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Articles

Nerve agent development: a lesson in intelligence failure?

Pages 96-111 | Received 23 Oct 2013, Accepted 10 Oct 2014, Published online: 08 Jan 2015
 

Abstract

The development of Nerve Agents by Germany in the lead up to the Second World War represents one of the best-kept secrets of the period. It also reflects an almost total failure of Western Intelligence Agencies to anticipate, detect and report on these weapons. This paper will use the results of archive-based research to illustrate the process through which Germany gained what was to become the most advanced Chemical Weapon capability in the World, maintaining that dominance until her defeat in 1945. It will be argued that despite having opportunities to fully identify German capabilities, UK and US Intelligence consistently failed to recognise key evidence – largely as the result of an institutionalised arrogance relating to their assumed technical superiority in the field. These failings, it will be suggested, were directly responsible for the Chemical Weapons arms race that persisted throughout the Cold War.

Notes

1 Rudolph Binding, A Fatalist at War, trans. Ian F. D. Morrow (London, 1929), 64. cited in Edward M. Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 31.

3 National Archive, Kew, WO 188 / 784, Russia: Bacteriological Warfare (Kulali Island) 16 February 1927.

4 In particular, see: Mark Wilkinson, “The Battle of Stalingrad, Biological Weapons, and the Expert Witness: Challenging Single-Source Evidence in Intelligence Studies”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 25 (2012):795–813.

5 For a full and detailed account of the ALSOS mission see: Boris T Pash, The ALSOS Mission, (New York: Award House, 1969) and John D. Hart, “The ALSOS Mission, 1943–1945: A Secret US Scientific Intelligence Unit,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 18 (2005): 508–37.

6 For an excellent historical overview of Chemical Warfare see: Robinson, Julian, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume 1, The Rise of CB Weapons, (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971).

7 Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 30.

8 Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ Warfare, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1982), 8–9.

9 Ibid., 9.

10 Barton Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939: Deception and Misperception,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5, no. 1 (1982): 3.

11 Ibid., 4.

12 Information relating to Russian casualties due to Chemical Weapons in the First World War is scant. The Hirsch Report cites Gilchrist in giving ‘the very probably number of 419,340 gas casualties, and 56,000 deaths due to gas’. In B Urlanis Wars and Population, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971) a much lower figure 11,000 gas deaths is cited.

13 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939,” 29.

14 Robert Himmer, “Rathenau, Russia and Rapallo,” Central European History 9, no. 2 (1976): 146.

15 Ibid., 172.

16 Voprosy vneshnei torgovli (28 August 1922), p. 306 cited in Himmer, “Rathenau, Russia and Rapallo,” 183.

17 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939,” 29.

18 Ibid., 30.

19 Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 54.

20 Erickson, John, The Soviet High Command: A Military – Political History, 1918–1941, (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 279.

21 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939,” 30.

22 One of the most useful sources can be found in: Erickson, The Soviet High Command, in particular on p. 264.

23 Confidential Interview.

24 Unknown author. Document states ‘Reported by a former member of ‘Tomka’ who worked in ‘TOMKA’ for 4 years and who was in charge of the dismantling of the enterprise in 1933‘. Document is titled Tomka: A German secret operation behind the Iron Curtain in the Steppes of the Volga area at Volsk in 1928 to 1931 (dismantled 1933).

25 In particular, Ludwig Haber (son of the chemist Fritz Haber) commented on ‘the mutual incomprehension of officers and scientists’ and ‘the unreliability of the weapon system’ as described in Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 42.

26 Unknown author. Document states ‘Reported by a former member of ‘Tomka’ who worked in ‘TOMKA’ for 4 years and who was in charge of the dismantling of the enterprise in 1933‘. Document is titled Tomka: A German secret operation behind the Iron Curtain in the Steppes of the Volga area at Volsk in 1928 to 1931 (dismantled 1933), 2.

27 Ibid., 4.

28 Ibid., 8.

29 Ibid., 11.

30 Ibid., 16.

31 Ibid., 18–19.

32 Ibid., 21.

33 Ibid., 25.

34 Jeanne Guilleman, Biological Weapons, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 135.

35 Unknown author. Document states ‘Reported by a former member of ‘Tomka’ who worked in ‘TOMKA’ for 4 years and who was in charge of the dismantling of the enterprise in 1933‘. Document is titled Tomka: A German secret operation behind the Iron Curtain in the Steppes of the Volga area at Volsk in 1928 to 1931 (dismantled 1933), 28.

36 National Archive, Kew, Box WO 188 / 784, Soviet Russia, Bacteriological Warfare, Page CX 9767, Dated 17 January 1927.

37 Patrick Barriot and Chantal Bismuth, Treating Victims of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Medical, Legal and Strategic Aspects, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 36.

