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Original Article

Complicity in democratic engagement with autocratic systems

Article: 1958509 | Received 24 Aug 2020, Accepted 10 Jun 2021, Published online: 04 Aug 2021
 

ABSTRACT

Autocratic control of civil society, including academia, can be extended to democratic societies and institutions in ways that pose threats to liberal-democratic values, such as academic freedom, for example through mechanisms and practices that lead to academic self-censorship. Engaging critically with the literature on ‘sharp power’ and ‘authoritarian influencing’ addressing this phenomenon, this paper argues that democratic actors who, without sharing the repressive goals of autocracies, contribute to their success in settings of international collaboration and exchange can become structurally complicit with such wrongs. Recognizing the risk of complicity is a necessary first step towards addressing the political responsibilities resulting from it.

References

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

Notes

* Professor of Law, King’s College London, affiliate researcher, NYU U.S.-Asia Law Institute; external member, Centre for Human Rights Erlangen-Nürnberg. The author would like to thank all the participants of the ECPR workshop organized by Carmen Pavel and Peter Niesen in April 2019 for discussing a draft with her: Evan Criddle, Eva Erman, Andreas Follesdal, Evan Fox-Decent, Ester Herlin-Karnell, Steven Ratner, Antoinette Scherz, Ronen Shnayderman, Oisin Shuttle, Jiewuh Sung and Alain Zysset. She would also like to thank Stephen F.D. Guest, Jiang Jue, Terence C. Halliday, Benjamin L. Liebman, Aruna Nair, Ralph Weber, Zhu Yi and the anonymous peer reviewers for their most helpful critical comments and suggestions.

1 This scenario draws on publicly reported cases, referenced below, as well as the author’s experience while working as an academic in universities in different countries.

2 Drawing on (Leavenworth Citation2016).

3 Drawing on Bethany (Allen-Abrahamian Citation2018); Scholars At (Risk Citation2019; Redden Citation2018).

4 Drawing on (Chao and Gooch Citation2018).

5 This issue is widely discussed. See e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2019.

6 Scholars At (Risk Citation2018b).

7 Drawing on Solidarity statement on behalf of scholars sanctioned for their work on China 2021.

8 See for example ‘About the China NGO Project,’ https://www.chinafile.com/ngo/about.

9 Drawing on (Carrico Citation2017).

10 On tianxia, see Teufel (Dreyer Citation2015).

11 ‘To be a subject of power is to be moved by reasons that others have given me and that motivate me to think or act in a certain way intended by the reason-giver.’ (Forst Citation2015), 111. This account of power clarifies that acting for power-related reasons does not constitute moral justification.

12 Walker’s analysis uses evaluative language, e.g. when he suggests that where democratic actors, are involved, they are primarily victims of autocratic wrongs, such as ‘degrad[ing] the integrity of independent institutions through manipulation’ and ‘nefarious arts of distraction.’ (Walker Citation2018), 12.

13 This would be counter to (UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel Citation1997).

14 In legal terms, liability encompasses ‘strict liability’ scenarios that do not require a culpability test; however the present discussion does not deal with strict liability scenarios.

15 Potential liability under autocratic legal systems is not discussed here. Inside China, actors such as Sun operate with evident impunity while the system remains what might be described as ‘dual state.’ (Fraenkel Citation1941; Meierhenrich Citation2018).

16 Under English law, this could be an offence of a ‘threat to kill’ s 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; see also s. 3 (affray) of the (UK Public Order Act Citation1986). Under German Law it could be an offence of threatening the commission of a felony (s 241 of the German Criminal Code).

17 Section 240 of the German Criminal Code. This provision dates back to Germany’s Nazi era and it remains a constitutionally contested provision, partly due to its vagueness.

18 Conceivably, the ‘soft law’ of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights could have a bearing (UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Citation2012; Ruggie 2017). These Guidelines were devised with scenarios such as the conduct of transnational companies in extractive industries abroad in mind, however.

19 For example, there is a current discussion about pursuing criminal liability and other responses for systematic human rights violations in Xinjiang. (Human Rights Watch Citation2021).

20 According to Dworkin’s rights-centred theory, for example, the point of all law is to limit the coercive power of the state. (Dworkin Citation1986), 6

21 We might be tempted, with Rawls, to consider freedom of speech in non-liberal but decent societies dispensable, but Zhang’s society did not satisfy the requirements of Rawlsian decency. (Rawls Citation1999, 80; Angle Citation2005, 518)

22 Young’s argument that complicity requires intent is problematic, considering that some legal orders recognize the possibility of negligent participation in a wrong primarily perpetrated by another. See, for example, s 25 of the German criminal code.

23 Lepora and Goodin, Chapter 1 (Introduction) p. 8.

24 Lepora and Goodin, p 171.

25 Lepora and Goodin, p. 63.

26 One of the cases establishing this principle in English law is (Hughes v Lord Advocate Citation1963) AC 837 .

27 They may have moral obligations to act responsibly, we might also say, using an older type of argument, even though these obligations are imperfect and thus incapable of triggering blame or liability in a Kantian sense. (Kant Citation1785, 2nd section).

28 The author has been involved in one such initiative: the UK-based academic freedom and internationalization working group (https://hrc.sas.ac.uk/networks/academic-freedom-and-internationalization-working-group/about-afiwg).

29 The University may even, as the GPPi has suggested, even have a political responsibility to stop taking such funding. (Benner Citation2018)

30 Such as, for example, the NGOs Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA, https://www.cara.ngo/) and Scholars At Risk (SAR, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/).