The EU: A Successful Military Conflict Manager?

Abstract

Since the European Union (EU) launched its first military conflict management operation in 2003, its military endeavors in conflict management have rapidly developed. By 2010, the EU had engaged militarily to contribute to the management of conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic. This article evaluates these five operations and assesses the EU's success in military conflict management to date.

Keywords:

• Common Security and Defence Policy
• European Union
• Military Conflict Management

Notes

1. The policy was officially named the European Security and Defence Policy until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. When this treaty entered into force, the policy was officially renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy. For further information about the Lisbon Treaty reforms, see Richard G. Whitman, Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: Significant or Cosmetic Reforms? Global Europe Papers, No. 1, 2008, http://iscrat.org/esml/research/security/pdf/whitman.pdf (accessed August 3, 2010).

2. For a discussion of the way in which scholars define “success” in military conflict management operations, see Annemarie Peen Rodt, “‘Success’ in EU Military Conflict Management Operations: What is it?” CFSP Forum 8, no. 1 (2009): 1–6.

3. Ibid.

4. Once a conflict has turned violent, the violence may develop in a variety of different ways. If a conflict becomes more violent, there are four different processes by which this can take place, namely, through continuation, diffusion, escalation, and intensification of violence. Continuation is when the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time. Diffusion occurs when violent conflict in one geographic area generates violence in another area. Escalation is when new actors become involved in an existing conflict. Intensification is when the violence increases either in the number or nature of violent incidents. The purpose of conflict management is to prevent these four processes. For further discussions of how conflicts become violent, see Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 293–309; Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Annemarie Peen Rodt, “Diffusion of Conflict,” in Encyclopedia Princetoniensis: The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), http://www.princeton.edu/~lisd/projects/encyclopedia/encyclopedia.html (accessed April 25, 2011).

5. Rodt, “Diffusion of Conflict.”

6. Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999 (London: Penguin, 2001); International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Macedonia,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/macedonia.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011).

7. Catriona Mace, “Operation Concordia: Developing a ‘European’ Approach to Crisis Management?” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (2004): 474–490.

8. Glenny, Balkans.

9. Mace, “Operation Concordia.”

10. EU High Representative Solana and NATO Secretary General Robertson concluded the Berlin Plus arrangements for strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management in March 2003. These arrangements allow the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in such operations. For more information about the agreements, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006).

11. Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 29/01/2003 on the European Union military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Official Journal of the European Union; Council of the European Union, “ESDP Operations,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN (accessed June 1, 2009).

12. Pierre Augustin, “Operation Concordia/Altair: Lessons Learnt,” http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine06/version_us/retex/art_22.pdf (accessed June 1, 2009); International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Macedonia,” 48–49.

13. Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 231–241.

14. Interview with the author, July 17, 2009.

15. Annalisa Monaco, “Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU Take Stock,” NATO Notes 5, no. 8 (2003); Mace, “Operation Concordia.”\

16. Gabriele Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO: Co-operation, Rivalry or Muddling-through?,” in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 143–158; James Dobbins et al., Europe's Role in Nation-building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Arlington: RAND, 2008); Mace, “Operation Concordia.”

17. Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO.”

18. Mace, “Operation Concordia”; David J. Ludlow, “Preventative Peacemaking in Macedonia: An Assessment of UN Good Offices Diplomacy,” Brigham Young Law Review, 2003, http://www.law2.byu.edu/lawreview/archives/2003/2/LUD.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011); George Robertson, “Speech of NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson” (EU Welcoming Ceremony, Skopje, Macedonia, March 31, 2003), http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Speech%20of%20NATO%20SG%20Robertson.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

19. Mace, “Operation Concordia.”

20. Interview with the author, July 17, 2009.

21. International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International Crisis Group Europe Report, No. 160, Brussels, January 17, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/160-eu-crisis-response-capability-revisited.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011); Howorth, Security and Defence Policy.

22. Gérard Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Denis M. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (2009): 215–230.

23. On May 28, 2010, the Security Council extended the MONUC mandate until June 30, 2010 and decided that from July 1, 2010 the mission would become the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). For more information, see United Nations, “MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” http://monusco.unmissions.org/ (accessed November 24, 2010).

24. International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Democratic Republic of Congo,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011); Prunier, Africa's World War; Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

25. Kees Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Faster and More United? The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity, ed. Andrea Ricci and Eero Kytoemaa (Brussels: European Communities Commission Directorate General for External Relations, 2007), 151–154.

26. Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

27. Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5/6/2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Official Journal of the European Union; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–241.

28. Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (2004): 508–525; Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5/6/2003.

29. Catherine Gegout, “Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 3 (2005): 427–443; International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, 46–49; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis.”

30. International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, 46–49; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–41; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis.”

31. Bastian Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper, No. 397 (London: Routledge, 2008); Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo”; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis.”

32. Tom Hadden, ed., A Responsibility to Assist: Human Rights Policy and Practice in European Union Crisis Management Operations (Oxford: Hart, 2009), 1–21; Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo”; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis.”

33. Deutsche Welle, “EU Soldiers Accused of Torturing Civilians in Congo,” March 29, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3223692,00.html (accessed April 25, 2011); SVT, “Prisoner Tortured at a Swedish Military Base in Congo,” 2008, http://svt.se/2.90352/1.1101022/prisoner_tortured_at_a_swedish_military_base_in_the_congo (accessed April 25, 2011)

34. Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

35. Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management.

36. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–241; Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 174–98; Tull, “Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

37. Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Welle, “EU Soldiers Accused of Torturing Civilians in Congo”; SVT, “Prisoner Tortured at a Swedish Military Base in Congo.”

41. Welle, “EU Soldiers Accused of Torturing Civilians in Congo”; SVT, “Prisoner Tortured at a Swedish Military Base in Congo.”

42. Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo, “Human Losses in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995: Research Findings,” http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/research_results.htm (accessed April 4, 2009).

43. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Glenny, Balkans; Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1996).

44. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton.

45. NATO, “SFOR,” http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm (accessed April 25, 2011).

46. Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO”; International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, 49–51.

47. Council of the European Union, “EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea),” http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=745&lang=en (accessed January 26, 2009); Howorth, Security and Defence Policy; Javier Solana, “Remarks on the Occasion of the Informal Meeting of EU Defence Ministers,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/106634.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

48. Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12/07/2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Journal of the European Union; Council of the European Union, “EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)”; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy.

49. International Crisis Group, EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, 49–51.

50. Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO.”

51. Peace Implementation Council, “Statement by the Ambassadors of the Peace Implementation Council's Steering Board: Ambassador Valentin Inzko Appointed as the Next High Representative,” March 13, 2009, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=43178 (accessed April 25, 2011); Peace Implementation Council, “Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council,” March 26, 2009, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=43264 (accessed April 25, 2011); Peace Implementation Council, “Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council,” June 30, 2009, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=43665 (accessed April 25, 2011).

52. International Crisis Group, EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements, International Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 31, Brussels, 2004, http://www.esdp-course.ethz.ch/content/pubkms/detail.cfm?lng=en&id=27854 (accessed April 25, 2011).

53. Ian Black, “Ashdown Backs Creation of EU Bosnia Force,” The Guardian, October 8, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/08/eu.warcrimes (accessed April 25, 2011); Nick Harton, “EU Troops Prepare for Bosnia Swap,” BBC News, October 23, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3944191.stm (accessed April 25, 2011); International Crisis Group, EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements.

54. An estimated 8,000 men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serb troops in Srebrenica in July 1995. For more information see Glenny, Balkans, 650.

55. International Crisis Group, EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements; International Crisis Group,“Conflict History: Kosovo,” http://www. crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011).

56. Fraser Cameron, “The European Union's Role in the Balkans,” in War and Change in the Balkans, ed. Brad K. Blitz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 99–109; Office of the High Representative, “Office of the High Representative and European Union Special Representative,” http://www.ohr.int/ (accessed January 26, 2009).

57. Kurt Bassuener and Enver Ferhatovic, “The ESDP in Action: The View from the Consumer Side,” in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 173–188.

58. Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27/04/2006 on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the election process, Official Journal of the European Union; Council of the European Union, “Press Statement on EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC During the Election Process in DR Congo: Council Adopts Joint Action, Appoints Operation and Force Commanders,” April 27, 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/89347.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

59. Council of the European Union, “Press Statement on EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC During the Election Process in DR Congo.”

60. Catherine Gegout, “The EU and Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006: Unfinished Business,” CFSP Forum 4, no. 6 (2007): 5–9; Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–241.

61. Gegout, “EU and Security,” 5–9; Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management.

62. Gegout, “EU and Security,” 5–9; Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management.

63. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–241.

