FoRB rights in Christian majority countries, which has been perceived, particularly in the Muslim world, as using religious freedom as a tool to promote Christianity. This is sometimes compounded by partisan political agendas. For example, the establishment of the Canadian Office of Religious Freedom (ORF) was mandated under the Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and the United Kingdom Conservative Party Manifesto and subsequent conservative think tank reports and policy papers expressly reference freedom of religion and belief for Christians. On the other hand, U.S.-commissioned reports such as the International Religious Freedom Report (IRFR), published annually by the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF), focus widely on FoRB advancement and help to demonstrate the need to integrate religious communities in that effort.

To draw upon an important Commonwealth example of how leaders and the political settings in which they operate work, the 2015 Commonwealth’s Malta Declaration on Resilience argues for the need to root global instruments and policy in the lived experiences and aspirations of communities and individuals at the local, national or regional contexts (Commonwealth People’s Forum 2015). For example, the 2016 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report on Human Rights and Democracy urged that emphasis must be placed on local knowledge and engaging with contextual practice in order to defend FoRB and other human rights in the most effective way (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2017). It is no longer enough to rely on international compliance with human rights instruments as an effective measure or mechanism for human rights implementation, not least because it can serve as a smokescreen for only minimal human rights compliance.

Examining and assessing such developments through the literature on issue-framing and agenda-setting can be helpful in understanding these intended and unintended effects of government adoption of FoRB initatives. In politics, both domestic and international, power can be defined as the “ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise” (Wilson 2008). This definition encompasses multiple means of exercising power, from military threats to issue-framing and agenda-setting preferences of others through the use of institutions that constrain the range of choices for action (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). The sequential decision making involved in agenda-setting typically includes: (1) informal influence, (2) policy formulation, (3) decision making, and (4) implementation and evaluation. Agenda-setting therefore highlights how political institutions and the political elites that inhabit those institutions turn societal conditions into political problems.

The struggle to direct attention, particularly to developments outside of local and domestic political cycles, often shapes the way in which agendas are set. This is especially the case with regards to agenda setting at the legislative level, where parliamentarians’ personal preferences and ideology may be reflected in their party positions and serve as springboards through which to amplify a particular issue. In the foreign policy arena, government officials, including parliamentarians, may be influenced by shared beliefs about how to best secure the national interest. To the extent that religion is seen as part of those shared beliefs, it will be seen to influence foreign policy decisions.

It is sufficient for purposes of the CIFoRB project to note that foreign policy decisions are ultimately made by individuals in leadership positions, suggesting that an obvious and important avenue of research in the role of religion in foreign policy is the beliefs of leaders, which is corroborated by the CIFoRB project’s empirical research into influencers and influences, coupled with optics, in country case studies. Such dynamics are highlighted in the rest of this paper as we examine the different country studies and their approaches to advancing FoRB. In the next section, we turn to the United States and its attempt to advance FoRB globally. We then shift to Canada, followed by examination of the U.K before turning to the instructive case of Norway.³ The cases are presented roughly chronologically in terms of these states’ efforts in advancing FoRB. What is clear is that there was quite a bit of learning across states and policy-makers. Although the U.S. did help to set the agenda, the agenda shifted along the way. The paper concludes with an assessment of these states’ efforts to advance FoRB and whether improvements have been made in the protection of rights around freedom of religion or belief.

United States: Changing Politics, Changing Policies on International Religious Freedom

[P]romoting religious freedom is a key objective of U.S. foreign policy. And I’m proud that no nation on Earth does more to stand up for the freedom of religion around the world than the United States of America. (Barack Obama, President of the United States, February 6, 2014⁴)

In the United States, domestic policy on “religious freedom” has been defined jurisprudentially by the courts in interpretation of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. International religious freedom policy has largely been a legislative achievement of the United States Congress in the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998,⁵ signed into law by President Bill Clinton. The nature and changes of the policies and government entities created by IRFA are the focus of this section.

The primary effect of IRFA was to create three government entities: (1) the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF) at the Department of State, (2) a bipartisan United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), and (3) a Special Adviser on International Religious Freedom within the National Security Council. Through these bodies, the U.S. government enacts the IRFA through a policy of “mainstreaming” across different governmental departments.

