Understanding protest “violence” in Hong Kong from the youth perspective

Abstract

Since the 2000s, political youths in Hong Kong have engaged in physical confrontations with the local police during protests, resulting in these youths being seen as “violent” by the mainstream media and by the SAR government. But by bringing the youth views and interpretations of protest conflicts to the forefront, this article shows that different understandings of “violence” currently exist in the city. It also argues that dominant frameworks used to make sense of these protest clashes are based on antiquated Chinese cultural categories of 暴力 baoli (mindless force) and 武力 wuli (authoritative force), respectively used to describe the actions of youth protesters and the police, and cannot adequately encapsulate the complex motivations and manifestations of the conflicts observed in contemporary Hong Kong. The discussion then reviews how different groups have responded to protest violence, with emphasis on the instrumental uses of violence by the SAR government and by political youths.

Keywords:

• protest conflict
• violence
• youth activism
• police tactics
• Hong Kong politics

Notes

1. Fieldwork was conducted from December 2010 until July 2012. Informants were “political youths,” young people from 20 to 35 years of age who are interested in the political developments of the city and have participated in protest actions. Informants were university students or were employed as teachers, NGO personnel, freelancers, musicians, and office workers. Although all youths espoused pro-democracy leanings, some adopted a moderate approach, believing that compromise with the SAR government is necessary, whereas others favored a “radical” approach, demanding that political reforms be enacted immediately, often veering towards anarchist ideologies. Informants are given pseudonyms in this article.

2. Violence is conventionally defined as the deliberate act of inflicting harm. However, scholars are aware that this definition excludes instances of harm caused by accidents, or actions that induced harm despite its not being a desired consequence. The issue of intentionality is complicated when accounting for the organizational use of violence through military or criminal institutions.

3. Hong Kong youth activists opposed the XRL because the railway was deemed too expensive and unnecessary, would destroy large swathes of rural land, and would forcibly displace residents of Choi Yuen village. Youths were also dissatisfied with the lack of transparency from the government surrounding the decision-making processes concerning the XRL.

4. Lam is referring to the 1966 incident that began as a demonstration against a proposed ferry fare hike. It escalated into a riot after the organizer of the protest, So Sau Chung, was arrested by the British colonial police and sentenced to jail. The riots led to one fatality, more than a thousand arrests with over a hundred convictions, several dozen injuries, and millions of dollars’ worth of damages to the city.

5. Apple Daily is known for its pro-democracy stance in its coverage of Hong Kong politics, portraying pro-democracy protests and protesters in a sympathetic light. Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post position themselves in the middle of the political divide, though recent changes in their ownership and editorship have raised concerns that they will begin favoring the pro-establishment camp. Sing Tao Daily, Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao, and Oriental Daily are seen as pro-establishment newspapers.

6. Benig was acquitted of these charges in November 2010 due to video evidence disproving Yuen’s allegations of assault. No legal action was taken against Yuen for making false accusations, and the police did not investigate Benig’s claims that excessive force was used against him during his arrest in March 2010 (Sfchoi8964 2010).

7. Under the current scope of the Public Order Ordinance, public gatherings (including but not limited to demonstrations) involving more than 30 people must be approved in advance by the police.

8. The Basic Law document makes no reference to the term “violence” in the English version (http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf), or to wuli or baoli in the Chinese version (http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/tc/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_tc.pdf).