The Third Ghallughara: On the Sikh Dilemma Since 1984

Abstract

This article examines the enduring impact of 1984 tragedy upon the Sikh community. After outlining the initial reaction to the Government of India's army action in the Golden Temple Amritsar, it looks at some of the ways common Sikhs made sense of the loss of the Sikh heritage and the hurt of desecration of their holiest shrine. While the Indian stately discourse enforced by the media tried to justify its ghastly action, this was challenged, by a section of the Sikh elite. Even after three decades the reverberations of the tragedy seem unending, reminding Sikhs individually as well as collectively about the precarious public space available for community's cultural, linguistic, and political expressions. The article points towards the persistent dilemma of the Sikh elite as it makes sense of various compulsions, choices, and strategies in the postcolonial Indian polity.

Notes

1 This loss is listed and elaborated by Kaur (1983, 1991). Also see Singh (2003).

2 The White Paper (1984, 169–170) lists casualties, dividing them into civilians and army personnel.

Table

3 See Pritam Singh's article in Singh (1985).

4 On anti-Sikh genocide in Delhi and other places see Who are the guilty;, Mitta and Phoolka (2007), Singh (2009). On Operation Black Thunder see S.J. Singh (2002).

5 Government of India, The White Paper (1984).

6 Text of broadcast of 2 June 1984 by Mrs Indira Gandhi appears in the White Paper on pages 105–109.

7 The army operation became subject of numerous books. See Tully (1985), Brar (1993), Kaur (1990). Early studies are reviewed in Tatla and Talbot (1995) and others that have appeared since include Singh (2001), Grewal (2006), S.J. Singh (2002), Singh (2011), Goraya (2013). For documents leading to the Akali Dal demands and conflict with the federal government, see, Singh (1989–91, 3 vols).

8 None has gathered evidence of these risings, but several old men verified such defiant gatherings in many villages of Ludhiana district to this author.

9 Commenting upon Sikh soldiers' desertion, General Sunderji said, ‘it was basically command failure coupled with this was the enormous emotional psychological pressure which our Sikh troops [mostly raw recruits] were under at that point of time, something which no other class of troops had been through’ … in Bhullar (1987, 81). On the other hand, A.S. Vaidya, chief of the army staff in his broadcast to the nation on 1 July 1984 warned of severe punishment for all deserters.

10 India Today, April 15, 1988.

11 Lloyd (2000, 212–228). As ‘Gramsci points out a major aspect of hegemony is control over ‘common sense’, that is, the body of doxa that regulates what passes for sense in any public sphere. See Gramsci (1971, 323–343).

12 The Sikh community's turbulent history of 500 years had generated abundant vocabulary of sufferings from the Mughal and then of Afghan invaders. Taking a cue from its heritage, common Sikhs immediately termed the 1984 tragedy as a Ghallughara – this is nearest term for the English word trauma indicating a traumatic experience by a whole community.

13 See Tatla (2010) and also Chopra (2011).

14 Singh (1992, 60–61). ‘I mention this specifically and other incidents that have taken place giving rise to the complaint that the Golden Temple has become a sanctuary for criminals. It is, Mr Home Minister, your word and your government's word against the word of the Akali leaders. They deny that criminals are getting sanctuary in these temples. I emphasise this point because I suspect you are trying to create a situation to provide justification for the police to enter the Golden Temple. And Singh warned, ‘It will lead to a blood-bath in the Punjab’ (58).

15 Singh, (1966, 302–305) In conclusion, he wrote:

A student of Sikh affairs may indulge in speculation on the course of the two movements to which attention has been drawn in the preceding pages viz Sikh resistance to being absorbed by Hinduism and the movement for a Sikh state. The two are more intimately related to each other than is generally realised or admitted.

In the revised edition of his book, he felt satisfied with the formation of Punjabi-speaking state in 1966 as ‘all one could ask reasonably in a secular India’.

16 Gill (1997, 138–139), wrote,

Unfortunately the very people who were responsible for the genesis of the tragedy in Punjab still have a vested interest in keeping these wounds alive; in reinforcing the image of the Sikhs as a victim community to provide a self-perpetuating justification for retaliatory violence; in recreating the ghetto mentality that will allow these leaders to consolidate their power over the Panth and the state … .

17 See for example an article by Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Arora in Kaur and Shourie (1984).

18 See for example Singh (2013), Badami (2006), Sandhu (2012), Singh 1995), Dhar (1996).

19 See Pettigrew (1992) for analysis of Dhadi tradition and commentary upon one song. Also see Pettigrew (1991, 1995) for a detailed analysis of militant groups' and some reflections upon the Sikhs by this major social anthropolist.

20 This and the subsequent quote is from Mahboob (1990).

21 Singh, Harbhajan (1990, 120).

22 See J. Singh (2006), Sekhon (1999). Also see Jodhka (1997).

23 See Kumar (1991), Mudgal (1995), Singh (2010) who pointed this out – though more studies are required.

24 Grewal (1994, 227). Also see Grewal (2005, 295–334)

25 By way of a model of new exploration of Indian democracy, see, Singh (2000). Also see contributions by Axel (2001), Mahmood (1996), Juergensmeyer (1988, 1993), Mehta (2010, 2013), Purewal (2000), Razavy (2006), Tatla (2004), Kalra and Nijhawan (2007), Fenech (2000), Gayer (2012), Deol (2000).