38 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919 – 1939,” 14–15.

39 Ibid., p. 15.

40 Robinson, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 80.

41 Ibid., 80.

42 The Times, Mr. Wickham Steed, former editor of The Times (Obituary), (The Times, London, 14 January 1956), 9.

43 Hugh-Jones, Martin, “Wickham Steed and German Biological Research,” Intelligence and National Security, 7, no. 4 (1992): 398.

44 Ibid., 385.

45 Geissler, E and Moon, J (Eds), Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), 92.

46 Hugh-Jones, “Wickham Steed and German Biological Research,” 386.

47 Ibid., 387.

48 Ibid., 379.

49 Ibid., 380.

50 Ibid., 381.

51 Unknown author. Document states ‘Reported by a former member of ‘Tomka’ who worked in ‘TOMKA’ for 4 years and who was in charge of the dismantling of the enterprise in 1933‘. Document is titled Tomka: A German secret operation behind the Iron Curtain in the Steppes of the Volga area at Volsk in 1928 to 1931 (dismantled 1933), 38.

52 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939,” 32.

53 Unknown author. Document states ‘Reported by a former member of ‘Tomka’ who worked in ‘TOMKA’ for 4 years and who was in charge of the dismantling of the enterprise in 1933‘. Document is titled Tomka: A German secret operation behind the Iron Curtain in the Steppes of the Volga area at Volsk in 1928 to 1931 (dismantled 1933), 24.

54 Confidential Interview.

55 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 69. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

56 Ibid., 69.

57 Whaley, “Covert Rearmament in Germany 1919–1939,” 36.

58 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 83. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

59 Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 54.

60 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 17. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

61 Col. Dr Walter Hirsch (late head of Wa Pruf 9), Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, Prepared for US Intelligence dated15 May 1951, 17. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

62 Ibid., 25.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., iv.

66 Ibid.

67 ibid.

68 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 68. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

69 Col. Dr Walter Hirsch (late head of Wa Pruf 9), Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, Prepared for US Intelligence dated15 May 1951, 69. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

70 Ibid., 58.

71 Ibid., 59.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 39.

74 Florian Schmaltz, “Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction in Nazi Germany,” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 15 (2006): 187.

75 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 65.

76 Schmaltz, “Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons,” 188.

77 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 53.

78 Schmaltz, “Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons,” 189.

79 Ibid. 189.

80 Email correspondence: Wilkinson/Tesko on 17 October 2013.

81 Ibid.

82 Extract from Hitler’s speech of 19 September 1939 in Danzig, taken from www.hitler.org/speeches/09-13-39.html

83 Col. Dr Walter Hirsch (late head of Wa Pruf 9), Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, Prepared for US Intelligence dated15 May 1951, 40. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

84 Ibid.

85 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 65.

86 Schmaltz, “Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons,” 203.

87 Ibid., 65.

88 Ibid., 64.

89 National Archives, London, Preparedness to Engage in Chemical Warfare, p. 9, para 2, dated 31 March 1942.

90 Ibid., 22, para 2.

91 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 67.

92 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 22. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

93 Barriot and Bismuth, Treating Victims of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 52.

94 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 67.

95 Ibid.

96 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 22. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

97 Vil S. Mirzayanov, “Chemical Weapons: An Expose,” Perspective, 4, no. 4 (April–May 1994): 1–8, 2.

98 Schmaltz, “Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons,” 198.

99 W/C A. K. Mills, M. A. P. Investigation of Chemical Warfare Installations in the Munsterlager Area, including Raubkammer, Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, G-2 Division, SHAEF (Rear) APO 413 reporting on work completed between 23 April and 3 June 1945, 22. (Document kindly provided by Mr Steve Tesko from personal collection).

100 ‘Interrogation of Certain German Personalities Connected with Chemical Warfare’. BIOS Final Report No. 542, Item No. 8.

101 National Archive CAB 80/54 Report of Progress of Disarmament and Demilitarisation in the British Zone in Germany, 31 May 1946, 142, para 6 b.

102 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 139.

103 J. B. Tucker, War of Nerves, (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 158–59.

104 Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, 185.

105 J. B. Tucker, War of Nerves, (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 232–33.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mark Wilkinson

Dr Mark Wilkinson is a consultant specialising in risk and resilience. He served for 16 years as a Commissioned Officer in the British Army, most recently as a High Threat Bomb Disposal officer in Afghanistan. He gained his PhD from Warwick University, UK, in 2010 with a thesis examining the relationship between UK Secret Intelligence and Chemical and Biological Weapons Related Arms Control.

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