The OIRF and USCIRF work in what is widely described as a “carrot and stick” fashion. Both the OIRF and USCIRF release annual reports on international religious freedom, but each has a different purpose. The OIRF report requires junior human rights officers to gather and submit information to the International Religious Freedom Report (IRFR), a comprehensive public online database of annual country-by-country reports. In contrast, USCIRF, is mandated by statute to produce an Annual Report recommending to the legislative and executive branches of government countries to be designated as Tier 1 “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs) or to be placed on a Tier 2 list of countries which, while not rising to the CPC level, exhibit poor records of religious freedom in a given year. The President of the United States is required to subject these countries to a series of punitive sanctions ranging from a mere expression of concern to economic isolation. It is worth noting that the mandated writing of annual IRF reports has served as a method of training and knowledge enhancement in the State Department by introducing issues of religious freedom and providing a level of understanding to junior officers who will gain seniority within the department.

Assessments of the effectiveness of this system over the years have been mixed. Knox Thames, the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia at the State Department, credits the CPC designation and the threat thereof with “providing the leverage to move recalcitrant countries to act, such as with Vietnam and Turkmenistan” (Thames 2015). Others, like former director of the Office of Global Religious Affairs Shaun Casey, argue that “There’s not a lot of evidence that a foot stomp and annual report has any diplomatic impact at all” (Dallas 2017; see also Casey 2017). However, former USCIRF Commissioner Katrina Lantos Swett believes that “Public naming, shaming and blaming tends to turn up the heat on the abusers” (Dallas 2017; see also Casey 2017). Indeed, Swett argues, “Even if public press conferences fall flat, the international religious freedom ambassador is in a position to convince the secretary of state and president to take religious violence seriously” (Dallas 2017; see also Casey 2017).

The existence of multiple government entities created to promote FoRB can cause issues to arise when different government institutions prefer to advance FoRB in different ways. The OIRF and USCIRF in particular tend to undertake divergent strategies. An illustrative case is that of Saudi Arabian textbook reform. In 2013, the State Department commissioned a study of Saudi textbooks that found negative portrayals of multiple religions and the promotion of jihad despite ostensible revisions by the Saudi government. The State Department chose to leave the study unreleased to avoid provoking Saudi officials.⁶ The USCIRF conducted a similar study in 2018 with identical results and, in contrast to the OIRF, released a statement “ … [urging] Congress and the administration to make textbook reform a priority in its engagement with the Saudi government.”⁷ Clearly, there are varying routes through which FoRB might be advanced, and institutions are not always in agreement over which one is correct. This confers significance onto the institutional design and mandate of systems created to promote FoRB.

In 2013, the United States adopted a National Strategy on Integrating Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement into U.S. foreign policy (Kallerson 2014). This strategy acknowledges the significant contributions of religious leaders and faith communities to human rights, conflict mitigation, and global health and development—and that the U.S. government should integrate more robust engagement with them into broader foreign policy activities. The State Department’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs and the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives helped to implement the strategy. USAID also works on programs relating to the freedom of religion and belief, although judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution means that USAID projects must maintain a secular purpose, regardless of whether the partners and beneficiaries are religious or secular.

On December 16, 2016, President Obama signed into law the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 2015,⁸ a bipartisan effort that the House passed unanimously in the spring of that year. IRFA 2015 was an amendment to the original IRFA of 1998 intended specifically to “improve the ability of the United States to advance religious freedom globally through enhanced diplomacy, training, counterterrorism, and foreign assistance efforts, and through stronger and more flexible political responses to religious freedom violations and violent extremism worldwide.”⁹

There was, thus, a strong foreign policy aspect to IRFA 2015. It created a wider range of classifications and gradations for IRF environments rather than the dichotomy between presumably FoRB-compliant nations and CPCs, recognizing that such gradations provide greater incentive for reform efforts, as changes in status are more feasible. It also established the new category “Entities of Particular Concern” for non-state actors, such as ISIS, so that the president can implement sanctions and financial investigations against groups that threaten IRF. IRFA 2015 strengthened the importance of religious freedom within the political and diplomatic framework by making clear that the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom reports directly to the Secretary of State, making previously optional training in the “strategic value of international religious freedom” compulsory for all Foreign Service Officers, and establishing a minimum number of full-time employees in the OIRF. IRFA 2015 also notably included the rights of non-religious people, giving protection against “specific targeting of non-theists, humanists, atheists because of their beliefs.”¹⁰

Along with legislation, training on FoRB was established. In 2011, the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute began offering a four-day course on religion and foreign policy, and in 2015 it launched a two-day course specifically on FoRB that was offered in multiple sessions at the Foreign Service as a training curriculum for all American diplomats in IRF policy, and that funds be appropriated for Institute’s regional training centers.¹¹ IRFA 2015 amendments mandated that the State Department develop a training curriculum, as required by the 2016 IRFA amendments. It is worth noting the relationship between the “security” of international religious freedom when enshrined in law and the capacity of the religious freedom narrative to rise above party politics and to become broader when unconstrained by political will. This distinction was made manifest in the creation of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which is jointly appointed by Congress and the White House. USCIRF has a powerful legal mandate but maintains an arm’s-length relationship with the administration, which it frequently criticizes.

