Understanding how individuals engage in match-fixing: the role of moral disengagement

ABSTRACT

Research question

This study aims to investigate the role of moral disengagement in individuals’ decisions to consent to match-fixing, either alone or in concert with money, other inducements, and threats or pressure. Drawing on the moral (dis)comfort component of an individual's rational-choice cost–benefit assessment, we examine the potential of moral disengagement as an explanatory mechanism.

Research methods

Data were obtained through an online questionnaire. The analysis was based on an international sample of 383 current and former athletes, coaches, referees, and board members who have reported having been approached for match-fixing in the past. The empirical evaluation employed descriptive statistics and (multiple) binary logistic regression models, which were performed using SPSS 24 software.

Results and Findings

Results indicate that a higher propensity to morally disengage can be associated with increased odds of consenting to match-fixing. These results suggest that individuals approached with a match-fixing proposal tend to employ self-defensive mechanisms to rationalise their decision to engage in match-fixing. Furthermore, the use of threats or pressure was found to have a significant impact on the decision to participate in match-fixing, both alone and in concert with (monetary) inducements and moral disengagement. While a positive significant interaction effect was observed between moral disengagement and the offer of (monetary) inducements, no significant interaction effect was noted between moral disengagement and threats or pressure.

Implications

This study offers novel individual-level explanations for match-fixing. Enriching the dominant rational-choice paradigm, this study emphasises the importance of detecting and counteracting moral disengagement mechanisms in match-fixing prevention initiatives.

KEYWORDS:

• match-fixing
• moral disengagement
• sport manipulation
• bribe
• integrity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In Forrest and Simmons' (2003, p. 607) equation, E(U^F) stands for the expected utility gain from participating in a fix; p refers to probability of detection; q is probability of a fix being successful; Y is current wealth; G is gain in wealth from an undetected and successful fix; F is financial penalty incurred if the fix is detected (fines or loss of salary or prize money while suspended); and R is value of loss of reputation if found guilty of fixing.

Additional information

Funding

The elaboration of this manuscript was co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union through the collaborative partnership ‘Evidence-based Prevention Of Sporting-related Match-fixing’ (EPOSM) (project number: 613385-EPP-1-2019-1-BE-SPO-SCP).