Joy and the Nature of Emotion

ABSTRACT

I discuss two fundamental issues that come up in Matthew Johnson’s literature review: the nature of emotion and the delineation or specification of the concept of joy. Emotions, I claim, are a kind of non-sensory perception, namely, concern-based construals. I argue that affect should not be thought of as fundamental to emotion as such (some emotions are not felt), and should not be regarded as non-cognitive (we learn truths from our feelings). In the second part of my response, I sketch my account of joy as the fundamental structure of positive emotions: that something I am concerned for (positively desire, for example) is, will, or might be actual. Joy is fundamental emotional satisfaction. (Its ‘negative’ counterpart is emotional distress.)

KEYWORD:

• Emotion
• affect
• concern
• construal
• joy
• types of joy

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Matthew Johnson for a conversation about the issues in his review article and in this comment on it, and to a reviewer for JPP for three helpful objections to the submitted draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.