Although the United States has one of the most established FoRB policy approaches, political scientist Daniel Philpott remains skeptical about US efforts, and has questioned whether there is any country in the world is more “religiously free than it otherwise would be because of this policy” (Philpott 2015). Much of the content of the 2015 and 2016 IRFA amendments has yet to be implemented, and FoRB education for US diplomats remains limited (Farr and Hoover 2017). There is still a significant lack of religious literacy among the diplomatic corps, which only serves to undermine other structures intended to promote FoRB. Further, the Special Adviser on International Religious Freedom position within the National Security Council has yet to be filled twenty years after its creation. The absence of this adviser has hampered U.S. efforts to tackle issues at the intersection of security and governance: whether governments should address religion or religious freedom, how to differentiate freedom of religion and religion in foreign policy. The U.S. serves as a template for other nations, and inaction here might be instructive in explaining the lack of a similar position in the Commonwealth and beyond.

Canada: The Brief Political Life of the Office of Religious Freedom

The Canadian Office of Religious Freedom (ORF) opened in 2013 and was closed down in in 2016. A campaign promise of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the ORF was created as agency of Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian analogue to the United States State Department. The mandate of the office was to: “(1) protect, and advocate on behalf of, religious minorities under threat; (2) oppose religious hatred and intolerance; and promote Canadian values of pluralism and tolerance abroad” (Government of Canada/Global Affairs Canada 2016).¹² Headed by Ambassador for Religious Freedom Andrew P.W. Bennett, an academic and civil servant, the office was criticized from its inception for promoting an alleged conservative and Christian bias. The Office of Religious Freedom was closed in March 2016 by the newly-elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

A government audit of the ORF released in May 2016 suggested that the office did have a raison d’être at its inception:

Amongst likeminded countries and relevant international organizations, Canada was relevant not only as part of a group of likeminded countries, but also as a global leader addressing a gap. The absence of a U.S. Ambassador for their Office of International Religious Freedom for a period of one year left a void in the international arena. Furthermore, interviewees in the U.S. expressed openness to having another country take leadership on the right for freedom of religion or belief. The U.S. did not see itself as needing to lead all initiatives on religious freedom. Rather the possibility of playing a supportive role at times was viewed as a positive change that increased their diplomacy options on the same thematic issue. (Government of Canada/Global Affairs Canada 2016)

The United States, United Kingdom, and Norway were among “like-minded countries” most frequently mentioned by the Canadian office in the course of its work. Ambassador Bennett noted that the lack of countries actively engaged with FoRB runs

a risk that for lack of experience or bandwidth, European countries end up uncritically adopting initiatives and approaches created in Washington D.C. or London, without re-adapting them to different cultural and social system and, simultaneously, importing the many oversimplifications and blind spots that characterize government approaches to the quite distinct issues of countering violent extremism (CVE) and Islamist engagement. (Mandaville and Silvestri 2015)

Human rights law scholar Jeremy Gunn argues that the IRFA created a hierarchy of human rights with FoRB as the zenith—through which the USA is seen to be engaging in “moral meddling” (Gunn 2000). As a result of this stand-alone legislative framework, it risks setting standards outside international human rights law through which states can apply their own subjective standards.

The short-lived and controversial existence of the office meant that it did not function well, never having more than a handful of personnel, to advance FoRB. Although there was initially leadership committed from Canada’s Conservative wing with an agenda to advance FoRB, the change in government to the liberal wing and a lack of commitment to FoRB meant that FoRB would no longer be promoted as a stand-alone issue. FoRB was now to become part of a broader agenda under the rubric of human rights through the Office of Human Rights, Freedom and Inclusion.¹³

United Kingdom: Balancing Human Rights and Counter-Extremism

In the United Kingdom, FoRB has been taken up by both Parliament and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the context of religious persecution. The space for discussion of FoRB is smaller than it might be because of a more general suspicion around the discussion of faith in U.K. politics that is similar to the dynamics in Canada. This has led to only the most extreme cases of FoRB violation being deemed worthy of discussion and action because they capture attention, especially cases that involve physical harm or threat to life and liberty.

In general, the U.K. government has taken a “hybrid” approach to the promotion of FoRB in broader foreign policy terms. Although there is no formal FoRB ambassador or envoy as there is in the U.S. and was in Canada, there is a dedicated FoRB unit situated within the Human Rights and Democracy Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In theory, this allows for a more nuanced and contextual approach to FoRB, yet in practice, anecdotal evidence and recent history suggest that in the absence of a sophisticated training program, there is still considerable reticence to engage with FoRB as a stand-alone right.

