The Sikh ‘Political Prisoner’ Issue and Hunger Strikes

Abstract

This article contributes to answering the question: What has happened to Sikh ethnonationalism? I argue that the decline of this phenomenon can best be explained by examining the changing interests, incentive structures, and patterns of dominance and legitimacy of various Sikh political actors in Punjab – that is, the institutional structures on which mass community mobilization occurs. More specifically, I argue that the sustained mass mobilization of Sikhs is not possible without the active encouragement of the components of the institutionalized ‘Sikh political system’ including the dominant Akali Dal, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, and Akal Takht. All of these are currently under the leadership of Parkash Singh Badal, and remain committed to moderation and non-confrontation with the central state. This conceptual argument is illustrated through detailed empirical analysis of the trajectory and eventual failure of the 2013 and 2014–2015 hunger strikes by Gurbaksh Singh Khalsa for the release of Sikh ‘political prisoners’ in India.

Notes

1 In this article, I use the term ‘ethnonationalism' as being the mass mobilization on the basis of a politicized sense of ethnic identity for political goals. Some sense of ‘ethnonationalism', by definition, always exists within any ethnic community but, without the added concept of ‘mass mobilization', one cannot distinguish between differing degrees or intensities of ethnonationalism within a community over various periods of time.

2 Causation in the social sciences is complex and ‘conjectural'. Thus, it is difficult to concisely isolate one particular causal factor and fully eliminate the impact of other potential ones. For a discussion, see Ragin (1987).

3 It should be duly noted that the term ‘Sikh political system' was coined by Wallace (1981).

4 For a sophisticated discussion of the intricacies of ‘social movement theory', see Morris and Mueller (1992).

5 The Indian political system has definitely become more decentralized since the emergence of coalition government in the center, particularly starting in the mid- to late 1990s to the present. It is unclear how the formation of a BJP-majority central government in 2014 under Narendra Modi will affect this nearly two-decade trend of decentralization.

6 Gurharpal Singh offers a more sophisticated version of the otherwise simplistic ‘managed disorder' thesis in his work, in which he analyzes the Indian state's changing approaches to the Sikh separatist movement from its inception to demise. He specifically points to differing degrees of ‘control' exercised by the central government ranging from ‘hegemonic control' at the inception of the insurgency, to ‘violent control' during the early 1990s, and back to ‘hegemonic control' thereafter. For details, refer to Singh (1995a).

7 For a detailed historical account of the creation of the SGPG and Akali Dal during the 1920s, see Kapur (1988).

8 This is the figure from its 2012–2013 budget, and comes from Singh (2014a, 337). One crore is equal to 10 million.

9 Bhindranwale emerged onto center stage in Sikh politics due to very specific historical and political circumstances. These include factionalism within the traditional Akali leadership, potential sponsorship by elements within the Congress Party to further divide the Akalis, sectarian violence within the Sikh community, and police repression against his followers. For a detailed political history of the entire Sikh ethnonationalist movement from 1978 to 1997, see Chima (2010).

10 The five Head Priests consist of the Jathedars of the Sri Akal Takht Sahib, Takht Sri Kesgarh Sahib, Takht Sri Patna Sahib, Takht Sri Hazur Sahib, and Takht Sri Damdama Sahib. All of these shrines, except for the Akal Takht, are associated with the life of the tenth Sikh guru, Gobind Singh. The head granthis (priests) of the Golden Temple and Akal Takht can substitute for the Jathedars of Patna Sahib and Hazur Sahib if the latter are not available due the distance of these shrines from Punjab.

11 For a history of the Akal Takht's role in both spiritual and temporal affairs of the Sikhs from its creation by Guru Hargobind to just before the 1980s militancy period, see Dilgeer (1980).

12 During the decade of militancy from 1984 to 1994, the Akali Dal had splintered into numerous factions, most of which catered to hurt Sikh sentiments by radicalizing against the central government. Yet, most of these factions avoided openly demanding a separate Sikh state or explicitly endorsing violence. In fact, the Akalis, in many ways, were caught between the armed Sikh militants who either wanted its endorsement for their struggle for a separate Sikh state to be called Khalistan or its elimination in favor of new ‘parties' supporting their movement, and the central government which was using brutal and draconian measures to crush the movement and its supporters.

13 It should be noted that there was a surge of Sikh ethnonationalism earlier in the spring of 2012 in Punjab over the Balwant Singh Rajoana execution issue. Rajoana is the prime accused and convicted in the 1995 assassination of then Chief Minister of Punjab Beant Singh who helped crush the separatist movement. Rajoana was scheduled to be executed on 31 March 2012. This prompted Sikh mobilization and large protest marches throughout Punjab. The SGPC and Akali Dal intervened in the matter. Both P. S. Badal and S. S. Badal personally met with the President of India, who temporarily stayed Rajoana's execution on 28 March 2012 under the advice of the Badals in order to prevent a possible deterioration of the ‘law-and-order' situation in Punjab. Rajoana was awarded the title of ‘Living Martyr' by the Akal Takht on 21 March 2012.

14 Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in May 1991 in Tamil Nadu by supporters of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who accused Rajiv Gandhi of intervening in the civil war in Sri Lanka in a manner unfavorable to the Tamil community in the 1980s in that country.

15 It should be noted that, on 23 July 2015 the Supreme Court of India did issue a ruling on this matter. In this decision, the Court lifted the stay on premature release it had imposed in April 2014, but indicated that state governments could not remit the life sentences of convicts who were prosecuted in national laws, including special security legislation including TADA (The Tribune, July 24, 2015).

16 The DSGMC is currently controlled by the Akali Dal (Badal), and the Sant Samaj is a conglomeration of Sikh religious figures and institutions generally, but not always, loyal to the SGPC and Akali Dal (Badal).

17 The Akali Dal (Delhi) is the primary competitor to the Akali Dal (Badal) in controlling the DSGMC, which performs the same functions in Delhi as the SGPC does in Punjab. The HSGPC is a local body set up by various Sikh leaders in Haryana to management the shrines in that state, which are currently managed by the SGPC. The HSGPC has yet to receive legal sanction, which is opposed by the SGPC.

18 This issue had been periodically brought up by Sikh activists or the media, but none of the three major components of the institutionalized ‘Sikh political system' (e.g. the SGPC, Akali Dal, and Akal Takht) had led any sustained effort on the issue's behalf, expect for sporadic comments or letters. In fact, the Akali Dal (Badal)-led government of Punjab was accused by Sikh activists of actually blocking the release of many Sikh detainees on the pretext of its constitutional duty to maintain ‘law-and-order' and ‘communal harmony'.

19 These include single-issue organizations like ENSAAF on police impunity and the Sikh Organization for Prisoner Welfare for prisoner release.

20 For an analysis of 2014 parliamentary election results in Punjab including the AAP's unexpectedly exceptional performance, see Kumar (2015).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jugdep S. Chima

Jugdep S. Chima. Address: Department of Political Science, Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio, USA. [Email: [email protected]]