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ABSTRACT
States combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants with policies that grant newborns of citizens (or residents) full membership of society without questions asked. This paper asks what, if anything, can justify this differential treatment of the two types of newcomers. It explores arguments for differential treatment based on the differential environmental impact, different impact on the (political) culture of the society in question and differences between the positions of the newcomers themselves. I conclude that, although some justification for differential treatment exists, the case for it is weaker than one may expect and the grounds on which it can be justified are surprising and problematic.
Acknowledgments
I am especially grateful to Anca Gheaus, Axel Gosseries, David Axelsen, Juliana Bidadanure, Nir Eyal, Serena Olsaretti and Siba Harb for elaborate comments and discussion on the arguments presented in this paper. I also want to thank Andreas Albertsen, Andrew Williams, Bruno Verbeek, Colin Hickey, Danielle Zwarthoed, David dela Croix, Dick Timmer, Emanuele Murra, Ingrid Robeyns, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Lasse Nielsen, Luara Ferracioli Paul Bou-Habib, Paula Casal, Sandrine Blanc, Sara Amighetti, Søren Flinch Midtgaard, Thomas Ferretti, Thierry Ngosso, Marco Verschoor and Maxime Lambrecht for comments and discussion. I am grateful to the two referees for this journal for their detailed and constructive remarks. This paper has been presented at workshops at Aarhus University, the University of Louvain, Leiden University, the European University Institute, the University of Minho and Pompeu Fabra as well as at the Society for Applied Philosophy conference. I thank the audiences at these occasions for their questions and feedback. The research for this paper was made possible by NWO grant VI.veni.191F.002.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 The puzzle at the core of this paper only arises if one thinks states have a duty to include migrants by stork; statists could theoretically – although I do not think many will find this an attractive option – simply deny this.
2 Most statists hold split-level views: fellow nationals owe each other full (often liberal egalitarian) justice, whereas obligations to foreigners are 1) less demanding, because our obligations to foreigners are fulfilled at a lower level (say, human rights or sufficiency) and 2) less binding, because the weight assigned to the interests of compatriots is greater, sometimes even in cases where human rights are at stake (Miller Citation2007, Citation2008a). Once non-citizens’ human rights are secured, or once a state has done its fair share in attempting to secure foreigners’ human rights, nothing in terms of distributive justice is owed to foreigners. At this point, no matter how beneficial a policy would be for foreigners, there is no obligation of justice to pursue it. Cosmopolitans have rejected statism for a range of reasons (e.g. Van Parijs Citation2007; Caney Citation2010; Valentini and Barry Citation2009; Brock Citation2009), but I will proceed on the assumption that the scope of justice is indeed restricted to the national sphere. I assume, then, that 1) principles of justice apply amongst citizens and; 2) after a state has met its minimalist obligations to foreigners, their interests no longer carry any weight from the point of view of justice.
3 Indirect justifications do not appeal to special duties to compatriots, but for example to the consequences (for all) of having open borders. See e.g. Meijers Citation2017.
4 The exact laws concerning which children are entitled to citizenship vary. Some countries, like the US, grant citizenship based on lineage as well as on the physical location of the parents (Ius Soli). Other states grant citizenship to children born when one of the parents holds citizenship of the state in question (Ius Sanguinis).
5 E.g. because the inequality between citizens and non-citizen residents is unjust (Walzer Citation1983, 58–60; Miller Citation2008a).
6 Other possible arguments for differential treatment could be grounded in the freedom of association view, see Brezger and Cassee (Citation2016) and Bou-Habib (Citation2019).
7 Or at least not bad in a way that makes it wrong not to create them. Narveson famously, expresses the sentiment that it is not bad clearly: ‘we are in favor of making people happy, but are neutral about making happy people’ (Citation1976, 73).
8 As a referee points out, by influencing the determinants of fertility one does not really exclude anyone in a straightforward way from citizenship. In the migration case the equivalent would be to address the underlying causes of migration (e.g. tackle poverty). This limits the number of migrants without exclusion. My point here is that migration and procreation are not that dissimilar in that regard: both preventing newborns from coming into existence and migrants from entering our territory may come at low costs (by tackling determinants for example) or high costs (use of force, limiting (bodily) autonomy).
9 I thank a referee for insisting on this. See Blake Citation2013: 127.
10 This skips over finer distinctions in the debate about how procreative and parental responsibility is acquired, for example whether intent or causation does the work. See Brake and Millum (Citation2021: section 4).
11 There is a non-trivial sense – although anti-cosmopolitans deny it is a relevant sense – in which destination countries cause the dependent position of all migrants: the mere fact that states impose restrictions on migration places people in this dependent position. Wherever a prospective migrant could get access to a good (enough) life as a citizen, the border restriction is a necessary condition for someone’s dependent position (e.g. Van Parijs Citation2007, 649–650).
12 Goodin (Citation1984, 81) makes a similar move from causation to vulnerability as a ground of parental obligation to children.
13 ‘The justice claim of a refugee stems from the fact that his human rights are currently under threat’ (Miller Citation2015, 395).
14 Because he thinks permanent non-citizen residents are impermissible (2007: 225).
15 See Brighouse and Swift (Citation2014: 64) for an account of what children can claim as a matter of right (understood as fundamental interests).
16 One possible line of defence here is that children have an interest in knowing their biological parents, or even being parented by them (drawing e.g. on Velleman Citation2005).
17 Although Carnes (Citation2018: 41 n) denies the equivalence because families might have decided to be separated (and hence the right to rejoin might have been waived).
18 See also Ferracioli Citation2018: 2864.
19 Carnes seems to share this intuition; part of the appeal lies in the claim that adoption constitutes ‘an opportunity to meet, well beyond a minimum acceptable threshold, a basic need that the child has – the need for a caring and loving family’ (p. 39)
20 Moreover, her account seems over-inclusive: not only children born to citizens are entitled to citizenship. Again, this is an implication she is aware of and accepts, as she embraces far reaching restrictions on the right to exclude.
21 One differential impact may stem from higher fertility levels in migrant communities. However, in the long run the fertility levels in migrant communities converge with local fertility norms. See: Beine, Docquier and Schiff (Citation2013: sec. 2.1).
22 But see Pevnick (Citation2009) or Abizadeh (Citation2002)
23 To what extent comprehensive enrolment is permissible is a point of discussion (e.g. Clayton Citation2006: ch. 3; 2012; Brighouse and Swift Citation2014) but each liberal view accepts considerable constraints.
24 One could think of secularization, attitudes to same-sex marriage, the sexual revolution, or more recently the large difference in support in the UK for Brexit between age groups.
25 Miller agrees: ‘immigration, in other words, is likely to change a society’s public culture rather than destroy it’ Miller (Citation2005a, 200).
26 Sandelind (Citation2015: 497) writes ‘[i]t is far from clear that adding people via immigration would have a larger impact than both internal migration and the birth of new generations.’
27 E.g. Shachar (Citation2009: 136):
28 There are reasons to doubt P2. There is evidence that migration to richer countries leads to lower fertility globally. First, migrants’ fertility levels converge with the local fertility levels (in many rich destination countries lower than in most source countries). Second, migration to low-fertility countries impacts fertility levels in source countries: fertility norms travel. See Beine, Docquier, and Schiff (Citation2013).
29 There are three areas of peripheral global justice: commutative, cooperative and reparative justice (Van Parijs Citation2007, 639). Anti-cosmopolitans – such as Miller (Citation2008b), – generally agree that there are rules of cooperation (e.g. combating climate change) and a duty to pay for damage done (e.g. historic injustice).