Government and Ministry Initiatives

During the coalition government that lasted from 2010 to 2015, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi served as Minister of State for Faith and Communities, reporting directly to the Foreign Secretary and a supporting Foreign Office Advisory Group on the Freedom of Religion and Belief.¹⁴ Asked what the FCO hoped to achieve through its new emphasis on FoRB, Baroness Warsi stated:

We started off from a very low base … [because] the concept of faith in the public sphere—even talking about faith in the public sphere, or belief, or religion—was considered in itself to be politically either naive or stupid. When we first came into Government, it was important to me that the first speech I made was that this Government would “do God”. I wanted to signal a change.¹⁵

She continued by noting that it was important to increase religious literacy and build confidence to have tough conversations around such sensitive issues as FoRB, and that the “FCO wanted to bring in expertise and had done so through the sub-group on freedom of religion or belief, to help the FCO formulate campaigns and policy.”

Following Baroness Warsi’s 2014 resignation, the Minister of State for Faith and Communities position was subsequently downgraded to a role within the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). In response, Douglas Alexander, MP called for a reinvigorated approach to FoRB and maintains that the incoming Labour Government would appoint a Global Envoy for Religious Freedom. When the coalition government was replaced by the Conservatives in 2015, they were the only major party to not make a commitment to the creation of a global envoy, and the role of Minister of State for Faith and Communities remained in DCLG.

Arguments against the creation of a global envoy on FoRB have echoed the rationale for the dissolution of the Office of Religious Freedom in Canada and its related ambassadorial position. Former Liberal Democrat party leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg took the position that FoRB should be advanced as a fundamental right, but not exclusively by one minister or office:

Other countries that have taken that step have found that those ambassadors and envoys are excluded from visiting certain countries. That is why the best course of action at present is for each of the Foreign Office Ministers to retain the responsibility for promoting freedom of religion and belief in the areas of the world which they cover … ¹⁶

Within previous governments, there appeared to be a prioritization of FoRB at the FCO level (if not the Ministerial level). FoRB was a thematic priority under the FCO Human Rights Fund, as a manifesto commitment in the recent re-election to the U.N. Human Rights Council, and up until 2015, there was a FCO advisory group on FoRB but allocations for staffing and funding specifically for FoRB were often inadequate. While a number of officials spend a percentage of their time on FoRB, the FCO has only one full-time desk officer wholly dedicated to FoRB.¹⁷ The officer works closely with the team leader in the Equalities and Non-Discrimination Team, who themselves spend approximately half their time on FoRB. While officials working on FoRB do excellent work, the resources allocated to FoRB reflect neither the increased number of global violations nor the problems caused when these violations occur over a sustained period of time. There does not seem to be the support needed in government at the executive level to maintain a sustained approach to FoRB.

The Role of Parliament

While the U.S. and Canada have developed and executed their international FoRB policies through their respective executive branch agencies, the U.K. has opted to address FoRB more systematically through its legislative branch of Parliament. U.K. parliamentarians have been advocating for FoRB on a global level as founding members of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion Belief (IPPFoRB), an international contact group that shares best practices among parliamentarians around the world to address FoRB issues through parliamentary mechanisms in their own countries.

Parliamentarians are often better able to engage with human rights and on FoRB than governments or para-governmental organizations. U.K. Minister of Parliament Naomi Long explained the role of parliamentarians in relation to FoRB as: (1) “to raise public awareness of the issue’s importance … becoming more active advocates in defence of religious freedom as a result,” (2) “to focus our attention and to encourage renewed vigour in our Government and abroad in defence of the principles,” and (3) “to raise with the Government specific concerns about individual countries, faiths, and regimes.”¹⁸ According to Long, parliamentarians are in a unique position to frame the issue and put it on the agenda in the parliament and at the desk of the executive branch. The U.K. Parliament also has a well-resourced All Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief (APPG FoRB) that works with parliamentarians to raise particular FoRB issues within the parliamentary system for response by the relevant government minister.

Just as a change in government diminished FoRB in Canada, change of government in the U.K. via Brexit changed the direction of political discourse and governmental focus, especially in terms of foreign policy. Understandably, there has been a distinct foreign policy shift towards trade to the exclusion of human rights and other concerns. Aside from the normal daily pressure of legislating, these more dramatic turns of government raise questions regarding the effectiveness of the operational ability of parliamentarians in sustaining long term change for FoRB.

