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Abstract
British decryption of Axis communications through the Ultra secret gave the Allies a substantial intelligence advantage during World War II. While this much is well known, existing scholarship focuses predominantly on Ultra’s impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. This article examines the underexplored role of Allied signals intelligence in the Mediterranean theater with reference to original decrypts of German communications between 1942 and 1943. The Mediterranean Sea was of key strategic significance for Allied and Axis supply lines; Ultra played a significant role in sustaining Allied shipping and impeding the transportation of Axis supplies across the Mediterranean. After an in-depth examination of communications the British were intercepting in the Mediterranean, this article presents three factors necessary for effective use of Ultra, which coalesced in 1942 to allow Ultra to play a significant role in the outcome of the battle over supply lines in the Mediterranean theater.
Notes
1 The Ultra documents [microform], University Publications of America, Maryland: main series of signals conveying intelligence to Allied Commands, based on intercepted radio messages, D810 S7 U46, Reel 152, September 2, 1942.
2 Examples include John Gooch (ed.), Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990) and Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow, 1989).
3 David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada’s Second World War (Toronto, ON: Stoddart, 1995), 150.
4 John Ferris, “The British Army: Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1941–1942,” in Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (New York: Routledge, 2005) Kindle edition, 4309.
5 Ibid., 4346.
6 Ibid., 4523–628.
7 Ibid., 5095.
8 Ultra documents [microform], D810 S7 U46, Reel 152, August 29, 1942.
9 Ibid., August 28, 1942.
10 Ibid., August 29, 1942.
11 See Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000).
12 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trs. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
13 In both cases, the Allies exploited Adolf Hitler’s fear that they would attack the Balkans – in the Sicily situation, and the Pas de Calais – rather than Normandy, thereby manipulating his interpretation of subsequent military movements through understanding his expectations.
14 Ultra documents [microform], Reel 257, October 19, 1943.
15 Ibid., October 20, 1943.
16 Ibid., October 10, 1943.
17 Francis Harry Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1981), 118.
18 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 51.
19 Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma, 112.
20 Ibid.
21 Brad Gladman, “Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign, 1940–1943,” Intelligence and National Security, 13, no. 4 (2008): 144.
22 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 75.
23 Ibid., 79.
24 Ibid., 151.
25 Gladman, “Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign, 1940–1943,” 147.
26 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 73–5.
27 Ralph Bennett, “Intelligence and Strategy: Some observations on the war in the Mediterranean Theatre 1941–45,” Intelligence and National Security, 5, no. 2 (1990): 448.
28 Ibid.
29 Ultra documents [microform], Reel 152, August 7, 1942.
30 Bennett, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 450.
31 Gladman, “Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign, 1940–1943,” 144–5.
32 Bennett, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 455.
33 Ibid., 449.
34 See Admiral Aegean, The Ultra documents [microform], D810 S7 U46, Reel 257, October 18, 1943.
35 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 75.
36 An excellent source to consult for details on the German lack of awareness of Ultra is Rebecca Ann Ratcliff, Delusions of intelligence: Enigma, Ultra and the End of Secure Ciphers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
37 Ultra documents [microform], Reel 152, August 29, 1942.
38 Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 24.
39 Ibid., 213.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Maria Robson
Maria Robson is completing a graduate degree at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary. Her research area is signals intelligence and her thesis focuses on Canadian signals intelligence and intelligence sharing.