Opposition Parties in Hybrid Regimes: Between Repression and Co-optation: The Case of Russia's Regions

Abstract

In this article the author analyses the intricate combination of repression and co-optation policies conducted by Russia's ruling elites in their relations with the opposition on the regional level. As the study shows the structural features of electoral authoritarianism not only ensure the victories of ‘approved’ candidates but also make the rare oppositional winners to adapt to the existing regime and change the political affiliation. If the regime gets more authoritarian the oppositional party can still be a tool to win a local election. But after being elected, the winner finds himself in another political environment of existing patron–client relations, and has no other choice than to become a dependent member, or an agent (according to principal–agent theory) in higher-level clientele. As a result, oppositional party has become useless in the recruitment of influential executive power elite. However, while blocking unwanted ‘invasion’ of opposition into the executive power the regime allows opposition to be presented in the leadership of regional legislative power. This policy reflects the necessity to make an opposition more loyal and included into the system of power relations in most safe and efficient for the ruling elite way.

Key words:

• Party system
• dominant party
• opposition
• co-optation
• repression
• spoils
• patron–client relations
• principal–agent relations
• regional power

Acknowledgements

This article is prepared as part of the program of fundamental research conducted by the Laboratory for Regional Political Studies of National Research University – Higher School of Economics (project ‘Structural Analysis of Regional Political Regimes and Electoral Space’).

Notes

1 The ‘oppositional’ governors were the targets of campaigns launched by the law-enforcement bodies. For example, in 2004 there was an investigation against Mashkovtsev. The leader of the Agrarian party Lapshin, whilst holding the post of Governor of Altay Republic, was also sued. Such cases had obvious political reasoning and were aimed at weakening the governors and stopping them from being re-appointment. Indeed, no governors who were investigated got their new terms of appointment.

2 This article is also based on the numerous expert interviews the author has conducted since the mid 1990s in the regions.