Events at the global level also impact how FoRB is approached by governments. In the case of the U.K., the rise of violent extremism, often with a religious tilt, and the government’s concern over how to combat it is critical. The most recent statement on the actions of the U.K. government with regard to FoRB contains a framing of UDHR Article 18 around religious rights and tolerance, specifically stating that “the key to increasing freedom in this area is to focus on tolerance,” ¹⁹ while also re-stating the framing of FoRB with policies on Countering Extremism (CE).

In January 2018, the U.K. Government appointed Sara Khan, a counter-extremism and women’s rights activist, head of a newly-created Commission for Countering Extremism in the aftermath of recent terrorist incidents on British soil, particularly the Manchester Arena attack. The new Commission is tasked with “identifying and challenging all forms of extremism, advising ministers on new policies and promoting ‘pluralistic British values.’”²⁰ In accepting the position, Khan stated:

I recognise the scale of the challenge we face in confronting extremism and I am deeply committed to this role. I will create a Commission that is forthright in challenging extremism in the name of our shared values, fundamental freedoms and human rights … I extend my hand out to you to work with me in supporting the Commission's work in building a Britain that defends our diverse country while demonstrating zero tolerance to those who promote hate and who seek to divide us.²¹

The Commission on Countering Extremism creation and Khan’s appointment have not been without criticism—particularly in light of Khan’s reported support for the controversial Prevent counter-extremism program, which Baroness Warsi deemed a continuation of the Government’s “policy of disengagement” with Muslim communities. ²² Harun Khan, the secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: “The fight against terrorism requires equal partnership between all parties, including Muslim communities. This appointment risks sending a clear and alarming message that the government has no intention of doing so.”²³

Metamorphoses of the British FoRB Agenda

Within a decade the framing of a FoRB policy has undergone three metamorphoses. From 2010 to 2015, there was a clear process underway to frame FoRB as a human rights issue, hence the locus of British FoRB policy in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Following Baroness Warsi’s departure, the framework for FoRB shifted to a more domestic focus, with the relocation of the diminished ministerial position to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Now there appears to be a further shift of emphasis to issues of pluralism and extremism with the new Commission for Countering Extremism. With these shifts in framing and location have come more normative transmutations. The “religious freedom” focus of the human rights paradigm at the FCO has given way to the “religious tolerance” domestication of the issue at DCLG to a new and even narrower focus on “security.” The problem with this securitization of FoRB is that this framing could potentially impact the positioning of FoRB in the wider protective framework of human rights and the rules-based order.

The current U.K. government has adopted a strategy of situating FoRB as a bulwark against extremism. In the past, the FCO has touted the government’s commitment to religious tolerance and celebration of faith, yet it is situating the majority of FoRB concern within the context of anti-extremism policy.²⁴ This is a clear step back from the prior period in which FoRB was recognized as a priority in itself rather than as an explanation or problem solver for extremism. In other words, the framing and agenda have shifted away from FoRB as a human right to one as a security issue.

Scandinavian Strategies: Lessons from Norway

Norway plays a much larger role when it comes to FoRB than what would be expected given its small size, geography, and secular leaning. Gaining influence on the issue of FoRB has been a strategic move to “ … focus on a few themes within which it can make an impact, and then expand on these globally. This concentrated effort enables Norway to punch above its weight on the global stage” (OECD 2013). In Norway, the authorities work to promote FoRB at the multilateral level, with particular emphasis on the situation of religious minorities. The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security has stated that an important feature in Norway is the “inscribed principle of equal support of all religious and life stance communities, which is an expression of the Norwegian policy of active support towards religion or belief” which manifests in foreign policy operations and procedure.²⁵ Norway cooperates closely with civil society organizations and other countries in this work.

International conventions and jurisprudence of the associated convention bodies have, over several decades, significantly influenced understanding of FoRB and other human rights in the Norwegian legal system. In 1964, the Constitution of Norway was amended to explicitly include the freedom of everyone to exercise their religion (Vik and Endresen 2016, 172). The majority of Norwegians are members of the Church of Norway, which was known as the public religion prior to 2012 reforms which included the repeal of the stipulation that at least half of the cabinet members be members of Church of Norway. There was a formal separation between church and state, with the Church of Norway designated as the “folk” church, but with the statement that all religious and belief communities should be supported on equal terms.

