Frontex as Agency: More of the Same?

Abstract

Building on the notion of ‘agencies’ as non-majoritarian instruments to professionalize (or ‘depoliticisize’) EU policy-making, this article examines whether the introduction of Frontex as an agency instrument in 2004 implied a major change in the management of the EU's border control compared to the earlier network. Even though formal evaluations have acknowledged the positive achievements of Frontex, this article questions whether those assessments actually helps us to understand better the added value of Frontex as agency. To do so, the article draws from a legitimacy-based model to assess the added value of the agency. Input and output legitimacy are being assessed through a number of accountability mechanisms. The model is applied to predecessor of Frontex (SCIFA + /PCU) and to Frontex. We conclude that the choice for the agency instrument was not sufficiently argued and that the design of Frontex hardly offers the advantages of the agency structure.

Key words:

• Accountability
• added-value
• border controls
• Frontex
• legitimacy

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank John Occhipinti and Peter Slominski for their insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

1 Although we acknowledge that the debate on the extent to which the Meroni doctrine limits the delegation of tasks is still open.

2 Those centres, located in various member states, were specialized on sea, air and land borders. The centre for land borders located in Kehl, Germany had the objectives to: ‘enhance the intensity of border controls and surveillance; to create a more effective, uniform border control standard; to prove the feasibility, effectiveness and added value of multinational teams on the spot; and to work out suggestions for the amendment of existing provisions aiming to reach a higher standard of border control and surveillance’ (House of Lords, 2003, p. 14). In other words it created a decentralized network of border control with specializations according to the expertise of each member state.

3 Art. 9 Joint Action 98/244/JHA of 19 March 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Art. K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, introducing a programme of training, exchanges and cooperation in the field of asylum, immigration and crossing of external borders (Odysseus programme) – (1998–2002) (Official Journal L 99, 31.03.1998).

4 Profiling is defined as ‘ trying to determine the type of person likely to be an illegal immigrant and the methods used to enter the EU’.

5 See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st13/st13779-re01.en03.pdf.

6 ILO are MS immigration officers based abroad in order to establish and maintain contacts with the authorities of the host country with a view to contributing to the prevention and combating of illegal immigration, the return of illegal immigrants and the management of legal migration. See Council Conclusions (2003b).

7 The authors thank P. Slominski for bringing this point to their attention.