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ABSTRACT
Dominant theories of organised crime assume that criminal organisations which operate in extremely violent markets do so because they consider it financially cost-effective. This article contends that by using increasingly violent actions intended to deter competitors and government forces, criminal organisations sometimes eliminate their exit option, making the penalties for withdrawal to a less violent strategy significantly worse than those of continued violence. Based on a systematic examination of footage of public statements by 18 former associates of two Mexican organised crime groups (OCGs), La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and its offshoot Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), this article argues that through gradual increases in their use of violence, these groups reached a ‘point of no return’. After reaching this point, desisting from further violence escalation became more hazardous than pursuing a violent path, even when the latter did not align with the organisations’ business interests.
Notes
1. This article defines OCGs as ‘enterprises involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities’. See, Abadinsky, Organized Crime. 6.
2. Grayson, Mexico.
3. Reuter, “Systemic Violence in Drug Markets.”
4. Valdes, Historia del Narcotráfico en México.
5. Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld. 78.
6. See note 4.
7. Reuter, Disorganized Crime.
8. Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing.”
9. Kenney, From Pablo to Osama.
10. See, e.g. Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum”; Turbiville, “Firefights”; Ríos, “Why Did Mexico Become so Violent?”; Kan, Cartels at War.
11. See, e.g. Friman, “Drug Markets.”; Shirk et al. “The Beheading.”; Ioan Grillo, El Narco; Kan, Cartels at War; Shirk, Wallman, and Lessing, “Logics of Violence.”
12. Friman, “Drug Markets.”
13. Espinosa and Rubin, “Did the Military.”
14. Calderón et al. “The Beheading.”
15. Ibid.
16. Ríos, “Why Did Mexico Become so Violent?”
17. See, e.g. Reuter, “Systemic Violence in Drug Markets”; Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia.
18. Tarver, “What Is the Difference between Horizontal Integration.”
19. A unique form of vertical integration occurs when OCGs take over the organisation in charge of protecting their operations from both competitors and the police. Once it can supply its own protection, an OCG may use that ability to offer protection services to other OCGs, to demand protection fees from legal entrepreneurs and to attempt taking over other organisations specialised in supplying protection services. Since the capacity to offer protection often requires the ability to employ physical force, groups with such capacity may also bolster their resources though illegal activities that rely on such ability, such as robberies, kidnappings or assassinations.
20. Abadinsky, Organized Crime.
21. Schedler, “Mexico’s Civil War Democracy.”
22. Kalyvas, Shirk, and Wallman, “How Civil Wars.”
23. Caesar, Caesar’s Gallic War.
24. Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld, 9.
25. Ibid.
26. Mexico has a federal system. The federal government has its own police service. Each state and some municipalities also have their own police. The national capital, commonly called Mexico City in English, until recently was known as the ‘Federal District’. The state that surrounds Mexico City is also known as Mexico, or officially the ‘State of Mexico’.
27. A detailed list of the videos is provided in the Appendix. All videos are cited according to the Chicago Manual of style guidelines for YouTube videos, citing the poster’s username and the year of publication.
28. Ahmed and Schmitt, “Mexican Military Runs Up Body Count in Drug War.”
29. Malkin and Villegas, “Enemies of Mexican Drug Gangs.”
30. Ioan Grillo, El Narco; Damien Cave and Karla Zabludovsky, “Navy Officer’s”; Kalyvas, Shirk, and Wallman, “How Civil Wars.”
31. Gabriela Calderón et al. “The Beheading.”
32. Kan, Cartels at War.
33. Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia.
34. TED, Los Genios Mortales.
35. Finnegan, “Silver or Lead.”
36. Kan, Cartels at War. 44.
37. Milenionoticiastv, “Captura de El Gordo.”
38. See note 36.
39. Uppsala University, “Uppsala Conflict Data Program.”
40. PGJEMSSC, Presenta PGJEM a ‘El Pariente’.
41. Grillo, El Narco, 2012. 35.
42. Narco Blog, Interrogatorio a La Culebra.
43. miltondemon, “Sicarios La Familia.”
44. Padgett, “Secretos de La Familia.”
45. Alvarado, “La Tuta.”
46. Of course, even during the height of its power LFM was not the only OCG operating in Michoacán, so that government agents killed in the region during this period were not necessarily LFM victims. However, as the most violent OCG in the region at that time and the main target of anti-OCG government efforts, LFM was responsible for a significant proportion of those killings.
47. Sandoval, “Michoacán.”
48. Hernandez, “Combate Al Narco.”
49. Castillo and Martinez, “Miembros de La Familia.”
50. Castillo, “Matan a 10 policías.”
51. REFORMA, Narra ‘El Molca’.
52. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts.
53. Le Clercq and Rodriguez, Global Impunity Index. Also, aware of the corruptibility of both local and federal officials, LFM may have believed it would ultimately be possible to co-opt or intimidate enough government agents to maintain an advantageous business environment.
54. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Project Delirium.”
55. Lacey, “Grenade Attack in Mexico.”
56. ejeCentraltv, Las Lágrimas.
57. ejeCentraltv, Con La Presencia.
58. El Universal TV, La Tuta Está Asustado.
59. García and Flores, “Emboscadas En Autopista.”
60. Hernandez and Guazo, “Semar.”
61. Otero and Muedano, “Enfrentamiento.”
62. Demos Desarrollo de Medios, “La Tuta Es Un Traidor.”
63. Cited in Gutiérrez, “Criminal Rebels?” 274.
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Valentin Pereda
Valentin Pereda is a doctoral candidate in the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto. Prior to that, I received a Master's degree in International Security from the University of Warwick in 2010, and an undergraduate degree in Political Science from CIDE, Mexico, in 2008.