Norway appointed an Ambassador-at-Large for Minorities and Human Rights in 2012. In priorities stated for the 2013 Conservative/Progress Government, the government pledged to devote attention to vulnerable groups, including religious minorities (Government of Norway 2013). It is within this theme of vulnerable groups that the commitment to FoRB materialized. However, former Ambassador Petter Wille stated that the “most important task is not to allocate money to religious minorities in the national budget, but to raise religious freedom higher on the political agenda” (Storaker and Brown 2014, 22). In 2015, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would increase support for Christians and other religious minorities in Syria and Iraq, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs earmarking up to NOK 10 million in 2015 and another NOK 10 million the following year.²⁶ In 2017, in the white paper on the Sustainable Development Goals and Norwegian development policy, the government set out its intention to promote greater respect for and protection of freedom of religion and belief worldwide.²⁷

Embassies are also required to report on the situation for religious minorities in their country in order to inform their Universal Periodic Review (UPR) through the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (UN Human Rights Council 2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs teaches staff members about FoRB and minority groups through tailor-made guidelines on religious minorities:

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide practical advice on how Norway can continue, intensify and systematise its efforts to promote human rights. Our aim has been to provide sound, practical and relevant guidelines that will provide inspiration for human rights work across the Foreign Service. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013)

Other government-sponsored FoRB work takes place at organizations such as the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), where the Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or Belief is responsible for the FoRB section of the international program at the NCHR. The Oslo Coalition relies on an international network of representatives from religious and other life-stance communities, NGOs, international organizations and research institutes, as well as its own Advisory Council (OSCE 2017). Its programs focus on topics such as the politicization of FoRB in a climate in which the regulation of religion is increasingly used as an instrument in political power struggles in a way that can have both negative and positive effects.²⁸

Framing and Progress

It is clear that FORB is now an integral part of the framing of human rights across these countries. There are three main frameworks through which to view FoRB in government policy and international relations. First there is the security framework that is operative in programs on countering violent extremism (CVE). There tends to be a distinction between a focus on religion and FoRB here, with the emphasis on “tolerance” being paramount over fostering religious freedom, per se. Second, there is the human rights framework, which emphasizes universal principles and “rules-based order.” The human rights approach is typically seen by its proponents as thematically and practically more effective in requiring engagement with religions and FoRB rather than the problematization that the security approach tends to foster. The third approach, the development framework, is often viewed as a “soft” approach and addresses FoRB both directly and indirectly through its emphasis on political stability and the reduction of poverty. In the U.K. the shift that has taken place, with the FoRB portfolio moving from the FCO to the DFID can be seen as an example of a government reframing FoRB for a range of political and practical reasons. The crux of the issue is how to frame religion and FoRB for maximum impact.

Framing FoRB as a security issue engages legislative, executive, and judicial approaches.

From a security perspective, religious freedom has value in combating extremism. As U.S.

international religious freedom expert Knox Thames points out:

The full protection of religious freedom within a rule-of-law environment can counter extremist voices by providing the civic space needed for the peaceful discussion of theological and societal issues, thereby empowering others to denounce violent interpretations. There is also practical value in engaging countries on religious freedom issues aggressively, so as to prevent depredations from escalating to a crisis level. Because of religious freedom’s unique role as a bundled human right, one that also serves to combat extremism, it must not be lost among the other goals in the Strategic Framework. At this turning point in world history, the European Union has an opportunity to help advance religious freedom and related human rights for generations. But is it fulfilling its commitment to make the issue a “priority” by listing it as one of 36 concerns? From my own experience in government, there is legitimate concern that the issue will be shunted to the bottom of long lists of human rights concerns and forgotten. (Thames 2015)

A critical question then is whether framing FoRB within the CVE rubric will cause it to be lost in the mix of issues to promoted by states. In October 2016, the British FCO held a major conference on “Preventing Violent Extremism by building inclusive and plural societies: How Freedom of Religion or Belief can help” (FCO 2016). At the conference, there was discussion of how FoRB might be situated within the political narrative of extremism and terrorism in foreign policy approaches. There was agreement on the urgent need to ensure that FoRB itself does not become part of the problem, but rather should be part of the solution. Discussions centered around whether FoRB can be utilized positively to beat extremism before it starts. This might include facilitating civil society space to talk about religion and belief alongside ongoing issues of identity, migration, political ideology and related issues. It was suggested that networks of Muslims living in the West could be utilized more to encourage this; it was also stressed that Muslims should not be relied upon to provide a counter theology to extremism. Instead, all religious leaders’ voices need to contribute to the FoRB dialogue. FoRB can be instrumental in enabling a more effective discourse in this area that does not focus on problematizing the freedom of religion or belief itself.