26 This is gratefully cited from an unpublished paper, ‘Was there ever a Khalistan movement?’ given at ‘What's happening to Sikh ethno-nationalism?’ workshop at the University of Birmingham, organized by Gurharpal Singh in 2009.

27 In a special issue of Pacific Affairs Oberoi, Jeffrey, Petigrew, major published articles on the tragedy.

28 In North America various Sikh Studies chair holders are signalling the arrival of this new elite, with appropriate studies published or promised in the near future. See for example new publications by Pashaura Singh (Riverside), Gurinder S. Mann (Santa Barbara), Anne Murphy (UBC), Arvind-Pal S. Mandair (Michigan), Balbinder S. Bhogal (Hofstra) and Nirvikar Singh (Santa Cruz). While Journal of Punjab Studies was shifted to University of California: Santa Barbara a new journal Sikh Formations has explored issues more pertinent to Sikhs and Sikh Studies.

29 See Kaur (2002), Amnesty International (1991), Human Rights Watch (1994), Jaijee (1999), Ribeiro (1998) and Kumar's publications.

30 Kumar (2008, 76) cited the concept of genocide as formulated by Lemkin (1947) as:

In general genocide does not necessarily mean direct destruction of a people (with the exception of mass murder of all members of a people) but rather systematic and coordinated policies aiming at the destruction of the indispensable vital foundation of ethnic groups in order to annihilate these groups in themselves. Objectives in such a scheme could be the smashing of political and social institutions, of culture, language, national sentiment, of a people's religion or economic life, the destruction of personal security, freedom, health and dignity and finally the killing of members in such a group. Genocide is directed to an ethnic group as such. And action related to it is not directed to persons because of their individual characteristics, but rather their belonging to a specific ethnic group.

31 See Sekhon (1999) who examined social and economic background of some young men who joined militants.

32 Hetchter (1987, 170)

33 Its Minorities Sub-Committee rejected separate electorates by 26 votes to 3. Hukam Singh and four Muslims demanded that the Council of States and the House of People should be elected by proportional representation. For the House of People this was rejected. See Robinson (1966).

34 Jalal (1995)

35 Enloe (1973, 143)

36 O'Leary and Paul (1990) provide a further discussion of hegemonic and other measures of control over minorities.

37 Simeon (1994). For the definition of such a state in Southeast Asia, see Brown (1994), Singh (2000).

38 Also see Das (1995), and Nandy (1990).

39 See a discussion of different states in the world. Cliffe and Luckham (1999), Green and Ward (2004), Kirby (1997).

40 From 1983 onwards Punjab was placed under direct rule from Delhi, an Akali government led by Surjit Singh Barnala was dismissed after a year, then in 1992, a Congress government led by Beant Singh was constituted with elections boycotted by Akali Dal.

41 The Spokesman, August 17, 1981.

42 Singh 1960.

43 The Spokesman, August 29, 1951. Also see Sarhadi (1970), Nayar (1966, 1968)

44 Raj karega Khalsa (Khalsa shall rule) has been part of Sikh vocabulary since the eighteenth century. In contemporary Punjabi, quam is commonly used for ‘nation’ or ‘community’, along with des for ‘the country’. While des may convey an idea of Punjab or refer to India, the word quam always referred to the Sikh community. See McLeod (1978)

45 Shiromani Akali Dal, Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1978), 1.

46 The ‘martial races’ idea was scrapped in 1949. In 1974, the Sikh army ratio was set at 2.5 percent, still above their portion of the population of just 2 percent. See Cohen (1988).

47 Joshi (1984), Chandan (n.d.), Singh and Purewal (2013). Sant Bhindranwale's rise and prominence in Akali politics remains an enigma. Called a saint by many, he was subsequently painted as a demonic figure by Indian official pronouncements. His presence in the Golden Temple was used as an excuse for army action. From 1982 onwards, he preached, through fiery language, religious orthodoxy, and blamed the Akali leaders for compromises. Official versions have branded him a terrorist who sent hit squads from the Golden Temple to murder his opponents. Yet while he was alive he was not charged with the heinous crimes that were attributed to him posthumously. For the Sikh youth who took up arms, he became a martyr.

48 Leaders of the Babbar Khalsa, the Khalistan Commando Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force, the Bhindranwale Tiger Force and several other groups were killed. Jaijee (1999), quoting from the ‘Punjab Legislative Assembly Proceedings: Reply by Chief Minister to a Starred Question’, lists a total of 41,684 rewards given to policemen between January 1991 and December 1992 for killing Sikh militants.

49 See studies by Smith (1981a, 1981b, 1983, 1986).

50 For few exceptions see: Ram (2002), Kaura (1999), Grewal (2004), Kaur (2008).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Darshan Singh Tatla

Darshan Singh Tatla. Address: Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala, Punjab, India. [Email: [email protected]]