64. Gegout, “EU and Security,” 5–9; Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy, 231–241.

65. Hadden, Responsibility to Assist; Gorm Rye Olsen, “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2. (2009): 245–260.

66. Dobbins et al., Europe's Role in Nation-building.

67. UNICEF, Child Alert: Democratic Republic of Congo, July 24, 2006, http://www.unicef.org/childalert/drc/content/Child_Alert_DRC_en.pdf (accessed June 1, 2009).

68. Gegout, “EU and Security,” 5–9.

69. Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich, “In Congo, a Cosmetic EU Operation,” International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2006, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/june-2006/in-congo-a-cosmetic-eu-operation/ (accessed May 26, 2009).

70. Patrick Berg, The Dynamics of Conflict in the Tri-border Region of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008).

71. Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15/10/2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, Official Journal of the European Union; Council of the European Union, “EUFOR Chad/CAR,” http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1366&lang=en&mode=g (accessed January 26, 2009).

72. Council of the European Union, “EUFOR Chad/CAR”; Hadden, Responsibility to Assist.

73. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR,” European Security Review 41 (2008), http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_231_esr42-euforchad.pdf (accessed March 16, 2009).

74. Council of the European Union, “EUFOR Chad/CAR”; Pat Nash, “EUFOR Chad/CAR Press Conference,” http://www.military.ie/overseas/ops/africa/chad/index.htm (accessed April 8, 2009).

75. Ehrhart, “Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR”; Oxfam International, Mission Incomplete: Why Civilians Remain at Risk in Eastern Chad, Oxfam Briefing Paper, September 2008, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/mission-incomplete-why-civilians-remain-at-risk-in-eastern-chad/?searchterm=none (accessed April 25, 2011); Valentina Pop, “EU Mission in Chad Ends Amid Tensions,” EU Observer, March 12, 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/27766?print=1 (accessed April 25, 2011)

76. Alexander Mattelaer, The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, IES working paper, No. 5, 2008, http://www.ies.be/files/repo/IES%20working%20paper%205_Alexander%20Mattelaer.pdf (accessed June 1, 2009); Olsen, “EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa,” 245–260.

77. BBC, “Sudan Troops Clash with EU Force,” March 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7276288.stm (accessed July 23, 2009); Elizabeth Pineau, “Sarkozy Condemns Sudan over French EU Soldier Death,” Reuters, March 7, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L07840405.htm (accessed July 24, 2009).

78. Pascal Fletcher, “Interview: Chad Rebel Attack Aimed to Spoil EU Mission,” Reuters, February 4, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/02/04/chad-rebels-eufor-idUKL045893720080204 (accessed April 25, 2011).

79. Oxfam International, Mission Incomplete.

80. Ehrhart, “Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR”; International Crisis Group, “Central African Republic,” http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_231_esr42-euforchad.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011).

81. Pop, “EU Mission in Chad Ends Amid Tensions”; On January 15, 2010, Chad's government informed the UN Secretary-General that it wished MINURCAT to withdraw from Chad as of March 15, 2010. Several rounds of intensive consultations between the Government of Chad and the UN Secretariat followed and eventually resulted in an agreement providing for the extension of MINURCAT, with a revised mandate, until the end of 2010. After that, military conflict management in the country would be the sole responsibility of the Chadian government. For more information about the changes in MINURCAT's mandate, see United Nations, “MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/index.shtml (accessed November 4, 2010).

82. International Crisis Group, Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, International Crisis Group Africa Report, No. 144, Brussels, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad/144-chad-a-new-conflict-resolution-framework.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011); International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Chad,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad.aspx (accessed April 25, 2011).

83. Mattelaer, Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations; Oxfam International, Mission Incomplete.

84. Ehrhart, “Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR.”

85. Mattelaer, Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations; Oxfam International, Mission Incomplete.

86. Ehrhart, “Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR.”

87. EUFOR Chad/CAR, “EUFOR Suffers its First Fatality,” March 10, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080310EUFORsuffersfirstfatality.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011); EUFOR Chad/CAR, “EUFOR Action under Fire Protect IDPs Refugees,” June 14, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/RezzouGozBeida.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011); EUFOR Chad/CAR, “EUFOR Challenge and Disperse Ambushers,” August 19, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Press_Release_19_august_2008.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011); Pineau, “Sarkozy Condemns Sudan over French EU Soldier Death.”