However, when it comes to framing on FoRB as a human right, Professor Malcolm Evans has asked:

The question which continually gets lost in these twists and turns is simple, but important: Why not start with the idea of the freedom of religion or belief for everyone, rather than focusing on the action to be taken against those who denigrate the beliefs of others? (Evans 2011)

Evans’ suggestion is useful, but asking the right sort of question is not enough. People often do not even know to ask questions, as ignorance and lack of training are often part of the problem hampering efforts. Canadian ambassador Bennet pointed to the need for training:

It is becoming increasingly axiomatic that Foreign Service officers in those predominant Western liberal democracies who are making it their business to care about the defense of international religious freedom (IRF) are hampered in their ability to advance religious freedom by insufficient training. (Bennett 2017)

In essence, they need to be educated and trained to ask the right questions and only then tackle FoRB more effectively. The majority of knowledge required on freedom of religion or belief is nuanced to specific regions, governments, and civil society. This includes the relevance of freedom of religion or belief to a broad range of themes from education and rule of law to trade. Often these connections and opportunities materialized at a diplomatic mission.

Conclusion

On July 4, 2018, United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May appointed Lord Tariq Mahmood Ahmad as the first Special Envoy on Freedom of Religion or Belief.²⁹ Part of a program announced earlier by Prime Minister May to promote religious tolerance domestically in the U.K., the new special envoy is specifically tasked with promoting British commitment to FoRB internationally. Lord Ahmad also serves as Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the UN at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict. His role in the new position is expected to focus on the situation of religious minority groups around the world. The position is analogous to the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom now occupied at the U.S. State Department by Sam Brownback, a former U.S. Senator and Governor of the State of Kansas. The director of the U.K. organization Faith Research Centre, Katie Harrison, applauded the focus of the special envoy position on religious intolerance against minorities, observing that

Whether that's Muslims in Myanmar, Christians in the Middle East or Yazidis in Iraq, you see people being singled and really, really suffering as a result. I think that we're starting to see in Western countries quite a lot of recognition of that, and people wanting to do something about it.³⁰

A number of observations can be made about the Lord Ahmad appointment that help to summarize some of the key observations of this paper. First, the appointment of a special envoy, follows and seems to validate the Scandanavian strategy being pursued in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, which focuses on multilateral diplomacy on religious intolerance and the plight of religious minorities. The approach may or may not be a more successful way of approaching FoRB issues than through the establishment of government offices, the objectives of which may become entangled in or dominated by domestic politics. Second, the focus on intolerance religious minorities reflects a larger trend that seems to have traction even in some of the Commonwealth’s (and the world’s) perennial offenders on FoRB issues. Whether this focus will be adequate to alleviate religiously conflict in more religiously divided societies where the majority/minority distinction is less salient—as in the recent Muslim attacks on Christians in the Commonwealth nation of Nigeria³¹—remains to be seen. On these seemingly intractable issues of religious conflict, backup from Parliament may prove helpful. Third, the tendency of these special envoys, as well as government offices and commissions where they still exist, as in the OIRF and USCIRF, to focus on religion as an international problem may serve to insulate them from domestic criticism from those who question whether their governments should be involved in FoRB issues at all, while serving to advance and deepen domestic commitments to FoRB, as well—particularly when religion and FoRB issues hit home, as in the aftermath of extremist violence and terrorist attacks. In those situations, these international FoRB envoys and bodies, may also have salient and salutary lessons to bring home to their domestic constituencies. In such cases, international FoRB work is neither a hegemonic projection of domestic value nor an a distraction or deflection of attention from FoRB matters at home, but rather can serve a valuable purpose of building a FoRB culture domestically, as well as abroad.

So, the record is mixed and the jury is still out when it comes to government and parliamentary initiatives on FoRB. There are ever-present risks of domestic political embroilment and international political hegemony in FoRB initiatives. Perhaps the main task of FoRB work at the parliamentary and government level is not only in putting forth FoRB as an important issue in and of itself, but also in framing security, human rights, and even trade and development discourses. Consideration of how FoRB interacts with and advances these projects is also vital. Progress on FoRB, as most other parliamentary and government initiatives is rarely ever assured, but requires constant vigilance, diplomacy, and voicing in order to succeed.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Harriet Hoffler for excellent background research assistance, especially on the United Kingdom.

ORCID

M. Christian Green http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4929-0005

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Monica Duffy Toft

Monica Duffy Toft is a Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Before joining Fletcher, Toft taught at Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. While at Harvard, she directed the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs and was the assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. She is a Global Scholar at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

M. Christian Green

M. Christian Green, J.D./Ph.D., is a scholar of law, religion, human rights, and global ethics. She is Research Director for law, religion, and human rights at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Co-Editor and Special Content Editor at the Journal of Law and Religion, Publications Manager at the African Consortium for Law and Religions Studies (ACLARS), and Academic and Social Media Consultant for the Commonwealth Initiative for Freedom of Religion or Belief (CIFoRB).

Notes

1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).

