Détente Improbable—Cold War Unlikely: Russian–American Relations in the Post-Soviet Era

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Notes

1. 1. Joseph L. Nogee and John Spanier, Peace Impossible – War Unlikely: The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1988).

2. 2. Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), x–xi.

3. 3. Ibid., xi–xii.

4. 4. Ibid., xiv.

5. 5. Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni; The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 5th ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014).

6. 6. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 13–17.

7. 7. Ibid., 20.

8. 8. Ibid., 42.

9. 9. Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni; Foreign Policy of Russia, especially 231–254 and 365–366.

10. 10. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 41–45.

11. 11. Ibid., 50–54.

12. 12. Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni; Foreign Policy of Russia, 366.

13. 13. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 62–66. See also Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni; Foreign Policy of Russia, 369–372.

14. 14. Coit D. Blacker, “The Kremlin and Détente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations,” in Managing U.S.–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 119–137.

15. 15. For example, see Stent, Limits of Partnership, 72–73; and Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, Foreign Policy of Russia, 369–372.

16. 16. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 154.

17. 17. Ibid., 97–123. For a discussion of the fear of ideological subversion and how it affects states’ actions, see Mark L. Haas, The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 12–17.

18. 18. Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, Foreign Policy of Russia, 351.

19. 19. Ibid, 392.

20. 20. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 245–246.

21. 21. Ibid., 14.

22. 22. Ibid., 218, 236.

23. 23. Ibid., 226–227.

24. 24. Ibid., 222–225.

25. 25. Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, Foreign Policy of Russia, 415.

26. 26. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 270–271.

27. 27. Ibid., 260.

28. 28. Ibid., 140.

29. 29. Ibid., 102, 235.

30. 30. Ibid., 397.

31. 31. George W. Breslauer, “Why Détente Failed: An Interpretation,” in Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry, 319–340.

32. 32. Ibid., 334.

33. 33. Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (New York: Henry Holt, 2010).

34. 34. Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, Foreign Policy of Russia, 235–237; and Stent, Limits of Partnership, 159–160.

35. 35. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 141–144.

36. 36. Many examples of this in their many aspects are covered in ibid.

37. 37. John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 26–31 and 41–47.

38. 38. Breslauer, “Why Détente Failed,” 323–324.

39. 39. Stent, Limits of Partnership, 247.

40. 40. Ibid., 159–163.

41. 41. Ibid., 57.