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Abstract
In this article, we analyse Euroscepticism as a common trait of current radical right-wing formations. Public opinion in Italy has become increasingly polarized on the issue of European integration, and largely Eurosceptic. Thus, it is relevant to understand whether there is an ideological opposition to the European Union (EU) in Italy, both inside and outside the Parliament, which, in the future, could capture the malaise of the citizens and grow within the political system. Particularly, we explore differences and similarities between the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary right. We show that the ways in which they perceive and (negatively) represent the EU through frames is strikingly similar, despite the fact that these organizations do not really cooperate and are even in competition with each other. Ultimately, despite many factors being mature for issue mobilization and the creation of an EU cleavage in Italy, the success of this process largely depends on the ability of the radical right organizations to come to terms with their ideological background, give priority to this emerging cleavage and establish more synergies with each other.
Notes
Although the article is the result of a joint effort, Manuela Caiani is particularly responsible for sections 2 and 3 and Nicolò Conti for sections 1 and 4, the conclusive section was written jointly.
1 In the most recent European elections of 2009, Eurosceptical radical right parties were particularly successful in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Among the party groups in the European Parliament, two are openly Eurosceptic: the European Conservatives and Reformists and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy.
2 Despite there being an open debate – one that goes beyond the scope of this article – on conceptual definition and terminology, this party family is defined in the literature by some common ideological attributes, such as nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, defence of the state from supranational and international organizations, welfare chauvinism, revisionism and traditional ethics (Mudde, Citation2007, p. 21). At the same time, ‘despite being referred to as “far-right”, many of these groups are not easily placed according to traditional political categories, often combining elements of leftwing and rightwing philosophy, mixed with populist language and rhetoric’ (Bartlett, Birdwell & Littler, Citation2011, pp. 25–26). In the article, we group different organizations on the basis of their common ideological attributes, but we do not separate them on the basis of their differences that are indeed relevant.
3 The political party, Forza Nuova, has been chosen because it is broadly recognized as the most rapidly growing, active and determined extremist group on the extreme right Italian scene (Caldiron, Citation2001; Ferrari, Citation2006). This organization shows, on the one hand, the characteristics of a militant movement organization, thus obtaining the support of radical right-wing activists, while, on the other hand, it has contacts with the institutional far right, especially at the local level, where it is permanently searching for unity of action with the Northern League for campaigns against immigration and Islam and in favour of ‘law and order’ principles. Therefore, the political discourse of this group can be considered as representing a mix between the institutional (and more ‘politically educated’) far right and the grass-roots basis. The second (more informal) group is Veneto Fronte Skinheads, which is the main representative of the skinhead movement in Italy. Founded in 1985 as a non-profit organization for the promotion of cultural and sport activities, it is considered one of the most violent racist organizations in Italy (EUMC, Citation2004). Camerata Virtuale is an online discussion forum and a meeting point for several radical right political movements.
4 The year 2004 is excluded from the analysis of Forza Nuova's magazine because it was impossible to get any copies for this year from the organization. We sampled two issues per year. All articles in the main section of the paper (the first three pages) were checked for statements containing frames, totalling about five or six per edition (including the editorial).
5 Analysed for the years 2005 and 2006.
6 Analysed from 2002 to 2006 (since this publication is informally produced and printed, it is not always published in a bi-monthly rhythm, but sometimes more rarely).
7 The codebook used for the analysis is available on request from the authors.
8 While the EU is the most frequently recurring actor in the documents of Forza Nuova (7.4% of all its frames) and significantly present in the discourse of the subcultural skinhead group (occupying third position among all mentioned actors, with 4.3% of frames), it is under-represented in the discourse of political movements (0.5%). This can suggest that although political issues play an important role in the discourse of the extra-parliamentary radical right, supranational politics (in this case, ‘European politics’) is a more relevant topic for grass-roots militants. Ultimately, the more institutionalized (or formal) a group is, the more these issues become part of its political discourse.
9 VFS, May–June 2004.
10 They are labelled as an ‘arrogant’ and ‘imperialistic power’, the ‘root of several dangers for the world’ (FN, various issues).
11 It is striking to notice that, here, the criticism of the extreme right towards globalization is almost overlapping with that of the global justice movement: The IMF, for instance, is accused of engaging in ‘criminal’ behaviour and practising ‘neo-colonialist politics’ by exploiting foreign debt (FN, May 2002).
12 Many observers agree that a genuine radical right does not really exist and that this broad milieu is actually made up of many organizations that do not cooperate, but, instead, compete with each other (Mudde, Citation2007, p. 159).
13 We classified the following as ‘political dimension’ categories: European integration and institutions, nation-state and the EU, the US and the EU. Then, we classified the following as ‘economy and policies’: domestic system and the EU, international economic system, monetary policy, agricultural policy, taxation, pension, employment and social policy. Finally, we classified the following as ‘culture’: culture and society, European identity and enlargement.
14 In the case of the Northern League, we made use of the Euromanifesto data gathered by the University of Mannheim, which is also part of the European Election Survey. The political dimension includes the following domains: external relations, constitution freedom and democracy, political system. The ‘economy and policy’ dimension includes: economy and welfare. Finally, the ‘cultural dimension’ includes: fabric of society. Only the Euromanifestos of 1994, 1999 and 2004 were considered for this calculation, as the Euromanifesto of 2009 was a very long joint document that was issued to contest both the European and local elections; therefore, a calculation of frequency distribution would be misleading for this document, which addresses the contents of both the local and the European arenas.
15 The 2002 Bossi-Fini law on immigration was co-authored by the party secretary and founder of the Northern League, Umberto Bossi.