2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.

3 On 1 January 2018, Denmark established an office for a Special Representative for Freedom or Religion or Belief, and it will be interesting to follow the approaches of this new Scandinavian office.

4 David Hudson. “President Obama Praises Freedom of Religion at the National Prayer Breakfast.” The White House, February 6, 2014.

5 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401-81 (1998) (as amended) H. R. 2431.

6 “State Dept. Study on Saudi Textbooks.” The New York Times, August 25, 2016.

7 “USCIRF Study Reveals Numerous Passages in Saudi Textbooks Inciting Violence and Intolerance.” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, March 24, 2018.

8 The Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (H.R. 1150, Pub.L. 114–281), approved December 16, 2016.

9 The Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (2015).

10 The Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (2015).

11 See White House (2016). However, key stakeholders in the US, when questioned, felt that the delivery of training needed to be reevaluated, and that it was also important to better utilize local people and to include thematic approaches.

12 The website is now longer available, but a government assessment of the office remains.

13 “Religious freedom office replaced with new ‘office of human rights’.” CBC News, May 18, 2016.

14 Foreign & Commonwealth Office. “Press release: Foreign Office Advisory Group on freedom of religion or belief: Baroness Warsi chairs first meeting of Foreign Office group on Freedom of Religion or Belief to discuss vision and strategy.” March 25, 2014.

15 Parliament UK, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. “The FCO’s human rights work in 2013.” Foreign Affairs Committee—Sixth Report, November 11, 2014. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmfaff/551/55111.htm.

16 Parliament UK, House of Commons, Oral Answers to Questions to Deputy Prime Minister, Topical Questions, Vol. 590, January 6, 2015. http://bit.ly/2MqX0Ka.

17 Parliament UK, House of Commons. “Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Religious Freedom.” Religious Freedom: Written Question-226038, March 6, 2015.

18 Parliament UK, House of Commons. “Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion.” Vol. 579, May 1, 2014.

19 RT HON Baroness Anelay of St Johns DBE/Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the UN/ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Inquiry into the status of the human right to freedom of religion or belief” Submission 36, February 23, 2017

20 “Government appoints campaigner Sara Khan to lead counter-extremism drive,” ITV News, January 24, 2018. The term of Khan’s appointment is three years, and the Commission is to be housed in the Home Office.

21 “Government appoints campaigner Sara Khan to lead counter-extremism drive.” Khan has previously served on the Home Office’s Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Working Group and the Department for Education’s Due Diligence and Counter-Extremism Expert Reference group and she has provided evidence on the issue of radicalization to the European Parliament, to the Home Affairs Select Committee, and to the Joint Committee on Human Rights which comprises both Houses of Parliament.

22 Jamie Grierson. “Choice of new UK anti-extremism chief criticised as ‘alarming.’” The Guardian, January 25, 2018. For views on the Prevent program controversy, see Miqdaad Versi. “The latest Prevent figures show why the strategy needs an independent review,” The Guardian, November 10, 2017; Alan Travis. “Paralysis at the heart of UK counter-extremism policy.” The Guardian, September 17, 2017.

23 Jamie Grierson. “Choice of new UK anti-extremism chief criticised as ‘alarming’.” The Guardian, January 25, 2018.

24 U.K. Government and Parliament. “Petitions” on banning the face veil- Government response’, date closed October 8, 2014.

25 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. “Contribution to the Australian Parliament’s inquiry into freedom of religion or belief around the world.” February 16, 2017, Submission No. 315. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Freedomofreligion/Submissions.

26 Government of Norway/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Norway to increase support for vulnerable groups and religious minorities in Syria and Iraq.” Press release, September 9, 2015.

27 Government of Norway/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Support for Religious Minorities Doubled.” Press release, May 4, 2017.

28 Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. “The Politicisation of FoRB.” July 20, 2016.

29 Government U.K. “Lord Ahmad appointed as PM’s Special Envoy to promote religious freedom.” Press release, July 4, 2018.

30 Alex Williams. “Prime Minister appoints first special envoy on freedom of religion,” Premier, July 5, 2018.

31 “Nigeria killings echo abroad: Herdman and Boko Haram threaten Nigeria’s future—UK Parliamentarians,” Vanguard, July 1, 2018; Saheed Salawu. “UK Parliamentarians: Killings in Nigeria disturbing, must stop.” Nigerian Tribune, July 1, 2018; Wale Akinola. “Killings in Nigeria is disturbing, it must stop—UK parliament tells Buhari,” NAIJ.com, July 1, 2018; U.K. Parliament, House of Lords. “Nigeria, Question for Short Debate,” Hansard, Vol. 792, June 28, 2018.