Monopolization, classification and symbolic violence: Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to the analysis of State Nationalism

ABSTRACT

The study of nationalism is usually split into its macro-sociological dimension and the political and coercive aspects on the one hand, and into micro-sociological, psychological and symbolic aspects on the other. Pierre Bourdieu’s methodological structuralist approach and his concepts of habitus and doxa give us a better understanding of nationalism in its dominant form – State Nationalism. These concepts shed light on: (a) the framework and micro-dimension of The State’s monopolization of symbols; (b) the battle lines between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’; (c) hierarchicalisation; (d) the invisible way in which nationalism as the dominant ideology creates coherent cognitive systems that dovetail with the institutional structure. Thus one of State Nationalism’s greatest victories is to pass itself off as Universalist and disinterested. In so doing, it fosters symbolic violence and adherence to this doxa.

KEYWORDS:

• Nationalism
• state
• doxa
• monopolization
• classifications
• habitus
• symbolic domination

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Although Pierre Bourdieu had reflected a little on The State and, especially, on the school system in his early research, it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that he developed most of his thought on The State itself. This later work was reflected in publications such as De la maison du roi à la raison d'État (on public policies) (Bourdieu 1997) and La construction du marché (on the Nation-State) in (Bourdieu and Christin 1990) or Esprits d'État (the genesis of the bureaucratic field) (Bourdieu 1993). It was at this point that there he shifted his position somewhat to draw a stronger link between The State and nationalism, as can be seen in the transcription of the seminars he taught back then and that were published in Sur l'État:(…) "What I had not grasped hitherto in tackling the issue of The State was that this culture is legitimate but also national. This political dimension of culture had escaped me, and in the end all I am going to say is to take up some old analyses on the role of legitimate culture, that of schools, but placing them in a wholly political context and linking this culture with the functions of national integration, and not just simply as Durkheim said, with social integration" (Bourdieu 2012, 267).

2 Pierre Bourdieu never directly uses the concept of habitus under a national label but always refers to it in terms of class. However, if we establish that the doxa is largely established by the Nation-State (Bourdieu 2012) and that social fields are largely national in their delimitation and content (Sapiro 2013) and are the framework within which the habitus is created, we can deduce that the habitus is also shaped and forged by the national framework, and thus qualifies as a national habitus. If we consider that social structure and symbolic class are expressed in the form of agency and are embodied, we can also see how the national doxa and its cultural structures affect agency, specifically through sports practices and nutrition. One can argue that the body itself forms part of ‘the body politic’ in the form of The Nation-State (Solenn 2017).

3 The French, as might be expected, had their own meridian — la Méridienne de France

4 That is why the nationalisms promoted by the new European States sought to build an identity differing from those in previous empires, despite the common trunk with the Roman Empire. They therefore sought to differentiate themselves from neighbouring States. Perhaps the process followed by German nationalism is the most notorious but British nationalism and French nationalism respectively made appeals to Celtic or to Gallic origins (Thiesse 1999).

5 Another typical cognitive structure constructed by State Nationalism covers the nation’s Capital as an empty space that in fact has no regional name and would constitute a kind of non-territory. This ‘emptiness’ lets us think of it as a space of (national) universalism. This is despite the fact that it is a territory that has its own ethno-cultural and historical roots. In this operation, State Nationalism can be presented as a space for communication between the parties, the regions and as an open space for the concentration of all the nation’s resources and people, especially the most symbolic ones (Menger 1993). One of the consequences of this cognitive structure is the need to fill the notion of the nation with content, hence the importance of folkloric regionalism in national construction (Thiesse 2006). This revindication of regions to build the nation seems paradoxical but we interpret it as a way of compensating for the symbolic domination of regions and of singularising nationalist universalism in opposition to other nations.

6 An example of the centralising strategies pursued by The State is the building of infrastructure. The Canal du Midi is a case in point, whose purpose was to break regional political power in the South of France. When the canal was built, the region had been very recently incorporated into the French State and its national identity. The building of the canal involved land expropriation and the mobilisation of State personnel, weakening the local nobility while strengthening The State’s hold over Occitanie (Occitania). At the time, Occitania was one of the least-integrated parts of the French dominions and the building of the canal was intended to overcome one of the hurdles to forging a unified State (Mukerji 2010). This scheme was begun under Absolutism. Other large projects followed throughout the 19th century and up until the present day. A good example in Spain is the country’s high-speed rail network (of the TGV kind). Here, the building of the network was based on State Nationalism and a Bourbonic obsession with a radial network based on Madrid. Social and economic needs were conspicuously left out of the plans. The upshot is yet further boosting of the Capital’s supremacy (with Madrid as ‘Centre of The Universe) while peripheral regions (all excepting Castile) are cast ever deeper into ‘The Twilight Zone’. Meanwhile, any rail or road systems that do not form part of Madrid-centric radial schemes (for instance, the economically vital ‘Mediterranean Corridor’) are given short shrift. The purpose of this ‘centre-periphery’ mental scheme is none other than keeping the Capital at the centre of the spider web and maintain its economic social and symbolic primacy (Bel I Queralt 2017).

7 The examples of France and Spain given in this paper are not intended to characterise all Nation-State building or stateless nationalism in these countries. However, the genesis of these two States and their ruthlessly centralising approach shed light on State Nationalism’s monopolisation of power, classification schemes and creation of a doxa (Thiesse 2006; Flor 2017; Archilés, Ismael, and Archiles 2012).

8 Bourdieu emphasises that The State is not a unified and coherent whole, hence the need to identify and analyse the many "State Deeds".

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Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins

Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins is PhD in Sociology from the UAB and EHESS. Currently, he is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the University of Valencia where he teaches on sociology of culture and sociology of social change. He is the author of several books and more than fifty articles on the sociology of culture and cultural policy in national and international journals. Since 2015 he has been the director of Debats. Journal of culture, power and society (Alfons el Magnànim Institution), director of the Center for Studies on Culture, Power and Identities of the University of Valencia and the Valencia Centre of the Menéndez Pelayo International University (UIMP). He is a member of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Cultural Policy, Revista Española de Sociología (RES), Papers. Revista de Sociologia and Publicacions de la Universitat de València (PUV).