Polish Business Lobbying in the EU 2004–2009: Examining the Patterns of Influence

Abstract

Polish business interest groups exerted limited influence on Brussels decision-making in the post-accession period (2004–2009). The patterns of influence are examined by means of a resource-based approach, including factors such as organization and budget, networks and reputation, but also on the basis of process tracing and preference attainment analysis. Limited effectiveness of Polish lobbying could be explained by the short period of socialization to EU politics. However, research shows that patterns of Polish interest representation in the EU should be further explained by the hybrid domestic institutional environment resulting from the transformation and Europeanization processes, as well as by the limited compatibility of the two institutional contexts. In fact, the actual opportunity structures differ to a large extent, both in terms of systemic openness and participatory regimes, between the national and the European level, notwithstanding the formally neo-pluralist character of interest representation systems both in Poland and in the EU.

Key Words:

• Business lobbying
• interest groups
• institutions
• Poland
• European Union
• participation
• openness
• transparency

Notes

Low levels of trust towards public institutions are particularly visible in Poland, even in comparison with other Central European countries. In 2004 82 per cent of Poles (71 per cent of Czechs and 66 per cent of Hungarians) declared a lack of trust towards members of the national parliament (CBOS, Zaufanie do instytucji publicznych w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, Warszawa, 10.2004). Equally, in 2008 only 16 per cent of Polish respondents declared that they trusted parliament (E. Karpowicz, A. Pol, „Parlament w opiniach Europejczyków”, Analizy nr 1 (9), Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, Warszawa, 19.01.2009). On a behavioural level, the average electoral turnout in national parliamentary elections in the years 2001–2007 was 47 per cent, whereas the average electoral turnout in European parliamentary elections in the years 2004–2009 was 22.5 per cent (M. Cześnik, „Partycypacja wyborcza Polaków”, Forum Aktywny Obywatel Programu Obywatel i Prawo Instytutu Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 24.06.2008, www.isp.org.pl; http://www.elections2009‐results.eu/en/turnout_en.html).

In the years 2000–2008 the office consisted of one representative. For a comparison, the Spanish business confederation employed six people. This difference is clearly translated into the amount of legislation and meetings that can be followed, which was confirmed by the interview with a PCPE representative in 2007; the latter was complaining about the huge gap between what was necessary and what was feasible, with regard to legislation that had tremendous importance for the Polish business community.

These committees worked most often on legislation that is subject to co-decision (re-named ordinary legislative procedure by the Lisbon Treaty), allowing for greatest parliamentary influence. At the same time, Polish MEPs were heavily overrepresented on the Foreign Affairs Committee (Polish MEPs constituted 11.6 per cent of the committee members in the term 2004–2009 and 14 per cent in 2009–2014 compared to 7 per cent within the entire EP). Consequently, between 2004 and 2009 Polish MEPs were rarely responsible for EP reports that were of importance to business interest groups.

The Commission's definition of universal service refers to the provision and collection of mail at least five times a week, accessible for all EU citizens notwithstanding their location (including mountains, islands and outermost regions).

Poland upheld its position on the narrow definition of vodka until the very end of negotiations in the Council and did not accept the compromise proposal of the Finnish presidency. The latter consisted of a labeling requirement where information about the non-traditional product is displayed on the label. Only in the case of the traditional product (cereals or potatoes) would the name ‘vodka’ be sufficient. The Finnish presidency suggested that any non-traditional product should be mentioned at the front of the bottle next to the ‘vodka’ inscription. The less favorable proposal of the succeeding German presidency indicated that the information on product should be placed only at the back of the bottle. Poland chose not to explore the opportunities that this debate presented. In the end, the regulation did not specify where the information should be put, apart from indicating that it should be there, easy to read and irremovable.

For instance, according to the report ‘A guide to an Effective Lobbying in Europe’ published in October 2009 by the Brussels office of the Burson–Marsteller consultancy, lobbying was considered a constructive and legitimate part of the decision-making process by only 3 per cent of representatives of the Polish political elite surveyed. At the same time, lobbying was accepted as a crucial tool for shaping public decisions by an average of 48 per cent of respondents in the 14 EU countries covered and by 52 per cent of EU-level officials and politicians.

Draft Lobbying Act as from 12 May 2010, explanatory note, p. 11; http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kprm/dokumenty/61_3632.html.

http://bip.mg.gov.pl/node/10404; http://sejm.gov.pl/lobbing/lobbing1.html (consulted on 25 March 2011); http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do?locale=en&reset (consulted on 25 July 2009).

Own calculation based on http://www.sejm.gov.pl/lobbing/lobbing1.html; http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kprm/dokumenty/61_3632.html.